
THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Edited by

Daya Krishna

with the assistance of

A. M. Ghose P. K. Srivastava



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Edited by
DAYA KRISHNA
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Department of Philosophy,
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EDITORS' PREFACE

The Indian Philosophical Quarterly is committed to the promotion of independent philosophical thinking in India today irrespective of doctrinal commitment or affiliation. Such an endeavour requires the creation of a national forum of philosophical investigations at advanced levels which would be committed to the achievement of structures of communication between classical perspectives, Indian and Western, and contemporary problems, thus, leading to the formation of a climate of relevance for our philosophical efforts.

As part of this objective, we have launched a series of publications in Philosophy to be called Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications. The series will include monographs, collections of articles, anthologies, original explorations and critical studies of specific problems or thinkers. We hope that such publications would provide a forum for scholars in our country to make available the results of their studies and reflections to a wider public. These publications, however, would represent only the point of view of the authors concerned and not necessarily the editorial view-point.

We are happy to release our nineth publication, 'The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya' edited by Professor Daya Krishna with the assistance of Prof. A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava. The papers included in this volume were presented at a seminar on the philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, planned and organized during January 1981, by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, Jaipur.

We are thankful to Prof. Daya Krishna and other authorities of the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University for making the manuscript of the proceedings of seminar available to us for publication under the auspices of I.P.Q. Publication Series.

This publication has been sponsored by the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, as a part of its publication activity under the University Leadership Programme sanctioned by the University Grants Commission. Dr. S. S. Deshpande, Co-ordinator of U.L.P. deserves special mention in this context. But for his valuable help the publication of the present volume would have been delayed.

S. S. Barlingay
Rajendra Prasad
Editors,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly

Pune, 1985

INTRODUCTION

There can be little doubt that hardly any attention has been paid to philosophical thinkers of India's recent past. Somehow the attention has either been focussed on contemporary philosophers in the West or on those Indian thinkers who have played a significant role in the religious or political life of this country. While Vivekanand, Tagore, Aurobindo and Gandhi have been discussed a great deal, the same cannot be said of such professional philosophers as K. C. Bhattacharyya, G. R. Malkani, S. Radhakrishnan, K. D. Bhattacharyya, N. V. Banerjee and others. The alleged spirituality of Indian philosophy and its relation to moksa seem to have continued to haunt contemporary Indian philosophers also. That perhaps may be one reason why hard-core philosophers have not attracted the attention even of those who have considered themselves philosophers in the current Western sense of the term. There can be little doubt that after K. C. Bhattacharyya, Kalidas Bhattacharyya was one of the most original thinkers amongst the professional philosophers in the country in this century.

It has been our desire for long to organize seminars about the work of living philosophers of this country so that they may respond to a critical appraisal of their work by their colleagues in the country. This is the first volume in the series[1] and has been rendered invaluable by the fact that it contains Kalidas Bhattacharyya's final formulation of his philosophical position done only about a year prior to his passing away from the world. Kalidas Bhattacharyya not only undertook the trouble to reply to most of the criticisms made but also critically responded to them by reformulating and redefining his position in their light. Except for two articles included in this volume, all the rest were

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1. The other contemporary thinkers on whose work seminars have been held are Prof. N. V. Banerjee and Prof. J. N. Mohanty.

specifically written for the seminar. The two articles, one by Prof. J. N. Mohanty and the other by myself had been published earlier. They have been included in this volume because they were circulated as background papers for the participants so that they may have some idea about Kalidas Bhattacharyya's philosophy. However, as Kalidas Bhattacharyya chose to mention them in his reply, we thought it fit to include them in the volume also. The other reason for including them is that they may be found useful as introduction to Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought by the reader who is not already familiar with it.

The responsibility for conceiving of the idea of this series of Seminars and of organising them is that of Dr. K. L. Sharma of the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. He deserves all the praise and credit along with others in the department for initiation and implementing the idea so successfully.

DAYA KRISHNA

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA
LIFE AND WORKS

Born August 17, 1911, at Barisal (modern Bangladesh); educated at Serampur (Dist. Hooghly, West Bengal) and Calcutta; M.A.,Ph.D., Premchand Raichand Scholar; awarded Hon. 'Mahamahopadhyaya' by Mithila Vidyapith, and Gold Medal by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, for being considered the best philosopher in India.

Lecturer, Vidyasagar College, Calcutta, and Council of Post-graduate Teaching, University of Calcutta, 1936–51; Associate Professor and Professor of Indian Philosophy; Post-graduate Department, Sanskrit College, Calcutta–1951–56; Professor of Philosophy and Head, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1957–71; Principal, Vidya-Bhavan (P.G. Department), Visva-Bharati, 1962–66; Vice-Chancellor, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1967-71; Emeritus Professor, Visva-Bharati, and National Fellow, Indian Council of Philosophical Research (I.C.P.R.)

Sometime Guest Professor, North Bengal University, Dist. Darjeeling, and Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta; Delivered Endowment and Extension Lectures, etc. at the Universities of Calcutta, Jadavpur, Burdwan, Visva-Bharati, Bhagalpur, Magadh, Gorakhpur, Banaras Hindu University, Banaras Sanskrit University, Lucknow, I.I.T. Kanpur, Delhi, Punjab University (Chandigarh), I.I.T. Bombay, University of Rajasthan at Jaipur, Utkal University at Bhubaneswar (also at Cuttack), Andhra University (Waltair), Sri Venkateswar University (at Tirupati), Madras, Mysore, Gujarat University; Gujarat Vidyapith and L.D. Institute of Indology at Ahmedabad, P.G. Department of Sanskrit College, Calcutta, R.K. Mission Institute of Culture (Calcutta), University of Hawaii (Honolulu), and Vienna.

Invited by Oxford University, U.K. to deliver six Radhakrishnan Memorial Lectures in 1984–85.

Sectional President, Indian Philosophical Congress, Patna; Secretary, Indian Philosophical Congress for several years; President, Indian Philosophical Congress, Varanasi; General Presi-

dent, Indian Philosophical Congress for several years; Member, different UGC Committees for several years; Permanent Member, Board of Directors, Federation Internationale Des Societes De Philosophie.

Delivered Convocation Address at the University of Magadh, North Bengal and Jadavpur.

Sometime editor, Visva-Bharati Quarterly, Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy, Visva-Bharati Patrika (in Bengali); sometime Guest Editor, Visva-Bharati Quarterly; Editor-in-Chief Visa-Bharati Journal of Philosophy; on the editorial board of, the Philosophical Quarterly, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Journal of Indian Philosophy (D. Reidel Pub. Co.), Darshan (in Bengali), Philosophia and a few other journals.

Edited the following books :

(i) *Recent Indian Philosophy* (Progressive Publishers, Calcutta).

(ii) *Philosophical Papers* (Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan).

(iii) *Rabindra Darshan* (in Bengali) (Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan).

Co-editor, K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume (Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner).

Books Published (in English)

1. *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* (Dasgupta & Co.—now out of print)
2. *Object, Content and Relation* (Dasgupta & Co.—now out of print).
3. *The Concept of Cause as in India and the West* (published in three instalments in *Our Heritage*, Vol. I, Pt. I, Jan.–June 1953; Vol. II, Pt. I, Jan.–June, 1954. *Our Heritage* is the bulletin of the P. G. Deptt. Research, Govt. Sanskrit College, Calcutta).
4. The Indian Concepts of Knowledge and Self (published in five instalments in *Our Heritage*, Vol. II, Part II, July–Dec. 1954; Vol. III, Pt. I, Jan.–June, 1955; Vol. III, Pt. II, July–Dec. 1955, Vol. IV, Pt. I, Jan.–June, 1956; Vol. IV, Part II, July–Dec. 1956).

5. *Philosophy, Language and Logic* (Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1965. Now out of Print).
6. *Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy and Other Essays* (Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1974).
7. *A Modern Understanding of Advaita Vedanta* (L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1975).
8. *Fundamentals of K. C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy* (Saraswat Library, Calcutta, 1975).
9. *Possibility of Different Types of Religion* (Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1975).
10. *On the Concepts of Relation and Negation in Indian Philosophy* (Sanskrit College, Calcutta).
11. *Humanism in Indian Philosophy and Religion* (in five instalments, Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta, June 1978–Nov. 1978).
12. *The Indian Concept of Man* (Jadavpur University, 1982).
13. *The Notion of Transcendence : The Philosophy of Gopinath Kaviraj* (University of Calcutta, 1982).

Books Published (in Bengali)

14. *Bhāṛatiya Samskrit O Ānekanta Vedānta* (Burdwan University, Burdwan, 1982).
15. *Māṇḍukya Upanisader Kathā* (University of Calcutta, 1982).

Papers Published (in English)

1. The Business of Philosophy (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Indian Inst. of Philosophy, Amalner, Vol. 28, No. 4, Jan. 1956).
2. Language, Logic and Fact (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Indian Inst. of Philosophy, Amalner, Vol. 30, No. 3, Oct. 1957).
3. Objective Attitude and Idealism Proper (K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume., ed. Maitra, Malkani, Murti and Bhattacharyya, Indian Inst. of Philosophy, Amalner, 1958).
4. Is Philosophy Linguistic Analysis ? (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, Vol. 32, No. 2, July, 1959).

5. Modern Psychology and Hindu Thought (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, Vol. 33, No. 1, April, 1960).
6. The Concept of Self in Buddhism (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, Vol. 34, No. 2, July, 1961).
7. Some Fundamentals of Russell's Philosophy (*Anviksiki*, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University).
8. The Concept of Philosophy (*Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. V, No. 2).
9. Relation in Indian Philosophy (*Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VI, No. 2, Feb. 1970).
10. Freedom (*Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Feb. 1971).
11. Types of Theoretical Sentence (*Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Aug. 1971).
12. The Advaita Concept of Subjectivity (*Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Feb. 1972, also *Philosophy East and West* ed. H. D. Lewis, Blackie & Sons, India, 1975).
13. The Status of the Individual in Indian Philosophy (*Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, July 1964).
14. The Concept of Man and the Problem of Peace (*Philosophical Papers*, ed. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, First Series, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1969).
15. Is Man Originally a Sinner ? (*Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission* Institute of Culture, Calcutta, Vol.22, Nol. 1, January, 1971).
16. Does God Suffer ? (Ibid, Vol. 22, No. 2, February, 1971).
17. The Indian Concept of Freedom (Ibid, Vol. II, No. 9, Sept. 1971).
18. The Indian Concept of Self (Ibid, No. 8, Aug. 1971).
19. Andrews, Gandhi and Tagore (Ibid, No. 11, Nov. 1971).
20. The Central Message of the Gita (*Quest for Truth*, ed. K. K. Mittal, Pub. K. L. Vohra on behalf of Prof. S. P. Kanal Abhinandan Samiti, Delhi, 1976).

21. Sri Aurobindo and the Cultural Crisis in India (*Visva-Bharati Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 3 & 4, 1971–72).

22. A Modern Defence of Orthodoxy (Ibid, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer, 1957).

23. Metaphysics—A Genuine Cognitive Pursuit (*Indian Philosophy Today*, ed. N. K. Devaraja, MacMillan, Delhi, 1975).

24. Nature and Freedom (*Man and Nature*, ed. George Maclean, Oxford University Press, Cal. 1978).

25. An Aspect of Mallik's Philosophy (Basanta K. Mallik—*A Homage Publication*, London, Vinecent Stuart Ltd., 1961).

26. The Meaning and Significance of Social Revolution and the Idea of Progress in Hegelian, Marxian and Indian Philosophies of History (*Contemporary Indian Philosophers of History*, ed. Donald Bishop.)

27. Some Aspects of K. C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy (*Philosophia*, Vol. 5, Nos. 1 & 2, 1976).

28. An Outline of K. C. Bhattacharyya's Philisophy (*Journal of the Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Calcutta*, Vol. III, 1978).

29. The Nyāya–Vaiśesika and Other Notions of Freedom (*Philosophia*, Dec. 1978).

30. Comparative Indian Philosophy : A Sample Study (Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy Vol. III.)

31. Education in Modern India (Convocation Address at North Bengal University, Bharat Prativa, Vol. II, No. II, October, 1978).

32. Is Supernaturalism All a Myth ? (*Bharat Prativa*—an earlier issue).

33. Metaphysics and Life (*Proceedings of the International Seminar on World Philosophy*, December, 1970).

34. Comments on ' Philosophy : Influence of Theory on Practice ' (Ibid).

35. Comments on ' Philosophy and Freedom of Consciousness '. (Ibid.)

36. Advaita and Western Thought (*Indian Philosophical Annual*, Madras University, Vol. VIII, 1971).

37. The Concept of God in Indian Philosophy (*The Mother*, Vol. VI, No. 7).

38. A Brief Account of the Writings of K. C. Bhattacharyya (*K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Vol.*, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, 1958).

39. Rabindranath on Religion (*Homage to Rabindranath Tagore*—Centenary Volume, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan).

40. Towards a Systematic Study of Gandhian Thought (*Visva-Bharati Quarterly*).

41. Jñana and Karma (*S. Bhattacharyya Felicitation Volume*, under publication at Varanasi).

42. The Traditional Indian Philosophy as a Modern Indian Thinker Views It. (*Indian Philosophy : Past and Future*, edited by Rama Rao Pappu of Toledo University, Ohio, U.S.A.) Published by Motilal Banarsidas,

43. Comparative Indian Philosophy—A (Second) Sample Study (Published in *Theory And Action : Essays in Honour of S. S. Barlingay*. Deptt. of Philosophy, Poona University.)

44. Some Reflections on Fine Art (*Visva-Bharati Quarterly* : Ramkinkar–Vinodbehari Memorial issue).

45. The Spirit and Matter in Man (*Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*).

46. Religion—What It is Exactly? (under Publication by the Philosophy Department, Punjab University, Chandigarh).

47. Meeting of Religions (under publication by Global Congress of World Religions).

48. Abu Syeed Ayyub as I saw Him (*Visva-Bharati Quarterly*, Abu Syeed Ayyub Felicitation Issue).

49. Some Reflections on Meaning (under publication simultaneously by *Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy* and *Journal of Indian Philosophy*).

Some earlier important papers :

50. The Idea of Noumenon (*Calcutta Review*).

51. Knowledge as Knowing and Knowness (*Calcutta Review*).

52. Negation (*The Philosophical Quarterly*).

53. Essence = Universal = Thought (*The Philosophical Quarterly*).
54. From Existence to Super-existence (*Prabuddha Bharata*).
55. Approaches to the Ideal (*Prabuddha Bharata*).
56. Object and Appearance (*The Philosophical Quarterly*).
57. Memory of Knowledge (*The Philosophical Quarterly*).
58. Some Aspects of Being (*The Philosophical Quarterly*).
59. Alternative Forms of Politics (*Calcutta Review*).
60. Self and Others (*The Philosophical Quarterly*).
61. The Given and its Appearance (*The Philosophical Quarterly*).
62. The Present-day Crisis of Culture (Convocation address at Magadh University)

Papers Edited (in Bengali)

1. Desh Āmāsāpeksa ki nā (*Darsana*, 1st issue).
2. Laukik O Prātibh Jñan (*Darsana*, in a very early issue).
3. Tattvavichār (*Samasamayik*, 1st issue).
4. Punarjanma (Unable to Locate where it was published).
5. Bharatiya Mānovijñan (Some Psychology Journal published by Professor Tarun Sinha).
6. Mānus O Visvsajagat (*Visva-Bharati Patrika*, Srāvan-Āsvin, 1369).
7. Sri Aurobindo (Centenary Volume published by Aurobindo Bhavan, Calcutta).
8. Dwijendranath Tagore (*Tattvabodhini*).
9. Bhūmikā (Foreword) to the Russell Number of *Manana* (published by the Department of Philosophy, Rajsahi University, Bangladesh).
10. Ācharaner Bhalomanda Vichār (*Darshan*).
11. Mānuser Kṛtyakṛtyavichār (*Darshan* or *Visva-Bharati Patrika*)
12. Khāntimānus O Tār Kṛtya (Samatā Prakasan).
13. Ādhunik Bhārate Sikṣasamasyā (*Udīchī*).
14. Jadavpur Visvavidyalay Samavartan Bhasan on Man and Technological Culture.

15. Jñan Bhakti O Karma (Pather Ālo).
16. Prākkathan (Foreward) to Manoranjan Basu's '*Rámkrishner Sádhan Parikramā*'
17. Prākkathan (Foreward) to Brindaban Bagchi's '*Āyurvede Manodarshan*'.
18. Abhāv .. } (*Bangīya Mahakoṣa*, ed. Amulya Vidyabhusan)
19. Anupalabdhi .. }
20. Anumān .. }
21. Arthapātti .. }
22. Ātmā (In the *Encyclopaedia* published in instalments by Bangiya Sahitya Parisad, Calcutta).

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1

A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya

K. L. SHARMA

Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya,[1] one of the foremost of living philosophers in contemporary India, is greatly influenced by Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya[2] (his father). Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya acquired from his father the fundamental principle of the Alternative Absolute, but on certain points, for instance, the correlation of the Absolute with the conscious function, he does not agree with K. C. Bhattacharyya. Therefore, the present paper aims to explicate Professor K. D. Bhattacharyya's philosophical thoughts in the light of K. C. Bhattacharyya's philosophy. The first part of this paper deals with K. C. Bhattacharyya's notion of Alternative Absolute and in the second part, K. D. Bhattahcaryya's views on Alternative Standpoints have been presented.

1. Professor Daya Krishna, in his paper entitled "Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation" (published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 2 January 1976 pp. 195–208) has suggested that "many of the points he (K. D. Bhattacharyya) has made, may be understood better if seen in the light of his father's (K. C. Bhattacharyya) philosophy." The present paper is an attempt in this direction.
2. K. C. Bhattacharyya (1875–1949) was a creative thinker of Modern India. His philosophical writings were edited by his elder son Professor Gopinath Bhattacharyya under the title : *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, (Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1957). Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya, (1912–1984) Ex-Professor of Philosophy and Ex-Vice-Chancellor of Visva Bharati, Santiniketan, West Bengal was the second son of K. C. Bhattacharyya.

I

If we look into the writings of K. C. Bhattacharyya we find that his philosophical thoughts have passed through three fairly distinct stages of development. The first stage covers the period 1914–18 : this period he devoted to the solution of the dichotomy of the *given* and the logical or, as one may say of the *actual* and the *possible.* The second stage extends from 1925 to 1932. The *non-given as subjectivity* was the main emphasis of his thought during this period. The third stage of his philosophising was the richest, profoundest and most original of all. In this period, (i.e. roughly from 1934 onwards) he wrote three important articles viz., 'The Concept of Philosophy', 'The Absolute and its Alternative Forms[3]', and 'The Concept of Value'.

These three phases are not disconnected with each other. Actually, to define the Absolute was his idea from beginning to end. In the first phase of his philosophy he defines the Absolute as *Indefinite*; in the second phase as *Subject*; and in the third phase as *Alternation.*

K. C. Bhattacharyya's Notion of the Absolute :

Philosophy, according to K. C. Bhattacharyya, starts with reflective consciousness. "Reflection is the awareness of a content as to a mode of consciousness"[4]. In other words, reflective consciousness implies that we are not merely aware of a content, but are aware of it in relation to consciousness. Consciousness is always the consciousness of a content and we are reflectively aware of the content as distinct from its necessary reference to

3. The Article entitled "The Concept of Absolute and its Alternative Forms", the basic work of his third phase of philosophy, was his presidential address delivered at the meeting of the Indian Philosophical Congress (1933) and was published in 1934 in the Philosophical Quarterly. It has also been included in his *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II.
4. *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 125.

consciousness. This peculiar relation between consciousness and content is described by K. C. Bhattacharyya as 'implicational dualism'. "It is in reference to this relation that the concept of the Absolute has to be understood".[5]

The relation between consciousness and content is indefinite. This indefinite relation can neither be denied to be a distinction nor can it be denied to be one of identity. That "the content is somehow distinct from consciousness is obvious to reflection but identity is not so obvious".[6] But what is indefinite demands to be definite. Every indefinite stage of consciousness demands a higher stage of consciousness where that which is indefinite becomes definite. The demand is for a "supra-reflective consciousness",[7] where the distinction or dissociation between consciousness and content becomes clear. The demanded dissociation of consciousness from content is neither identity nor identity-in-difference but distinction. In other words, to begin with or in unreflective consciousness, consciousness and content are thought to be identical. In reflective consciousness the relation of consciousness and content is known as identity-in-difference, but in *supra-reflective consciousness* this relation (between content and consciousness) stands as distinction, or, in other words, consciousness is dissociated from content and known as a mere distinction.

Now, as consciousness is of three kinds viz., *knowing*, *feeling* and *willing*, the implicatory distinction is also three-fold. In knowing the content is not constituted by consciousness, in willing the content is constituted by consciousness, and in feeling the content constitutes some kind of unity with consciousness. In the words of K. C. Bhattacharyya, "the content that is distinguished in reflection from consciousness may be spoken of as

5. *Ibid.* p. 125.
6. *Ibid.* p. 126.
7. *Ibid.* p. 125.

unconstituted by consciousness or as constituted by consciousness or as along with consciousness constituting some kind of unity.[8] Symbolically it can be put like this; "if A is distinct from B, B may be simply an other or it may be constitutive of A or A and B may be both constitutive of C. The first mode of distinction is the relation of content and consciousness in knowing and the last two will be found to appropriately symbolise the relation in willing and feeling respectively."[9]

There are three ways again in which freedom from this distinction can be understood, and each has consequently its own formulation of the Absolute. In knowing, the content may be freed from its reference to consciousness and we have Truth,the Absolute for knowing. In willing, consciousness may be freed from the content and we have freedom of will. *Freedom* is the Absolute for willing. In feeling, the implicational relation of content and consciousness may be freed from their distinction as a constituted unity and we have what K. C. Bhattacharyya calls Value. For feeling, the Absolute is *Value*. According to K.C. Bhattacharyya, "in the reflective stage these absolutes or formulations of the Absolute will be found to be un-unifiable and to be in a sort of alternation."[10]

From the standpoint of reflection the Absolute may be defined as "what is free from the implicational dualism of content and consciousness".[11] There is an Absolute for Knowing (Truth), an absolute for Willing (Freedom) and an absolute for Feeling (value). This tripple formulation of absolute cannot be avoided. We cannot say that there are three absolutes or only one absolute. The reason for this is that "the absolute is not a *known content* about which alone the question 'one or many' has meaning."[12]

8. *Ibid.* p. 112.
9. *Ibid.* p. 129.
10. *Ibid.* p. 129.
11. *Ibid.* p. 141.
12. *Ibid.* p. 141.

In other words, "each is absolute, but what are here understood as *three* are only their verbal symbols, they themselves being understood together, but not as *together*".[13] The absolute is *either* truth *or* freedom *or* value, but not all of them simultaneously. It is an alternation of truth, freedom and value. In other words, there is no sense in speaking of the absolute as the unity of truth, freedom and value. It is each of them, these being only spoken of separately, but not meant as either separate or one. "Whether a mystical identity of the absolute can be reached in the supra-reflective consciousness does not concern us".[14]

The absolute "as transcending the enjoyed reality of religion is positive being (truth) or positive non-being (freedom) of their positive indetermination (value)."[15] The absolute in K. C. Bhattacharyya's opinion "is conceived regorously as truth in (Advaita) Vedanta, as freedom in Buddhist nihilism, as value in Hegel."[16] All these views belong to transcendental grades of philosophy or philosophy of truth which is the highest level of philosophy according to K. C. Bhattacharyya.

The above analysis raises certain issues such as how can the indefinite distinction of content and consciousness be defined? How can their apparent identity be denied? How can the implicatory distinction be resolved into non-implicatory distinction?

We have already seen that the implicatory distinction of content and consciousness varies according to the various forms of consciousness, viz., knowing, willing and feeling. These three forms of consciousness of content are three indefinite distinction and they present alternative demands to resolve the implicative distinction. Thus the implicatory distinction is resolvable in

13. *Ibid.* p. 142.
14. *Ibid.* p. 128.
15. *Ibid.* p. 117.
16. *Ibid.* p. 117.

three different ways in these three ideal forms of consciousness and the absolute is understood in the reflective stage in terms of the mode of resolution in each of these three case. When these indefinites are definitized we have three absolutes i.e., absolute as truth, as fieedom, and as value. At the supra-reflective stage these formulations of absolute, viz., absolute as truth, as freedom and as value are in a sort of alternation.

The three ways to absolute (knowing, feeling and willing) according to K. C. Bhattacharyya do not converge, rather they are intrinsically and essentially divergent from each other. The mutual relation between Truth, Value and Freedom in the form of alternation is however, not merely epistemic. In other words, they are not just alternatives descriptions of the Absolute. There is no sense in speaking of Absolute as the unity of trutn, freedom and value. Each of them is only being spoken of separately, but not meant either as separate or as one. Gopinatn Bhattacharyya has rightly said that "alternation appears to be constitutive of the absolute."[17] According to K. C. Bhattacharyya "it appears to be meaningless to speak of truth as a value, of value as real or of reality as true while we can significantly speak of value as not false, of reality as not valueless end of truth as not unreal, although we cannot positively assert value to be truth, reality to be value and truth to be reality. Each of them is absolute and they cannot be spoken of as one or many. In one direction their identity is intelligible though not assertable. Truth is unrelated to value, value to reality and reality to truth while value may be truth, reality, value and truth reality. The absolute may be regarded in this sense as an *alternation* of truth, value and reality."[18]

17. Bhattacharyya, G. N. : *Studies in Philosophy* (*Ed.*), Vol. II. Editor's Introduction, p. 31.
18. *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 143.
    In the above quoted paragraph K. C. Bhattacharyya has employed the term *reality* to mean *freedom* and has also given its explanation.

The third phase of K. C. Bhattacharyya's thought, where he defines Absolute as Alternation yielded a remarkably original contribution to philosophical thought. These thoughts of K. C. Bhattacharyya were greatly influenced by Jaina theory of Truth. The Jaina theory of Anekantavada (non-absolutism) or the many-foldness of truth, according to K. C. Bhattacharyya, "is a form of realism which not only asserts a plurality of determinate Truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths."[19] In this new interpretation of non-absolutism K. C. Bhattacharyya found the clue for comprehending the absolute in a way at once more subtle and more profound than was given by his earlier notions of the Indefinite or of the Subject.

Kalidas Bhattacharyya[20] has further developed K. C. Bhattacharyya's concept of Alternative Absolute. K. C. Bhattacharyya's concept of Alternation is such a powerful concept that it can be fruitfully applied to various problems in Psychology, Logic, Metaphysics, Aesthetics, Ethics, Religion,[21] Politics[22] and even Technology[23].

II

In this section of the paper an attempt will be made to present Kalidas Bhattacharyya's views on the Concept of Alternative Absolutes briefly.

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19. *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, p 23.
20. Bhattacharyya Kalidas : *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* (1953). Das Gupta and Co., Ltd. Calcutta.
21. Bhattacharyya Kalidas : "*Possibility of Different Types of Religion*", The Asiatic Society (1975) Cal.
22. Bhattacharyya Kalidas : Alternative Forms of Politics, *Calcutta Review*, 3rd series, 86 (1943).
23. Krishna, Daya : *Technology and Meaningful Patterns of Life*. U.G.C. Seminar Report, 1975, pp. 31–34.

In his book *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* (Ph.D. Thesis 1945) Kalidas Bhattacharyya develops the logic of alternation and applied it to the three conscious functions of knowing, feeling and willing. The logic of alternation has also been applied by him to the content of perception and to relations in his book *Object, Content and Relation*, (P. R. Scholarship Thesis 1951). In his later writings he modifies the logic of alternation and applied it to the ideal and the actual.

The foundation of Kalidas Bhattacharyya's philosophy may be said to lie in his "epistemological subjectivism", and the logic of alternation may be said to provide the basic structure for the building of his thought. The central problem of philosophy, for him, is "how knowledge (any knowledge) is possible"? Knowledge and object are opposed to each other in nature and their conjunction is contradictory; but it is also a fact that they are not only conjoined but are also united in the close unity of "knowledge of object". Thus, the 'knowledge situation' presents a problem as to how to explain this close unity of two terms which seem intrinsically opposed to each other?[24]

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24. Attempts have been made by different philosophers to answer this question. In these attempts either the primacy of the subject or of the object or the denial that there is any opposition between them has been asserted. The logical positivist thinkers do not consider it a problem at all and call it a mere linguistic confusion. Daya Krishna has rightly said that—"in a sense all confusions can be considered to be linguistic—for, in reality (whatever that word may mean), there can hardly by any confusions. But supposing reality i.e., the object of our linguistic statements, is itself indeterminate, i.e., of such a nature as to make conflicting statements possible. Is the *Order* then linguistic or the confusion? What are the grounds of our belief either way?" (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation. See pp 14–30 below).

Kalidas Bhattacharyya believes that unities should not be regarded as only of the conjunctive type (p and q). If unities are only conjuctive there can be no conjunction of elements having opposed nature. But, if unities other than the conjuctive ones can be thought of then there may be possibility of incompatible elements forming a unity. For him the unity of alternatives in a disjunctive judgement (p or q but not both) is such a unity. In other words, the disjunctive judgement is the judgement where elements having opposed natures are united. However, it should be kept in mind that the judgement does not *assert* either the one or the other or both together but only the excluding relation between them. The nature of such a judgement is that if one is true the other is rejected or ignored or subordinated or included and vice-versa. In other words, the logic of alternation, according to him, asserts the primacy of disjunction in the understanding of ultimate reality. Disjunction occurs when alternatives exist at the level of possibility. One alternative must be asserted, that is, tied to actuality for the speaker, but if the alternation is real (A is both opposed to and united with B) the commitment may be arbitrary to either. The chosen alternative is developed to its logical conclusion, but so could the other alternative, if one had chosen otherwise.

The disjunction of consciousness and object offers two alternatives, but alternatives to their disjunctive unity is their dialectical unity. This presents the possibility of a third alternative attitude viz., the dialectical attitude. These alternative attitudes, according to him, offer alternative solutions. A philosopher, he says, " does not become an Idealist or an objectivist through logical arguments," but, " at the very start, according as he begins with the subjective or the objective attitude, he only interprets phenomena from the standpoint he has already assumed."[25] If we assume the *subjective attitude*, we have *knowing* in which the subject

25. Bhattacharyya, K. D. : *Object Content and Relation*, p. 141.

is seen as determining or creative its object. If we assume the *objective attitude* we have *feeling* in which the object is felt with immediate certainty. If we assume the *dialectical attitude* we have *willing* wherein a dialectical synthesis of subject and object is attained.

In the subjective attitude *knowing* subordinates feeling; in the objective attitude feeling rejects the knowing, and in dialectical attitude i.e., *willing*, the subjective incorporates the objective. The alternative philosophies are equally correct but incompatible with each other. The alternation is not a fact of empirical world which is usually a correlate of the self at the non-reflective level. Rather, it is only when the self *reflects* that it disintegrates into these possibilities. In practical life knowing, feeling and willing tolerate each other, but reflectively each demands the subordination, rejection or incorporation of all the others. Ultimately, as an ideal, each demands to the absolute, not simultaneously but alternatively, pure subjectivity as absolute knowing or Truth, pure object as absolute feeling or Beauty, dialectical synthesis as absolute willing or Goodness.[26]

The ultimate problem of philosophy for Kalidas Bhattacharyya, is the status of these alternation itself. For *Buddhism*, there is no reality but only alternative philosophies; for *Jainism*, reality itself is alternative; for *Vedānta*, there is one reality, but it can be viewed from alternative standpoints. The alternation of these alternative theories of alternation is the last word of the philosophy of alternative standpoints.

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26. These represents respectively, the three traditional paths of Hindu Religious philosophy—knowledge, love and action (Jñāna, Bhakti and Karma) characteristic respectively of schools of Advaita, Vaishnavism (also Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) and Tantric Śaivism (also Buddhism).

But, one may ask, even if the problem about reality has alternative solutions, must we suppose that reality itself is alternating? This question in turn, according to Kalidas Bhattacharyya, has and can have only alternative answers. The three philosophies mentioned above are alternative images of reality.[27] For example as already seen, in the case of Buddhism there is no reality but only alternative philosophies, for Jainism reality itself is alternative and for *Vedānta* reality is one, but viewed from alternative standpoints.[28]

Thus, we see that Kalidas Bhattacharya's philosophy is founded on the key doctrine of disjunction, rather than on contradiction or conjunction, as the fundamental principle of logic. Disjunctive alternatives are equally valid as possibilities and in-

27. The phrase 'image of reality' may itself mean either that reality is nothing but the image, that the image is a function of the reality and that there is some dialectical unity of one with the negation of the other.

28. Kalidas Bhattacharyya's views regarding the alternative absolutes as presented in his book *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* have been developed further in his later work. Besides the alternation of knowing, feeling, and willing there is cross alternation also in which each may be alternatively considered in terms of either of the others. Besides pure knowing, which is purely subjective, there can also be knowing of objects, which is knowing in terms of feeling. Besides pure feeling, which is purely objective, there is also feeling of self, which is feeling in terms of knowing. The concept of coincidence must be joined to that of alternation: the line dividing adjacent squares belongs alternatively and entirely to either because the squares coincides in one side. Alternatives diverge, but there is a sense in which they converge also.
Burch, G. B. : "Search for the Absolute in Neo-Vedānta: The Philosophy of K. C. Bhattacharyya" *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 1967, p. 665.

deed equally tenable as actualities for different persons, but only one can be actual for any one person depending on the initial attitude he adopts to the paradox encountered in the reflective consciousness.

The doctrine of Alternative Absolutes is based on the psychological distinction between the knowing, feeling, willing, functions of the self and on the epistemological distinction of subjective, objective and dialectical attitudes correlated with them. This doctrine is an original approach to the perennial problems of philosophy. On the one hand the doctrine of alternative absolutes avoids the dogmatism which maintains that if one view is tenable the opposite view must necessarily be untenable. On the other hand, it avoids the irrational liberalism which would hold contradictory views simultaneously either by some compromise or by a hierarchical arrangement of by some alleged harmony. We all start from the same unreflective experience. But as we reflect philosophically, our paths do not converge but diverge, and their final goals are the alternative forms of the absolute.

However, his puzzle regarding the unity between two terms having opposed nature in the knowledge—situation and his proposed solution to this puzzle raise certain questions which demand an answer in the first place, is the puzzle itself a genuine one? If so, what is the nature and the origin of this puzzle? Some Indian philosophical systems such as Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā do not consider it a genuine puzzle at all. For Nyāya, the relation between subject and object is a factual one and, therefore, a later Naiyāyika like Raghunath even accepts relation as an independent category. The unity between two opposite terms is a puzzle only for Advaita Vedānta and Sāṁkhya, because they think the Subject is a close category and that it can be (or should be) understood independent of any relation. The relation between one object and another is not a puzzle for them but only the relation between the subject an. object, because they treat know-

ledge as a non-relational category or a trans-category. In fact, not only this but any intentional act would pose a problem for them.

Even if it is granted that this is a puzzle the solution given by Kalidas Bhattacharyya would still remain the conjunctive relation which should be replaced by the disjunctive relation to solve this puzzle. But, even though it is true that mutually contrary or contradictory judgements can be united in a disjunction, each being taken as a disjunct, the components of the resulting disjunctive judgement would be symmetrically related. If *p* is contrary to *q* then *q* too will be contrary to *p* and if *p* is the contradictory of *q* then *q* too will be the contradictory of *p*. Thus, the unity of mutually opposed elements in disjunctive judgement presupposes a symmetry of relation among the two. But in the solution offered by Kalidas Bhattacharyya, this symmertrical relation is lacking.

The concept of Alternative Absolutes, particularly the third alternative, is also problematic. We may validly ask what is the basis of this assertion regarding knowledge as being subjective, feeling as objective, and willing as dialectical in nature. Also the classification of consciousness into knowing, feeling and willing, seems to be greatly influenced by Faculty Psychology. But Faculty Psychology has been long given up by most psychologists and all the criticism levelled against it may be treated as applying to the positions of K. C. Bhattacharyya and Kalidas Bhattacharyya also.

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*Kalidas Bhattacharyya and The Logic of Alternation**

DAYA KRISHNA

Kalidas Bhattacharyya is, undoubtedly, one of the foremost of living philosophers in contemporary India. Along with K.C. Bhattacharyya and N. V. Banerjee, he may be said to have renewed the tradition of creative philosophising in this country which had perhaps been blocked by the historical necessity of coming to terms with an alien tradition in philosophy which was forced on our notice due to the imposition of British rule in India. Yet, though " Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy "[1] was published as early as 1953, little discussion has taken place regarding the philosophical thesis of this extraordinary book. Unfortunately the book has been out of print for a long time and in fact has been unavailable to students of philosophy both here and abroad as large stocks of it happened to have been burnt in some accident only a few years after its publication. Still, the general neglect which this work has received on the part of most students of philosophy in India is inexcusable, and it is time that it receives the attention which, in my opinion, it so richly deserves.

However, as it is not easy for most students to understand the contentions of the author due to the difficulties of his thought and style in this book, I think it would be helpful if this paper is confined only to an exposition of his major thesis in the work mentioned above. A critical discussion and assessment of the author's contentions must await a proper understanding of what he has said, and may be undertaken later in a sequal to this paper.

* This article was first published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 2, January 1976.

1. Kalidas Bhattacharyya': *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*. Calcutta, Das Gupta and Co., 1953.

The fact of knowledge as everybody knows has seemed puzzling to most thinkers. From the Sophists and Socrates to the logical positivists of today, there has been a continuous concern with what has come to be called " The problem of knowledge ". However diverse the solutions to the problem they have generally seemed unconvincing to many, if not most, philosophers. Varying from the indubitable certainty of self at the one end to the equally indubitable certainty of sense-data on the other, the solutions seem to form a continuum where one can choose whatever one likes. Mr. Bhattacharyya's explanation of this variability is so capable and original that any thinker who still wishes to attempt a unimodal[2] explanation must first come to terms with it.

Whenever something seems problematic, it is mostly because we feel the conjoint validity of things[3] which seems to be incompatible in their nature. The solution is generally reached when we come to feel that either the things are not incompatible in their nature or that they are not conjointly valid. The various solutions to the problem of knowledge can be seen as attempts in either of these directions.

The " Knowledge-Situation ' can seem problematic only if we find two things conjoined in it which reveal themselves to be incompatible in their natures. The occurrence of knowledge is a fact from which the thinker takes his start. But ' knowledge ' is not a thing like tables or chairs; rather, it is more like relations which involve a reference to terms between which they hold. ' Knowledge ' is always the ' knowledge of object ' and not just knowledge itself. This ' of ', it should be noted, is not the ' of '

2. The significance of this word would become clear in the further course of this exposition.
3. Normally, the compatibility or incompatibility is supposed to be between propositions and not " things ". However, in the context of Prof. Bhattacharyya's thought, the latter usage is more meaningful as would appear from the sequal.

of identity as in 'the City of Calcutta'. Rather, it denotes the distinctness of the object from the fact of its known and, at the same time, an equally close unity between them. In fact, leaving aside error and illusion, the "knowledge of object" should be the same as the object itself. The other term in the "knowledge-situation" is traditionally called the "subject" or the "self".

Whatever may be one's difficulties with respect to these concepts, a distinction has always been drawn between the way in which self knows itself and the way in which it knows an object. Whatever be the name that has been given to this distinction the difference between self-consciousness and the consciousness of object has been recognised by most thinkers. It, however does not seem to have been noticed that the relation between the two is of, at least, seeming exclusion. The movement towards self-consciousness is a movement away from the consciousness of the object and while we are conscious of the object we are just unaware of the fact of consciousness or of the subject that is conscious of the object.

The "Knowledge-situation", thus, presents a problem, for it reveals a close unity of two terms which, however, seem also opposed to each other. The usual solutions of this problem have taken the form of asserting the primacy or even the absolute reality of the Subject or the Object or the denial that there is any opposition between them.[4] The subject has seemed so self-

4. The fashionable solution preferred at the present time would, perhaps, be that it is all a linguistic confusion. It is generally forgotten, that, in a sense, all confusions can be considered to be linguistic —for, in reality (whatever that word may mean), there can hardly be any confusions. But supposing reality, i.e., the object of our linguistic statements, is itself indeterminate, i.e., of such a nature as to make conflicting statements possible. Is the order then linguistic or the confusion? What are the grounds of our belief either way? Mr. Bhattacharyya has thoroughly discussed these possibilities which are not even dreamt of by the logical positivists of to-day.

evident to many thinkers and an independent object so inconceivable that they have found it difficult to understand in what the objectivity of the object lies. The movement from epistemological objectivity to metaphhysical objectivity is the central problem in almost all the great thinkers from Descartes to Kant and though they all find alternative routes to their solutions (or do not find a route at all) they are convinced that the immediate awareness of consciousness is indubitable in a sense in which the consciousness of the object is not.

On the other hand, the whole movement of modern realism is based on the immediately felt independence of the object from the fact of its being known. The object is, thus, revealed to be independent in its very being, the situation of being known being essentially accidental to its very nature. It, thus, is real, self-subsistent in a sense in which the subject can never be; for it (the subject) is never known as an object, and seems, at most, the shadowy projection of the grammatical ' I ' which accompanies most of our judgements. Further, the conteingency of knowledge-situation for the object reacts back on the subject and makes it contingent for while the object reveals itself to be independent of the knowledge-situation, the subject is inevitably bound to and dependent on it.

The opposition between the two terms in the " knowledge-situation " is, thus, the reason for the divergent movements in philosophy. But the very fact of the " knowledge-situation " reveals that there is also a close unity between them. The question, then arises : " can we intelligibly conceive of a unity of elements which are in mutual opposition to each other ? " Bhattacharyya's answer is that we can, and the answer is extensively elaborated in his doctrine of what we have called in the title of this paper " The Logic of Alternation ".

The unity of alternatives in a disjunctive judgement, is' according to Bhattacharyya, such a unity. The disjunctive judgement, being a judgement, unites in itself elements which are in opposition to each other. The judgement, however, does not assert either the one or the other or both together but only the excluding relation between them which is of such a nature that if one is true, the other is false[5] and vice-versa[6]. The difficulty, in fact, has been felt because—so Bhattacharyya contends— almost all thinkers have presupposed that unities can only be of the conjunctive type. If the unities were only of the conjunctive type then, obviously, there could be no unities, i.e., conjunctions of incompatible elements. But if the unities can be of types other than the conjunctive then there is, at least, a possibility that even incompatible elements can form a unity.

In fact, Mr. Bhattacharyya contends, the unity formed between a positive and a negative is more intimate than the unity between two positives. He writes, for example, " If on a table an ink-pot is absent, and if we say ' the table is without ink-pot' ", we mean some unity of the table and the *absence of ink-pot.* It is a much closer unity than when we unify two positive entities. Between two positive entities (except in one case to be presently mentioned)[7] there is always a *factual* relation which cements

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5. The word " false " is too strong for a correct characterisation of Bhattacharyya's position. A more adequate statement would follow later.
6. We are quite aware (and so is Bhattacharyya) that this is not agreed to by any modern logician. We would give later his reasons for this differences on this matter.
7. The case excepted in the inherence of a quality is that to which it belongs.

the relata into a unity. But between a positive and a negative there is no such factual relation felt; the only speakable relation between them is a *predicative* one, i.e., a relation obtaining only in the judgemental description of the whole affair. We say 'the table is without an ink-pot', positing thereby a relation inspite of there being no factual relation corresponding to it—actually the relation is but the identity of the table ".[8]

What Mr. Bhattacharyya, perhaps, means to say is that in a positive relationship both the entities are affected in a positive manner and, thus, get modified. But in a relationship between the positive and the negative, the positive remains unmodified; in fact, just itself, while the locus of the negative lies nowhere else in the positive itself.

Now the elements in a disjunctive judgement are actually related in such a manner. Each of the elements is negatively related to the other, but unlike the ordinary negative judgement, the disjunctive judgement does not assert as to which of the elements is to be affirmed or denied. The judgement merely asserts the alternative exclusion of each by the other and leaves the question open as to which is to be asserted and which denied. Rather, by its very nature it suggests that there is no reason to prefer either and, in fact, that both are to be asserted but only alternatively. The relation between the two elements in the disjunctive judgement, thus, is that the negation of each alternative is predicated of the other. For example, " In 'Either M is N or P is Q' the reality is alternately 'M is N' and 'P is Q' and its very identity is explicated respectively in 'P is not Q' and

7. and 8. *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, p. 11, Italics author's.

'M is not N', 'P' is not 'Q' is in reality nothing but 'M is N', and similarly 'M is not N' is nothing but 'P is Q'".[9]

Thus, in the disjunctive judgement we are faced by a unity (which is as close as it can be) of elements which are incompatible, yet real, though only alternatively. But before we can, on this ground, understand the unity of knowledge and object as a disjunctive unity, we should try to dispose of two serious objections that may arise. The first is that the alternative disjunction belongs only to the indecision in our state of knowledge due to our ignorance about the state of affairs as it is. The reality in itself is not indeterminate but is quite specific. When we say, for example, that "he was born either in 1919 or in 1920", we do not mean that he was alternatively born in both the years. The "Either-or" belongs to our ignorance and not to reality which was only one and not the other—not even alternatively. The other objection related to the view that in a disjunctive judgement one alternative is necessarily negated on the affirmation of the other. The commonly accepted view is that the disjunctive judgement excludes only the falsity and not the truth of both the alternatives contained in it.

The answer of Bhattacharyya to these objections takes the form of denying the ultimate relevance of the former and ques-

9. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, ibid p. 152. It should be noted that according to Mr. Bhattacharyya, the disjunctive judgement is better symbolised by "Either M is N or P is Q" than by "Either M is N or Q". For the latter can mislead one to suppose that "M" is the subject of the disjunctive judgement while the former can never do so. In fact, it is only when the former is analysed that we find that in it each clause is alternatively the subject and the negation of the other, the predicate. Further, while the latter can be translated into the former, the former cannot be reduced into the form of the latter. We can say "Either M is N or M is Q" but there is no way of putting "Either M is N or P is Q" into the form "Either M is N or Q".

tioning the adequacy of the latter. He admits that "ordinary disjunctions involve ignorance," but denies that it is intrinsic to the very nature of disjunction itself. Ordinarily we believe that it is because of our ignorance that we are asserting the disjunctive judgement and that it will be removed in a later stage of experience. But from the mere fact that ignorance has been removed in the past in the case of our "Either–or" judgements, it cannot be inferred, without sufficient grounds, that it must be removable in the case of all such judgements. Norman Malcolm has brought out this point in a masterly manner in connection with the complete verifiability of empirical statements.[10]

An irremovable ignorance, however, is ignorance only in a Pickwickian sense. In fact the whole doctrine of ignorance in this case presupposes the determinacy of reality which, unless we have some grounds for believing it in a particular case, cannot be considered self-evident in its own right. In the case of irremovable ignorance we can either suppose that we are irremediably involved in some metaphysical Māyā or that the reality itself is of an indeterminate nature and admits of different formulations. This, is, perhaps, the ultimate alternation with which we may be faced in our enquiry about the relations of knowledge and reality. The alternatives, however, are related, as before, in such a way that the affirmation of one involves the negation of the other and vice-versa. Thus, each is valid but only alternatively.

This brings us to the second objection, that the disjunctive judgement does not exclude the possibility of both the alternatives being true together. It is well–known that such a view has been held by most logicians in the past and by almost all in the present. But this view seems, in the main, due to a confusion between what the disjunctive judgement qua–judgement may be

10. "The Verification Argument" in *Philosophical Analysis* Ed. by Max Black, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1950.

taken to mean and the state of affairs as it obtains in reality. As Mr. Bhattacharyya writes : " There is no denying the fact that *both* the alternatives may be, or even are, real; but the question is whether that is *meant* in the disjunctive judgement. That fact *may not be denied*, but non-denial is widely removed from positive assertion. Not to deny X does not mean to assert it positively, nor even to assert any real possibility of it. *Ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* ought to be kept apart."[11]

The point is that " we never mean ' both ' in a disjunctive judgement as such " even if it be a fact that both happen to be true in rerum natura. The compatibility or incompatibility of the alternatives is undecided within the disjunctive judgement. It neither affirms nor denies it. In the words of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, " If the alternatives *may be* taken as compatible, equally they *may not*, so that the upshot is pure indeterminacy, which means that the affirmed alternative is *completely indifferent* to the other."[12]

The alternatives in a disjunction judgement, therefore, are related in such a way that one alternative either cancels out or rejects the other or is entirely indifferent to it. Which of these relations obtains depends upon the nature of the alternatives concerned. The term " negation ", thus, is used by Bhattacharyya in a wide sense. As he puts it : " There may be negation either of the *content* or of the *assertion* of the content. Either that other alternative is itself negated or there may be the negation of *stating* that alternative, i.e., no statement at all of that."[13]

The unity of elements in a disjunctive judgement, thus, is an extremely close unity of alternatives which either actively reject each other or are, at least, completely indifferent to each other. In the wider sense of negation, they negate each other

11. *Op. cit.* p. 156, Italics author's.
12. *Ibid.* p. 158, Italics author's.
13. *Ibid.* p. 158, Italics author's.

and yet form a close unity, for each is related to the negative of the other. The question, therefore, whether we can intelligibly conceive of a unity of elements which are in mutual opposition to each other, gets its answer in the affirmative. The unity, in such a case, must be conceived of as a disjunctive unity—and, at least, the disjunctive judgement is no mysterious or unintelligible affair.

The "knowledge situation", which has seemed so puzzling to most thinkers, can thus be made intelligible if we conceive of it as a disjunctive unity between subject and object. If we look from the side of the object, it proclaims its complete indifference to the fact of its being known. The subject, however, rejects the objectivity of the object in becoming aware of itself and in fact, transforms the object more and more into the direction of and in the interest of pure Subjectivity which it is itself. The transformation that the object successively undergoes at the levels of sensation, perception, inferred object, memory-image and thought is simultaneously both in the direction of and in the interest of subjectivity. There is an increasing rejection of the object at these levels till we reach a stage where the subject rejects within itself or goes a stage further and rejects the object altogether. Thus, the phenomenological analysis of the "knowledge-situation" reveals that while the subject actively rejects the object, the object is perfectly indifferent to it—a situation completely intelligible in terms of the relationship that obtains between the elements of a disjunctive judgement.

However, the relation between elements in disjunctive unities is of such a nature that each can be asserted and is, thus, valid but only alternatively. Similar must, therefore, be the situation in the knowledge-relationship. The subject and the object both can be affirmed and are, therefore, valid but only alternatively. The validity of both cannot be asserted simultaneously except in the form of "the verbal trite that *there are these two alter-*

natives".[14] The objectivistic and the subjectivistic philosophies can, therefore, both the constructed and are valid but only alternatively. To say, therefore, that only one of them is valid, is wrong. But it would be equally wrong to say that both are valid. What can correctly be said is that teach is valid but only alternatively. "The only standpoint from which both can be spoken of as real is that of the *verbal* super-philosophic conjunction corresponding to the transdisjunctive togethering of the alternatives."[15] The subjectivistic and the objectivistic philosophies are, thus, valid alternative constructions from the "Knowledge-situation" which is of such a nature as to permit or rather require both, but only in such a way that the validity of the one negates the validity of the other and vice-versa.

Among the Subjectivistic philosophies which all involve the rejection of the object, Mr. Bhattacharyya, however, makes a distinction. The rejection of the object through which the subjectivity comes to be aware of itself, may be conceived to be a necessary step as, for example, in the system of Hegel. The subject returns to itself by negating the object and grows richer by this negation. The object, thus, gets a type of non-being with which the subject forms a dialectical unity and grows richer and concentrete just through this unity. But the object may be rejected altogether, i.e., even the first level rejection itself may be rejected. This, it should be noted, does not posit the object once more but rejects it even in its character of non-being.[16] What remains, then, is pure Subjectivity without any distinctions and without any 'other' to itself. This is the position of Śaṁkara and though Hegel has characterised it as 'abstract idealism',

14. *Ibid.* p. 153, Italics author's.
15. *Ibid.* p. 159, Italics author's.
16. The denial of the denial, therefore, does not here result in an affirmation but in an absolute negation. Reasons for holding this view are given in detail in the work concerned.

Bhattacharyya shows in detail that there is no reason to prefer one view as a more intelligible account of the "Knowledge-situation" than the other. If we characterise Hegel's solution of dialectical unity as absolutism, then there is a disjunctive alternation between Subjectivism, Objectivism and Absolutism. Each construction is valid, but only alternatively.

If Bhattacharya would have stopped with this formulations alone even then he would have said something so original that a serious consideration of his view would have been incumbent on any thinker who was not hampered by the style of his presentation or prejudiced against the geographical location of the philosopher concerned.[17] But he goes even further and tries to show that the three alternatives are not mere theoretic logical conceptions but actually obtain in our experiential life. "Mere *logical* establishment of a doctrine", he writes, "is never convincing until it is confirmed by psychological appeal to immediate apprehension. In the absence of such direct psychological appeal much of the traditional philosophy has been useless logomachy, a hair-splitting that has come to nothing substantial."[18]

He, therefore, undertakes an analysis of experience in its cognitive, affective and conative aspects and tries to test his theoretical formulations on the basis of such an analysis. The result is an extremely original and challenging analysis of cognition, feeling and conation which is sometimes so bold and unorthodox that one is left wondering at the author as utterly confused—and one feels it rather too often—one always returns, if one continues to read, to the conviction that there is some solid ground for what the author is saying and that it was only the novelty of the idea that had made one feel that he was confused.

17. The reference to geographical location may surprise some readers, but it is a fact that it is not only Westerners who believe that no meaningful philosphical activity could occur outside the western hemisphere but Indians also.

18. *Op. cit.* p. V, Italics author's.

The analysis, it should be noted, is undertaken for the confirmation or rejection of the theory of knowledge elaborated in the last section. In fact, while trying to understand the "Knowledge-situation", we were trying to understand the relation between subjectivity and object. But as subjectivity and object are involved in all experience, the relationship postulated between them by the theory of alternation, if true, must throw light on other aspects of experience as well. The analysis, therefore, aims at discovering "the exact subjectivity and the exact object', in each of the psychical processes and the relationship that obtains between them. The results reveal that there is a "correspondence between cognition, feeling and conation, on the one hand, the subjective, the objective and the dialectical attitudes on the other."[19]

However suprising it may seem, that cognition, at its different levels, moves towards Pure Subjectivity and involves an increasing rejection of the object, Mr. Bhattacharyya contends that it is such. The movement from sensation to perception, memory and thought is, in his opinion, simultaneously an increasing dominance of Subjectivity and an increasing rejection of the objectivity of the object. Of course, the reference to object, even at the highest level, does not cease. But the direction of the movement, he suggests, is fairly clear. The view may perhaps become more intelligible if we reflect that even in sciences, when there grows up an increasing theoretic complexity and an increasing distance from ultimate empirical correlation, one begins to feel the receding of the object till it is reduced to mere "pointer-readings" or the reception of visual or auditary signals. The object seems to grow more and more shadowy while the creative philosophers' aspect of the Subjectivity comes more and more into focus. The philosophers reflecting on cognition have, again and again, felt it difficult to find that bare object which is bereft of any subjective

19. *Ibid.* p. 208.

construction altogether. The scientists, on their part, have equally reduced the object to a complex theoretic construct in which the overwhelming character of the objectivity of sense-percepts is reduced to its chastly minimum. The attempt to deduce the whole set of physical phenomena from certain ultimate postulates, called "postulates of impotence" is another pointer in the same direction. The dream or the ideal has always been to weave the whole web of knowledge out of the self-evident necessity of thought. The deductive form that the advanced sciences seem inevitably to take suggests that there is some imperative behind the dream which, even if intrinsically unrealisable, sets up a goal towards which we can perhaps asymptotically approach. There seems, thus, some ground for Mr. Bhattacharyya's assertion that the movement of cognition is towards pure subjectivity, though the reference to the object is never completely lacking even at the highest level.

Equally, surprising, at first sight, is his contention that feeling leads us towards objectivity. So obvious does it seem to most persons that feeling is purely subjective that it would come as a shock to find any one seriously contending that it is not such. However difficult it may be to conceive this at the level of pleasure-pain, it becomes increasingly clear at the succeeding levels of emotion, aesthetic creation and aesthetic appreciation. It may, perhaps, make the situation more intelligible if we disabuse our minds of the usual notion that only perceptual objects are objects. The overwhelming character of objectivity that belongs to perpeptual objects belongs even more so to pleasure or pain. We are completely immersed in them and do not, in most cases, stand back from them. Such a situation obtains at the perceptual level also though even there, in a sense, the subjectivity may be said to be standing back from the object and confronting it. But on the higher levels of emotion, aesthetic creation and aesthetic appreciation the differences are clearly revealed. There

is an increasing domination of the object and the absorption of the subject into the Object. The reference to the subject never completely ceases but it receds more and more in the background till it remains almost a mere background.

Whatever be the different theories of aesthetic appreciation, there is a fair amount of common agreement about on thing at least, viz., that we are interested in aesthetic appreciation in the object 'for itself', and 'in itself'. This, if we examine, is just the character of pure objectivity. In fact, there is just this difference between ordinary perception and aesthetic appreciation. Unlike the theoretic transformations that the perceptual object undergoes at different cognitive levels, its objectivity merely gets more deepened at the highest level of aesthetic appreciation. In fact, if we reflect on the constructional character of scientific objects and the concrete character of the objects of aesthetic appreciation, it would perhaps be easier to understand what Mr. Bhattacharyya is saying. There is, at least, hardly any rejection of the object in the aesthetic situation and, thus, on a prima facie view, it should be considered to belong more to the objectivity side of the previous analysis. Most writers on Aesthetics have noted the fact of depresonalisation both of pleasure and pain in aesthetic creation and appreciation, a fact that supports the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya.

If, then, cognition belongs to the Subjective and feeling to the Objective attitudes, it is natural to accept that conation belongs to the third, i.e., the dialectical attitude. Dialectical unity, if we remember, involved the negating of the object and, through this negation, the returning of the Self to itself. The object had a kind of being (for it was not mere Nothing) and its being consisted just in this that it was negated by the subject. Conation reveals just these characteristics at the levels of (1) instinctive and other unreflective activities, (2) ordinary volun-

tary will and (3) moral will (i.e.) willing the good.[20] It is the very character of conation to negate an existing state of affairs. But such negation necessarily presupposes the actuality of the state of affairs to be negated. At the highest level of the moral will, such a characteristic is clearly revealed. Further, the negation involved makes the subject richer and more concrete and is, thus, necessary to its very being. It is a well-known problem of morality that, if things were as they ought-to-have-been, there would be no place for morality. Morality, thus, presupposes a non-valuational or disvaluational state of affairs in the negation of which the necessary reality or worth of the self lies. But if even this stage is to be negated then the self returns into itself, and we move in the direction of Pure Subjectivity, a direction which would seem both abstract and immoral to the dialectical philosopher.

Conation, Cognition and Feeling, thus, seem to involve in themselves movements towards Ideals which are increasingly, though never completely, realised at different levels. The claims of Pure Subjectivity, Pure Objectivity and the Absolute are felt and a movement made towards them at different levels. But if the logic of alternation has given us any insight, then the relations between these ideals must also be of an alternative character. The relation between Pure Subjectivity (cognition) and the Absolute (conation) on the one side and Pure Objectivity (Feeling), on the other, should on the logic of alternation, be that while the former rejects the latter, the latter is completely indifferent to the former. The relation between Subjectivity and Absolute, however, should be of such a nature that each can admit the other only as a subordinate movement within itself. The moment the other tries to dominate, it has to be rejected. The movement towards pure subjectivity admits the first negation involved in the dialectical attitude, but the moment it tries to

20. *Ibid.* p. 257.

stop there, it has to be rejected. Similarly, the dialectical attitude can tolerate the Subjective as an abstraction, but if it refuses to move out of this abstraction, it has to be rejected. Each, thus, can tolerate the other as a subordinate movement but has to reject it when it claims to be the dominant one.

Such, in brief, is the tentative exposition of Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought as delineated in his *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*. Many of the points he has made may be understood better if seen in the light of his father's philosophy. But K. C. Bhattacharyya's philosophical writings are filled with such obscure profoundity as to vie with Hegel and Heidegger in this respect. Further, his writings were not available to the early students of Kalidas's work, and they could not have placed it in its proper context even if they had desired to do so.[21] Even Now when K. C. Bhattacharyya's work has been available in a compact form for more than a decade, few persons have paid it the sustained attention which alone could render it intelligible to students of Philosophy in the country.[22] A critical appraisal must await adequate comprehension of the thought of these two major philosophers of modern India. The present essay, hopefully, is a step in this direction.

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21. This paper is a slightly amended version of something that was written long time back. It thus also suffers from the limitation, as the only work of K. C. Bhattacharyya which was then available was *Subject as Freedom*.
22. N. V. Banerjee's monograph on K. C. Bhattacharyya's *The Concept of Philosophy* published from Calcutta University and K. T. Kadankavil's *The Philosophy of the Absolute* published from Bangalore (1972) are notable exceptions to this but, as everybody knows, even two swallows do not make a summer.

3

Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy

S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA

The Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University is to be warmly congratulated for initiating a new move for taking stock of and of arriving at an impartial assessment of the contribution to philosophy made by contemporary Indian philosophical thinkers of repute by arranging seminars on their works. Such a movè was very much needed but not attempted so far, as we had scant regard for the value of anything indigenous, competed with each other for personal recognition in foreign circles by a demonstration of our up-to-date knowledge of the western dicta, and scarcely had the mind to converse with one another and compare notes on our own individual findings and acquisitions in the realm of philosophy. Our ignorance of our Indian contemporaries is colossal—perhaps only matched by our ignorance of classical Indian Philosophy which of late we have been trying to modernise by coercing its fundamental concepts into certain relations of affinity or identity with current Western models in justification of their philosophicality. While Western philosophers have developed their thoughts by going through each other's writings, amending, supplementing or even reversing the trends of thought of their living contemporaries, we, in India have been behaving as Leibnitzian monads without a harmony—pre-established or newly to be established. While attempting to draft this note on Professor Bhattacharyya's philosophy I myself plead guilty to this charge of non-acquaintance with major portion of his philosophical works. I am thankful to the organisers of the Seminar for exposing my inadequacies

to meet the challenge of what I am now convinced was a very needful programme.

Professor Bhattacharyya, I believe, has remained wedded even to-day to the view that philosophic wisdom, although absolute knowledge, is capable of formulation in alternative ways and that there are alternative standpoints of philosophy. In his published book bearing that title he seems to have advanced two-fold claims one retrospective the other prospective and anticipatory. By a retrospective analysis of previous philosophies, Eastern and Western he appears to have discovered that all these, at least the most epoch-making among them, have in course of their development adhered in some way to Professor Bhattacharyya's model or models of alternation summed up in the concluding part of the book. This historical survey of the movement of thought on principles of alternation appears to me as calculated to furnish some sort of a 'Transcendental deduction' of the principles of Profess orBhattacharyya's contemplation. Next, Professor Bhattacharyya seems to project these patterns or principles as binding upon all future philosophies—even justificatory of their very claims to be true "philosophies". So the modern defence of philosophy is possible only through the logic of alternation discovered in the attempt to understand the "knowledge-object unity"—we have been told.[1]

Professor Bhattacharyya starts with the situation such as, 'knowledge of object', and while accounting for the very 'close' unity which the preposition 'of' symbolises in the fixture, discovers his principle of alternation and its several forms and this discovery then convinces him that philosophy has to follow the alternative lines of formulation advocated by him. One would be, I feel, simply marvelling at our philosopher's ingenuity in constructive interpretation, his grasp of details and penetrative analysis of common place themes, even when disagreeing either

1. p. vi (Preface). *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy.*

wholly or partly with his plan and programme. Knowledge is *of* objects, and this he regards as a solid fact immediately given. This exhibits a close unity of knowledge and object, and this close unity is also given. This unity he maintains, cannot be explained in terms of any additive or conjunctive relation such as, '*togetherness*', '*compresence*' or bare connectedness. One ground, as stated by him, is that in a relation of 'togetherness', or compresence, one item cannot be, 'of' the other, and this 'of' relation is so peculiarly referential that it eludes a conjunctive relation of any form. The other ground is : The items in relation here, 'subjectivity' and 'object', are incompatibles, even contradictories and therefore, 'a conjunctive unity of two clashing things is unthinkable'.[2] Professor Bhattacharyya begins with several themes which he regards as incontrovertible as far as knowledge-relation goes. Knowledge, which means to him subjectivity, and object are, according to him, both equally evident. What he means is, perhaps, that one of the items cannot be simply reduced to the other or made to vanish away. This "subjectivity and object are matters of immediate feeling".[3] But, since knowledge is apprehended in the subjective attitude and object in the objective attitude, the difference between them, we are told, amounts to contradiction. In Section IV of Chapter I, Professor Bhattacharyya has explained this contradiction. In Section II of Chapter II, he shows how this contradiction is beyond remedy and rejection. In Section I of the same chapter, he demonstrates with equal regour how the unity of these incompatibles is equally unrejectable. He seems to make out the case that both the contradiction between subjectivity and object and their close unity are equally given in immediate knowledge or feeling, and so there can be no propriety in sacrificing the

2. Preface p. iii.
3. p. 42.

testimony of one immediate experience for the sake of that of another.[4] In this debate, reason or social and demonstrative knowledge cannot be an arbiter. Nor can any of the constituents, particularly the belief in unity, be disposed of as illusion. Faced with the problem of accounting for a close unity of two apparently incompatibles, and convinced that such a close unity of 'conflicting things' cannot be explained in terms of any conjunctive relation, Professor Bhattacharyya falls back upon certain remarkable innovations of his own. And these have furnished the basis of his alternative standpoints of philosophy. To these we shall turn after a brief review of the situation.

I am not sure if a relational unity, such as, "knowledge is *of* object" is immediately felt, and is a prime datum. The immediate, in the sense of primary content or datum, may just be a "This so-and-so", a chair, a table, a running bus. This "this", of course, must have been "given" and "known"; otherwise it could not be there in the sense of being *presented.* But although its 'known-ness" or "given-ness" is integral to it as a *given* "this", I am not sure if in my immediate knowledge of a presentation, I am aware of a "knowledge-object" *relation,* such as "knowledge *is of* object". The fact of knowledge or subjectivity, the fact called object and the fact of relation seem to depend on conceptual formulations which all belong to a *reflective* level quite different from the pre-reflective level of *immediate* experience which precedes it, and which is without that relational *review.* If this is correct, a given knowledge, initially, is not a relation and so not a *unity,* but is simply the non-distinguished *one-ness* of what are subsequently made out to be distinguishable entities standing in a bi-polar relationship. A view like this, I believe, cannot be rejected without a proper hearing, since it explains the so-called subject-object unity, a "close unity" in

4. p. 91

Bhattacharyya's phrase, is a much simpler way without the innovations of disjunctive or dialectical unities. Professor Bhattacharyya, to my mind, starts not with the immediately given, but with a reflective breaking of it which shows the bi-polar relation and the situation such as, knowledge *of* object'. The unity which he admits as an incontrovertible fact, and the incompatibles, subject and object, which he takes as equally incontrovertible, are really so. But the close unity of the two incompatibles as also their relation of incompatibility will have to be explained in a different way altogether. The prior state of non-distinguished and 'pure' one-ness of what is subsequently distinguished as two bi-polar entities forms the essential matrix of their close unity although now broken up, and their bi-polarity or incompatibility is due to the reflective, analytic and separating act which holds them now apart and farther from each other. And as the reflective process grows in volume, this separation also becomes greater and greater. What I mean is that the prime datum is a pure *one-ness* in which the division into act and content does not hold as a matter of fact. This "one-ness" which is non-relational, and so not really any unity of "sides", through reflection and develops into a relational unity of two sides or poles. Also, the opposition or incompatibility between the two is a necessary consequence of the reflective division which holds them as absolutely distinguished from each other in spite of their necessary relatedness and, perhaps, even as a consequence of that relation. So the close unity of the subject-object which Professor Bhattacharyya seeks to discover so laboriously is already presaged in the given experience, the pure *one-ness* of the to-be-developed act and the to-be-discovered content. So there is actually no demand for discovering the close unity of the "subjectivity" and the "object" in a remote reflective context which, on his own showing, can give only a relational unity of alternatives, which in their counter-poise pave the ground for the alternative standpoints of philosophy.

Leaving the foregoing contention apart, I also fail to see how the possibility of conjunctive unity can be rejected on the very face of it, if "knowledge-of-object", a relational union of an act and object, is accepted as the prime datum. It seems that either such expressions as 'unity', 'union' are inappropriate as description of what he has attempted to convey by his notion of "close relationship", or that "close relation" does not necessarily exclude the relation even of a conjunctive sort. In a conjunctive relation also, there is no bar to one thing *being of* the other, or their involving each other. The hyphenated space-time, the compresent mind and object, and the distinguished subject-object inside a knowledge-relation have been regarded by some as conjunctively related. Conjunctive relation need not be adventitious; it may as well be the characteristic of a complex body. Professor Bhattacharyya is alive to this, and that is why he has rejected conjunctive relation, be it *external* or *internal*. His basic reason for this rejection has been that in a conjunctive relation one thing cannot be 'of' the other, and the relation 'of' is sacrosanct. But Samuel Alexander had argued that of two factors, if one is of the character of consciousness and the other unconscious, the conscious one may be conscious of the unconscious as its *object*. As regards the incompatibility of subjectivity and object, I feel that although their *distinction*, as both integral to their interrelation and also incidental to that relation, is given in *primary* reflection, their *contradiction* or absolute incompatibility is not given there. The latter is rather the result of further *constructions*. Further, the unity or relatedness, symbolised by "of" in the phrase "knowledge of objects", does not seem to me to have anything to do with any relation between "subjectivity" and "object", since "knowledge" or "knowing" does not necessarily imply the "knower" which alone can be understood as subject or subjectivity. Professor Bhattacharyya, I feel, has not explained his transition from "knowledge of object", *to* "subjectivity-object" relationship

clearly. The notion of " subject " or " subjectivity " as also that of " objectivity ", I feel, is no part of the primary datum, speakable (reflectively) either as " *objective* knowledge " or as " *known* object ". Reflectively taken " knowledge " and " known ", " thought " and ' thing thought of ' may be expressed as distinguishable aspects of a dialectical unity of the Hegelian type but I do not feel sure if ' knowledge ' and ' object ' can be taken as disjunctively related and if their close unity can be expressed in terms of a disjunctive relation. May be, I have failed to follow up his argument properly in the context.

To my mind, knowledge, by which I mean a revelation or " *being-there-ness* " of a presentation (I do not really know how to describe it significantly without incorporating ' figures ' which belong to the reflective level) is no " relation " initially. But, in reflection, which is latent in it, it also ' shows ' itself as a relation by distinguishing itself as an act against itself as a content thereby giving rise to a new situation, such as, *knowledge*-and-*known*. This relation, which is of the distinguishing kind, cannot certainly be regarded as a conjunctive relation. This is internal to the situation, incidental to reflection, and *was* latent in the original pure " one-ness " of act and content. This relation of knowledge to its content *relates by way of distinguishing*, and is, therefore, very peculiar, and cannot be identified with what we mean by " relation " in common parlance, i.e., something which brings two things together instead of pushing them apart from each other. Yet there is another way in which knowledge is taken as a relation in this latter positive meaning, bringing things together, such as, a mind with an object, a knower with the object known and so on. These two relations, one *distinguishing* one thing from another, and the other *bringing* two things *together* in a certain situation, seem to me to be characteristically different. The subject *knows* the object by knowing or knowledge, which stands as a relation between itself and the object. This is a

relation of *coming together* and not one of *turning away* or falling apart from one another. This relation has been conjunctively expressed, and it has been expressed in other ways also, giving rise to alternative epistemological theories and their cognate metaphysics. We all are used to such alternative standpoints. There have also been alternative philosophies in the rival cosmologies, the philosopher taking his stand on a *naive objective plane.* There have been rival interpretations of reality, proceeding from the *epistemological* angle. In recent times, there has been an attempt at rival formulations from the *linguistic* angle and, again, from the *conceptual* or meaning angle. And all these may be taken as illustrative of alternative standpoints. Professor Bhattacharyya's showing of alternative standpoints of philosophy is independant of all these classical formulations in the philosophical tradition. His formulations are original and his own, and have their roots not so much in known facts of history of philosophy as in his very singular 'constructive interpretation' of such known facts. Even the solid fact, the "knowledge-*of*-object" situation which he takes up as his basis, seems to me, not one of common acceptance but rather as one reformulated by his constructive interpretation. His thesis does not help us so much to understand how knowledge *becomes of* object, how the close unity of knowledge and its object is *realised* in modes of actual fulfilment of cognitive enterprise as it calls upon us to regard the *values* that philosophy, moving on alternative lines of interpretation of subjectivity and object, is likely to project before us for our choice. This has very eminently been brought out in his concluding remarks. On the ultimate analysis, "knowledge of object" or philosophy at its highest reflective level turns out to be several 'images' of reality, and these images or pictures are capable of being regarded in three ways—subjectively, objectively and dialectically. The first gives philosophy as a value in itself but as a subjective fantasy which may be enjoyed but not objectively vindicated or *realised*; the second as objective value or value in

objectivity with complete annulment of the claim of thought or subjective stipulation to have made any addition or contribution whatsoever. The third is to be a mystical unity of the whole imaging process (to put in my own way) and the negation of the other pole reality or objectivity. If I am not entirely mistaken (which is very much probable), Professor Bhattacharyya also proposes that each of these alternative valuation-processes is capable of formulation triad-wise (subjectivity, object and absolute).

Professor Bhattacharyya's programme seems to have three parts. (1) The discovery of the *types* of unity and *kinds* of attitude that knowledge-relation seems to involve. (2) The discovery of the same types of relational unity and attitude among the three classical divisions of conscious field into cognition, feeling and conation. (3) The discovery of the further stretching or extension of the above kinds of unities and attitudes in the notion of the three infinites or 'absolutes' realised in the Indian *Jñāna*, *Bhakti* and *Karma* mārgas. Thereafter, in a final and valuational assortment of philosophy in the light of the unities and attitudes analysed and illustrated in course of the main body of his book he seems to give us three ultimate models, each realising the three attitudes, subjective, objective and dialectical, in terms of subjective playful construction, indifferent objective posited-ness and in a mystical unity of the playful realising itself in apparent modes of objective presentation. I refrain from following his lead in identifying each such development with any existing system, but I feel almost carried away by his stupendous power of analysis and forceful logical construction. Yet I discover a line of resistance.

The attitudes that he speaks of are all post-reflective. It is on the basis of these attitudes (which are undoubtedly alternative) that he takes the original unity (or pure one-ness as I have pleaded) in given knowledge as a union of alternatives.

The fact is : the original datum is *no unity at all.* It is a pure, undistinguished (not saturated even) *one-ness.* But this breaks up itself into two, distinguishes itself against itself, the "*positing*" against the "*posited*". The subjective attitude and the objective attitude are thus *born* of it, formed *in* it. These only thrive in opposition, but cannot, all the same, cut themselves completely loose from each other. They shelve each other gradually to opposite poles, yet cannot break away from that polar relation altogether. This necessitates a further attitude of taking them in separably together, both dialectically and synthetically. Thus, we get *three* approaches or ways in which they may be taken together, the subjective way, the objective way, and the compromising, interrelational, and commonly called dialectical way. *Each way*, the subjective, the objective, the inter-subjective-objective may be regarded as a form of unity in itself. The absolute impossibility of their breaking away even from their relation of opposition gives to each this unity. The subjective involves the unity of itself with its absolute apartness (distinguishedness) from the object. The objective involves unity of itself with its absolute indifference in respect of the subject. None can be its pure self—or, rather, itself. The so-called dialectic attitude may better be called the compromising attitude. It is the unity of the subject and the object in their interrelation and yet mutual distinction. This is a relational one-ness while the earlier given knowledge, was a *non-relational one-ness*, and so I designated it as "pure one-ness". The compromising unity, I describe, is the dialectical unity of Hegel—a combination of opposites, *not* a combination of one opposite with the negation of the other opposite, as is suggested by Bhattacharyya. This second kind of unity, the unity of something with the negation of its opposite, I believe, is more characteristic of the subjective, and of the objective as understood by me and explained above. What I like to emphasize particularly is that none of these three unities are matters of the original matrix; all are *later developments* in

reflective thinking, in the *reflexive growth*, out of the matrix. But philosophy is incidental to reflection. The reflexive development of pure experience brings in philosophy. The separation into the subjective, objective and, let me say, dialectic attitude, is only one mode of stipulation. There may be another also. This is found in *not separation* or distinguishing the subjective, the objective, and later on, again, reconciling them under a third mode of dialectical union. It consists in seeking to *unite* the subjective and the objective, already expressed as two sides, *together* in some mode of conjunctive union. Dualistic epistemology has taken this stand. It starts with certain pre-formed or pre-fixed notions of subject and object and attempts to explain the *how* of knowledge by some ingenious stipulation of the mode of their adventitious union. It indulges in constructions in the radically opposite ways. With the help of certain pre-formed notions of the subject and of the object it indulges in the stipulation how the two could be conjunctively united so that knowledge which is some sort of a joint product of theirs may arise. Here all philosophical constructions centre around the question of the nature of knowledge. That the mind conforms to the object, the object conforms to the mind, that there is a relation of reciprocity between the two and some such stipulations give alternative philosophies built upon the foundations of alternative forms of dualistic epistemologies in this approach. The other direction is the one proposed by Professor Bhattacharyya. It is starting with knowledge as a given fact and then following up the implications of the subjective, the objective and the dialectical attitudes. This speculation may, again, take diverse forms depending on *how* we interpret the relation of opposition, rather the relation of *distinction* between the subject and the object and *to what extent*. Philosophies built upon this approach give different accounts of subjectivity, objectivity and their dialectical union. That knowledge of knowledge-relation is a close unity of the subjective, objective and their dialectic union, seems

to me a rather loose talk. These developments are incidental to the *self-splitting* of the pure one-ness in reflection, and so, incidental to *division* and *blowing up* of one-ness and here then no unity is implied. Only in so far as all these alternations issue forth from the reflexive development of the self-same *materia prima*, we can loosely talk of their holding in the original matrix, or as belonging to it. But that which is the result of division and self-splitting cannot be taken to be the result of a union. Yet, as the division takes place inside the original one-ness, the matrix, even the division or dividedness, of course, presupposes a certain unity or one-ness since the distinguished and separated are incapable of falling apart or away from their relation of distinction. This may illustrate the disjunctive unity of the subjective, the objective and the dialectical in some sense. But a principle of alternation, I feel, needs to be regarded as *alternation*, rather *than* as disjunction, which holds that " not both A and B can be true together ".

□ □

4

'Subjective and Objective' Attitudes as Alternatives

A Study of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's view of 'Knowledge-object Unity

K. BAGCHI

Introduction

'Knowledge of object' ultimately means 'knowledge or object'. It is true that the two are not wholly identical, there must be some additional factor involved in the former. But that does not affect the fundamental position that *knowledge of object* is ultimately *knowledge* or *object*".[1] The imagination that permeates the passage cannot at all strike one who is disposed to understand 'meaning' in terms of 'synonymy': indeed for one disposed to think thus 'knowledge of object' *cannot* mean 'knowledge or object'. For one thing, "of" is no synonym of "for". An objection of some such kind, were it made, would enchant one with its facade of clarity. Equally, however, it would surprise one with its frivolity: its edge is taken off by Professor Bhattacharyya's making explicit reference (in the text quoted) to the "fundamental position". That "fundamental position" is called by Professor Bhattacharyya "alternation". Thus: "There is an alternation between Idealism and Realism, and neither...... is justified to attack the other".[2] The alternatives are, as we shall presently see, alternative ways of viewing knowledge. We shall, in this paper, see, *first*, how the alternative views emerge; *secondly*, how, if at all, it is possible to square the alternative views which are philosophical views with the

1. *Object, Content and Relation:* Calcutta, Dasgutpta and Co., Ltd., p. 68, Italics author's.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

fact of knowledge, i.e., the fact that knowledge is 'knowledge of ...... ' Finally, we try to see what view of 'alternation' emerges through the clash indicated in 'knowledge *or* object" and the *conciliation* indicated in "knowledge of object".

I

As is common with the philosophers belonging to the school founded by his father, Professor Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Kalidas Bhattacharyya's almost constant refrain is the distinction between what he calls the subjective or inward attitude and the objective or outward attitude. The word attitude is significant. It indicates two directions of interest on the part of consciousness. In both these interests knowledge is attained though "knowledge" takes on new meaning commensurate with the interest concerned.

In the objective attitude I come to know individual things or events or persons; their aspects, relations, patterns of behaviour etc. I may know particular periods of history or stretches of time. I may know things that are general, viz., laws of movement of bodies in space, temporal relations between events etc. I may make surveys of landscapes. I may submit report to the University on the state of affairs there. In these several ways of knowing the world, my attention is completely absorbed in it and forgets itself wholly. In brief, my objective attitude of seeking knowledge is comprised in the total gamut of conscious activities I perform in relation to the world, being absorbed in it and forgetful of myself.

But what is the world in which I am said to be absorbed in the objective attitude being forgetful of myself? Does it not have a place for myself? Like other items, my consciousness, myself as ego with my mind and body and history and heritage and social and cultural *milieu* belongs to this world defined by spatio-temporal category and the category of subjectivity. I am

describable in the same way in which any thing or event or attribute is describable, i.e., in objective and spatio-temporal terms. For example, I have, i.e., my body has a spatio-temporal location; it is regulated by physico-chemical laws; it can be pointed to in the same way as one may point to a thing. The physiologist and the anatomist treat me as a physiological and anatomical specimen. The doctor understands me as a case. The psychologist sees in me a thinking-feeling-knowing being i.e., as an agent who does knowing and thinking or as a possessor of feeling, and the psychiatrist is interested in my case-history. My past history may be of interest to the passport issuing officer. I may have a place-name. I may interest persons who want me to play a role. These are the different ways in which the ego comes to be regarded as a part of the spatio-temporal system or world. In face of these several ways of describing, identifying, introducing me, how can it be said that the objective attitude involves self-forgetfulness ? What to speak of forgetting myself, I rather loudly proclaim myself, my capacities and attainments and distinctions and heritage and history and all that kind of thing when my mundane interests are concerned. It is not just because I am a man of the *world* that I bolster up my claim to the highest office in the institution in which I am working ? Precisely *what content* of the self is left out of account in mundane interests so that we might say that such interest involved self-forgetfulness ? The self is *described, identified* in terms of *names, roles,* etc. Thus objective descriptions of the self *are* possible. How then can it be said that objective attitude is one of self-forgetfulness ?

Now the answer to the objection is lurking in the objection itself. I can indeed give objective descriptions of mayself; and when others too give objective descriptions about me, I may acquiesce in them. But neither in giving those descriptions or acquiescing in them, I take the world as the standard of reference. I ascribe to me predicates *on condition that* they are applied to

other selves also. I ascribe to myself characters, names, roles etc., in so far as they can be ascribed to others. My identity may have to be expressed, but it is expressed to *others, not to me,* i.e., *to myself.* And to express it to others is to place it in a world which makes for such identification. That world is the world of intersubjective persons. It is the world of *self to others.* But in the world of *self to itself,* there is no *question* of expressing identity. Names, roles, castes, clans, lineages, performances, social class etc., in terms of which one is identified, and that rightly as a matter of procedure, do not enter into my 'I'. *My* 'I', which is uniquely *mine,* eludes all that. I am *nāmagotrahīna.* I have introduction *to* others. But I have no introduction *to* myself. So, as we said, the objection that I *can* say many things about me as a man of the world, contains the answer to itself also : only in so far as I am enmeshed in the world, only in so far as I am not free from its tentacles can I describe me, i.e., ascribe predicates to 'I'. But there are situations in which ascriptions to 'I' are not *really* ascriptions.

This becomes evident when we distinguish between to kinds of statements, viz., (i) statements which I make about me and which correspond to statements made by *others* about me and (ii) statements which I make about me but which *do not correspond* to those made by others. For instance, there is correspondence between the doctor's statement about me in his medical report. 'He is quite fit' and the statement I make about me 'I am quite fit'. But there is no such correspondence between the statement 'The body is hot' and the statement 'My body is hot'. For the latter is no statement about me or 'I'; it does not contain 'I' as logical subject to which ascriptions *might be* said to have been made. Strictly, it is no statement, for less a statement *about.* There is, in this apparent statement, no logical subject apart from the speaker, i.e., apart from the speaking subject. It is only the facade of a statement. If it avails

one who utters it of anything, it gives expression to one's inwardness, as Professor Bhattacharyya would say. My body becomes interiorised or subjcectivised in being recognised as *mine*. In being spoken of, it is drawn away from the spatio-temporal world into the field of '*consciousness expressing itself*. Speaking here is symbolising consciousness' inwardness.

Consider, again, two statements made in another kind of situation. My friend tells me "You have not changed since I saw you last' and I reply 'Yes, that's true. I am what I was'. Stated in a clearer language, my reply is 'I who am now am I who was then.' My reply is not, as my friend's remark was, a statement. To me, i.e., to the speaking subject, there is no 'then' I *different from* the 'present' I or the speaking 'I' which might be said to be somehow combined as logical subject and as logical predicate. My reply is no judgment, not even one expressing identity-in-difference or *bhedasahaabheda*. Far from expressing identity-in-difference, my reply *forestalls the suggestion* of the 'then' I being different from the 'present' speaking I.

II

It is this, viz., consciousness, dalliance with itself, so to speak, which is lacking in the objective attitude and it is on account of such lack that the objective attitude is said to be one of self-forgetfulness.

Self-forgetfulness and the conception of self have to be understood in depth. The objective attitude is realised as having been rooted in self-forgetfulness only when the subjective attitude has grown, only when the self is realized,—self being nothing real if not realised. When the interest in self has grown the objective attitude comes to be *retrospectively* understood as the attitude in which self *did not* attend to itself. Self, so to say, castigates itself in the words 'I did not attend to myself'. The

more of interiorisation, the more is the realisation of self. When the interest in self has grown, when the subjective attitude has started there is a 'change of signature' in Husserl's words. In proceeding, then, from the objective attitude to the subjective, we do not make any temporal transition from one psychological state to another. When we reflect or retrospect upon the previous attitude it becomes *oriented* to the present attitude (i.e., the subjective attitude). So reflection-retrospection here is no review of a past state of mind : it is, on the contrary, a *new achievement* on the part of consciousness. In so far as the objective attitude is *constituted* by the subjective attitude, i.e., oriented to it, we may say that in proceeding from the objective to the subjective attitude, we really traverse twice on the same straight line.

And once we view the relation of objective attitude to subjective attitude in this way, i.e., once we understand that the objective attitude is constituted through the reflective-retrospective understanding of it, the traditional controversy between Idealism and Realism (to which Bhattacharyya refers) appears to us in a new light. What the Realist calls 'object' would be viewed by the Idealist as what consciousness did not distinguish itself from : it was *outside reflection* or non-reflective in short. But then the distinction between the reflective and the non-reflective point of view is itself reflective i.e., understood in reflection. So what the Realist calls 'object' is non-reflective; and since the non-reflective is known in the reflective attitude, *even the Realist thesis about the* independence of 'object' in relation to knowledge is grasped in *reflction,—a point which the Realist fails to see.*

III

To indulge in a bit of retrospection. In the beginning of this paper, we called attention to the two interests of consciousness. We may describe these two interests, in both of which knowledge is sought, as *manipulative* and *contemplative.* When, in the day-to-day conduct of our lives or in the pursuit of the sciences, we seek information or systematise information relating to particular items of nature, periods of history, general laws of nature or society, the pattern of behaviour of *a* person or *a* community (which general pattern is, so far, different from law), our basic interest is, in some way or other, manipulative. On the basis of what we come to know, we seek to control nature, adjust ourselves to it or it to us, plan our future, etc. It will not do to say that while technology is governed by such manipulative motives, science as *pure theory* is interested in *knowledge for its own sake.* From the point of view of science, 'knowledge for its own sake' is just a howler. So-called pure science is either a name for pure theory, i.e., a formal-deductive discipline, in which case it does not amount to "knowledge", if by "knowledge" we mean information about nature which science wants (unless, however, one prejudges the issue, in the manner of a Cartesian, in favour of such deductive model by taking it as representing the essence of Nature); or it is just a system of ideal contrivances. A scientist may, of course, reflect on the procedures he has adopted, the methods he has followed and the assumptions he has made. But such reflection is just *review* and is not to be passed for distinctively philosophic reflection. To be sure, such review requires a good deal of thinking on methodology, law-formulation etc. But such critical review, which may be called philosophy of science, is not philosophy proper. To the end of the chapter, philosophy of science remains as much world-bound, as much mundane in outlook as science itself.

Knowledge is sought in science in a manipulative interest and philosophy of science just consciously understands and procedures and methods of science in order, as it were, to sharpen the tools of science to help it fulfil its manipulative interest. When the knife compels *attention to itself*, that is because it requires to be sharpened in order that it can cut things better.

Contrast, now, the manipulative attitude in which knowledge is sought and attained with the contemplative attitude in which, too, knowledge is sought and attained. In the contemplative attitude, consciousness, in Bhattacharyya's words, 'inwardises' itself. What one comes by through such inwardisation may be, e.g., the transcendental constants of a Kant, the grades of consciousness of a Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, the regions of intentionality stratified into 'noesis' and 'noema' as revealed to the phenomenological epoche of a Husserl, the content-object distinction (in some modes of awareness) of a Kalidas Bhattacharyya etc.

One general name given to the studies founded on such inwardisation is Epistemology or Theory of knowledge. Now, the distinction we have made between knowledge as manipulative and knowledge as contemplative should serve as a warning against a current misconception about theory of knowledge. It is the misconception that theory of knowledge deals with the existing fund of knowledge, i.e., its principles, postulates, assumptions; in other words, theory of knowledge is reflection on science or philosophy of science. Three considerations count against such interpretation of theory of knowledge; two of them have already been indicated. *First*, reflection as understood in the subjective attitude is no *review* of already existing knowledge; reflective consciousness of consciousness is really consciousness's *being* consciousness, its achievement in the way of being inward. *Secondly*, as already pointed out, philosophy of science is to the end of the chapter chained to the world : it cannot, indeed it

must not, forsake its 'mundane' attitude, to use the Husserlian diction. And this leads to the *third* consideration : epistemology does not deal with knowledge as propadeutic to science, but with knowledge in its pure subjectivity, i.e., contemplativeness. As Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya has pointed out, "An epistemology must itself be a body of knowledge . . . "[3] 'Science' is of course 'knowledge'; but in conceiving of a philosophical discipline like epistemology we must not allow our minds to be clouded by such lexical synonymy. There is a positive *scientific* view of knowledge—as distinguished from a philosophic view of it—according to which knowledge consists in supplying information about the world *in the interest of manipulating it to our purposes*. If this scientific outlook in which knowledge is treated as an appendage to our mundane interests gets the better of our philosophic outlook, we fail to appreciate how in pure subjective reflection we can get another idea of knowledge. Epistemology is not only no theory of science but also no 'science' itself.

IV

From what we have said so far, we can now find the answer to the question raised in the introduction, viz., "how can the alternative views of knowledge square with the fact that in common parlance we regard knowledge as 'knowledge of . . . . . . ?.' " To state the objection more precisely : Professor Bhattacharyya gives two alternative views of knowledge but then how would he bring those views *conjointly* to bear upon the fact of knowledge being 'of' ? The answer is that 'knowledge of . . . . ' would be regarded by him as unreflective knowledge; he would at the same time hold that in so far as it is 'reflection' which discovers unreflective knowledge, it is the combinatory concept required by him to answer the aforementioned objection.

3. 'Knowledge and Truth'—in *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, Calcutta Progressive Publishers, 1958, p. 154.

The view of alternation that emerges is called by Bhattacharyya as 'disjunctive unity'. We tend to take alternatives as *two*. But as he points out, "The phrase 'two alternatives' is in a way meaningless. If they are alternatives there is no bothness and if there is bothness they cannot be alternatives."[4] In a disjunctive judgment, there is a "unitary thought[5] of two alternatives. Further, in a disjunction no alternative is rejected. "Disjunction means that when one alternative is *real* the other is rejected ...... What ...... is meant by disjunction is that each member is *alternatively* real.[6] In knowledge-object untiy, too, there is this disjunctive unity between subjective attitude. "Each attitude is valid, but alternatively.[7] It is, then, disjunctive judgment which truly reflects the knowledge-object unity.

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4. *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, Calcutta, Dasgupta and Co., Ltd., 1953, p. 149.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

5

Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes

N. K. SHARMA

It is only with the limitations I have that I can dare to write something on Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought. Prof. Bhattacharyya has rightly been admired and placed among the top thinkers of the country by most of us. It would have been a very valuable thing for me indeed if I could have taken stock of the whole range of his writings and presented it in my own humble way. But the short notice and other occupations made it rather difficult to attempt this adventure and I had to satisfy myself by confining this paper to his earliest, but by no means less important work, *The Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy.* No doubt there has been an evolution in his thought, as he himself has remarked and consequently there has been some change in his ideas in his later writings, yet as he himself admits that "with the main line of thinking in this book and with the vast majority of minor points (he is) still in agreement."[1] As a matter of fact, even for those who want to understand his later writings, acquintance with this basic work is a necessity.

Like a true philosopher Prof. Bhattacharyya starts by raising certain basic issues. He wants to start from the very beginning and build his edifice on the very foundation, developing it into a complete, comprehensive system. From this point of view he is different from most of the thinkers of to-day who suffer from adhocism and who pick up the thread from here and there and after developing that point to some extent leave it unfinished.

1. Bhattacharyya, Kalidas : *The Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* p. vii, footnote.

Bhattacharyya, on the other hand, has a vision of his own which he systematically and comprehensively works out with the help of his vast knowledge of philosophy.

Bhattacharyya is well aware of the fact that 'Philosophy stands suspect even to this day'.[2] He thinks that the reason for this is that "Philosophy has not yet gone deeper and there is something yet to be revealed, some fundamentals till deeper."[3] But, he remarks that "to go beyond these standpoints is impossible unless the standpoints themselves are thoroughly understood."[4]

We thus find in his work an earnest urge to understand sympathetically and critically different standpoints propounded by different thinkers. His main contribution lies in unveiling the deeper fundamentals. We shall be emphasising this aspect of his contribution in this paper, although his presentation and comments on the different standpoints of philosophy are also of no less value.

Philosophy, according to him, is a cognitive activity. It is through philosophy that we understand or interpret reality. But reality is given to us through knowledge only. The starting point for philosophy, therefore, can only be knowledge.

Now, as soon as we start reflecting on the knowledge phenomenon we find that knowledge is of the object; it is unitary, a whole uniting knowledge and the object.[5] Here both knowledge and object are equally evident. They cannot be proved by any inference, but are a matter of immediate feeling, a matter of faith. Any attempt, he argues at length, to reduce subjectivity to object or object to subjectivity is bound to fail. The subjectivity and objectivity again do not stand apart. They are

2. *Ibid.*, pp. ii.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. ii.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. ii.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

united. This unity is also as self-evident as the subject and the object are.

But this unity poses many problems. To understand the nature of this unity is the basic problem of philosophy without solving which, he believes, one has no right to philosophise. To come to the problems this unity poses, we find that there is a basic contradiction between the subjectivity and the object and that " in apprehending one of these the other has to be rejected."[6] In section IV of Chapter 1 Professor Bhattacharyya has explained the nature of this contradiction in detail. But as two contradictions cannot be true together, they cannot be asserted in one judgement. We cannot assert " subjectivity and the object " even though they seem to be united in our knowledge phenomena. In other words, the relation between the subjectivity and object cannot be that of conjunction as it is ordinarily understood.

He, therefore, thinks of another relation which may hold good between the subject and the object and that he finds in the relation of disjunction. In section III of Chapter 2 Bhattacharyya discusses in detail the nature of disjunctive judgement and also shows as to how the subject—object unity can be understood only as a disjunctive unity.

The disjunctive unity is the unity of alternatives and is expressed in the form ' Either A or B '. Here also two things are no doubt being taken together, but such togetherness of alternatives is infinitely removed from an ordinary togetherness ".[7] Replying to the objection that the predicative unity in disjunction is no more than a mere aggregate and hence unity at all, Bhattacharyya argues that the " disjunctive unity is immediately felt as unitary act of asserting the hypotheticals."[8] The disjunctive judgement, according to him, means not merely hypotheticals, but also the

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 73.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 136
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 139.

assertion of both simultaneously and in an identical act.[9] In reply to another question regarding what is the subject and the object of this judgement if the disjunctive judgement is a unity ? Bhattacharyya's reply is that each clause is alternatively the subject and then the negation of the other is the predicate.[10] He, thus, writes that " In a disjunctive judgement a negative supposal is predicated of a positive one."[11]

Why Bhattacharyya works out the disjunctive logic of the alternatives and why he makes this logic a pivot to his entire theme will become clear if we focus our attention on the difficulties which we have to face if we take the relationship between the subject and the object as that of conjunction symbolised by the connective ' and '. While analysing the knowledge situation, Bhattacharyya says that knowledge is apprehended in the " subjective " and object in the " objective " attitude. The subjective attitude means to be installed in subjectivity and as being one with it. It is withdrawal into subjectivity. But if it is a withdrawal into something, then it must also be a withdrawl from something and this " something " is the object. Further, according to him, " withdrawal from something means to reject that thing."[12] This rejection in its turn implies refusal to unity because " A rejects B " means that A resists unification with B.[13] And hence between " subjectivity " and " object " there is at least one-sided contradiction and so " they ought not to form a unity." " And yet the strongest of all things is that they have formed a unity, ' knowledge of object ' is a patent fact in which the two are caught unified. How could this impossible thing take place ?[14] And the basic problem before him is " How can

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 139.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 145.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 148.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 73.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 73.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 79.

this puzzle be solved."[15] The history of philosophy has been a continuous effort to resolve this riddle and make our knowledge phenomena acceptable to reason.

The thrust for this solution has been in three directions—the subjective, the objective, and the dialectical. These three attitudes have given rise to three kinds of philosophies, Idealism, Realism and Absolutism. All the three philosophies are valid from their own points of view and it would not be true to say that any one of them is more true than the other. All the three points of view can thus reasonably claim equal validity.

It is here that Bhattacharyya makes the significant point that only one of the alternatives of a disjunctive judgement can be asserted at a time. Both being opposed to each other are contradictory of each other, and hence the acceptance of one implies the rejection of the other, of course alternatively, and yet the alternatives do form a unity in a disjunctive judgement. Similarly, the three kinds of philosophies can be asserted, but only alternatively.

It is on the foundations of his analysis of disjunctive judgement and his categorising the subject-object unity as a disjunctive one that he builds his philosophy of Alternative Absolutism and we can do no better than to quote him in order to understand it. Giving everything in a nut-shell he says, "In the disjunctive judgement there is a disjunctive unity of alternatives. So here also knowledge and object, or the subjective and the objective attitudes, have to be taken as alternatives forming a disjunctive unity. Each attitude is valid, but alternatively. So we cannot have both knowledge and object at the same time, unless of course, we utter the verbal trite that there are these two alternatives. Actual philosophy which is more than this 'trite' is either from the subjective or from the objective point of view, not from both. The subjective and objective philosophies are each self-complete

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 89.

and totally in disregard of the other. Each alternative fulfils itself in a system, and the two different systems so developing stand in such a way that from the point of view of each the other is as good as nothing. Idealism and objectivism are such alternatives systems, each absolutely valid on its own ideology. There is no question of treating both as true, except verbally. As in philosophy we must be either Idealists or Objectivists. From each to both there is no passage in philosophy the ultimate logic of which is alternation. This view may be called 'Alternative Absolutism'—each is absolute but alternatively."[16]

Bhattacharyya's philosophy comes very close to that of the Jains. The Jain doctrine of Anekānta-Vāda and Syādvāda is very much similar to the philosophy cf the alternative absolutes. He himself admits that a "discussion of the Syādvāda of the Jains would have been appropriate and profitable in this connection."[17] Professor Bhattacharyya is a philosopher of great repute. He discusses at length many Western thinkers and most of the Indian systems in his book. It is, therefore, not at all clear as to why has he overlooked a system which was most relevant and important for his purpose simply on the pretext that his superficial acquaintance with Jainism prevents him from entering into it.[18] Had he paid attention to this system also carefully and in detail as he has done in other cases, he would have not only been greatly benefited but also forced to modify his system considerably. After carefully reading his book, I am tempted to believe that where he is in agreement with the Jains, he is right, but where he differs from them, his position is not that sound.

Let us first note the agreement as well as the difference between the two philosophies.

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16. *Ibid.*, pp. 153.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 163.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

In a sense Jains also accept the philosophy of alternatives. Jainism does teach that reality appears different from different points of view, and also that from different points of view alternative philosophies which are complete and valid from their own points of view are not only possible but justified as well. It is only when a philosophy which is valid from a particular point of view alone starts claiming absoluteness i.e., when any one of such philosophies claims that it is only this philosophy which is valid and all other philosophies are wrong that the dispute arises. The Jains declare any such claim to be fallacious. So far the two approaches—that of Prof. Bhattacharyya and of the Jains—seem similar.

But the difference appears as soon as we try to work out the relation among these alternatives and their respective status. Here Jains have no doubt that they (the alternatives) are related by way of conjunction. The word they use as connective between different alternatives is 'ca' and 'or'. They clearly argue that because each system is true from its own point of view and not absolutely, that is no contradiction involved in their being asserted together. The contradiction will hold good only if the word "*Syād*" (from a point of view) is not added in a judgement. The addition of this word in a judgement steers us clear of the fallacy of asserting two contradictories together. Not only this they rather insist on the use of the word 'and' in this judgement. According to them reality is Anekānta. It requires an infinite number of predicates to describe the reality truly and completely. No one predicate or set of predicates can be sufficient to give a complete picture of it.

How does Prof. Bhattacharyya respond to this ? It is obvious that he is strongly opposed to the use of the word "and" as a connective. It is in fact his main thesis and he has explained and elaborated it in so many words, as we have seen earlier. But here we may ask him whether these different alternatives or philo-

sophies are true descriptions or interpretations of reality or not? His answer, obviously, is "Yes". Also, he further agrees that these alternatives are true from their own points of view. Naturally, the term absolute in his phrase "alternative absolutes" has to be understood in a special sense. Generally we understand the word absolute as contrasted with the relative. But the alternative absolutes of Prof. Bhattacharyya are in this sense not absolute at all. What he means to say rather is that, human beings as we are, our mind is capable of understanding the reality only from these different points of view viz., the point of view of the subjective, the objective and the dialectical attitudes. These views are such that they cannot be synthesised in one judgement as this kind of assertion leads to contradiction. Whether there is a transcendence from these alternatives or not, we do not know. At least uptil now we do not have any knowledge of such a transcendance and there is little hope of finding one. We have therefore to be satisfied with these alternatives.

Bhattacharyya's attitude thus appears to be that of an agnostic. He says : "The disjunction between knowledge and object is precisely such a case. It may involve ignorance, most probably it does. But there is no possibility of transcending this ignorance. There is no conceivable standpoint from which *one specifically* of these subjectivity or object will appear as the final definite reality. What we have learnt so far believes any such possibility. Subjectivity *or* Object—this is the final disjunctive structure of reality. If this is incompleteness or indeterminancy, it has to be submitted to, as there is no way out".[19]

The philosophy of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya, then, cannot be the true understanding or interpretation of reality. It only refers to the appearance of it, if it is one. No reality as a matter of fact can admit disjunction as its true structure; it may only appear to us to be so.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 16 1

If this interpretation of Prof. Bhattacharyya is accepted then the difference between the two approaches becomes clear. But, then, the entire glamour of his thought disppears also. Having accepted the thesis of an agnostic, he cannot escape the conclusion drawn from the same premises by, for example, the logical positivists. If we can have no knowledge of reality at all on what grounds can we say that philosophy can give us any kind of knowledge. Not to talk of knowledge, there can be even no approximation to reality either. If we rebut the dilemma presented by him, we may even say that the alternative absolutes presented by him cannot be regarded as interpretations of reality as none of them may claim absolute truth. On the other hand, they cannot be true together either, as they contradict each other. In such a situation, no knowledge of reality will be possible. In other words, as there is no method to decide finally the issue of reality, all philosophy will become non-sense, in the liberal sense of the word.

We may also examine the concept of "the disjunctive unity of the alternatives"—a unity which is very close according to Prof. Bhattacharyya. While explaining the knowledge-object unity which he categorises as disjunctive later on, he tries to make the idea clear by giving an example. He explains the unity of disjuncts as the "rejection of the supposed negation". It is like the unity of the table with the absence of the inkpot. This unity, according to him, is a much closer unity than when we unify two positive entities. "Between the two positive unities there is always a factual relation which cements the relation into a unity. But between a positive and a negative there is no such factual relation felt, the only speakable relation between them is a predicative one, i.e., a relation obtaining only in the judgemental description of the whole affair".[20]

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20. *Ibid.*, pp. 11.

Here the concept of unity is being understood in the sense of "being related". But "relatedness" is a much wider concept. Even disunity is a relation. If we say that X and Y, are ununited, because the two terms occur in a judgement, we may meaningfully say that they are related, but this would not entitle us to say that they are united. Mere occurrence of two terms in a judgement cannot be called a unity. Such unity can at most be a verbal one. In what meaningful way, then can the two or rather three alternative absolutes of Prof. Bhattacharyya be said to be united? They contradict each other. One either rejects the other or is just indifferent to it. Shall we still call them united for the simple reason that they can be put together in a disjunctive judgement by any relation whatsoever?

Again, in the example given by him, the table is not united with the inkpot but with the absence of the inkpot. Similarly, one alternative is united not with another alternative, but with the denial or negation of it. But would it not amount to saying only that the two stand unnuited?

I think, therefore, that like all philosophers of the past, Bhattacharyya also fails to resolve the problem of knowledge. He also ends his philosophy with a note of distrust in the power of human mind to know the reality as it is. What he is stating is only a description of a philosopher's attitude when he is philosophising. But in philosophy the question of validity is also an important one. And this validity transcends the philosopher's attitude.

□ □

6

Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy

Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought

R. S. BHATNAGAR

This essay is a result of an encounter with a paper of Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya entitled 'Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy' published as chapter one in the book *Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy and other Essays* (1974). I regret that I could not study Professor K. D. Bhattacharyya's other related essays—particularly *The Nature of Reflection in Metaphysics* and *The Business of Philosophy* for which he himself made recommendations, in the preface to the book mentioned, for the convenience of other readers. Let me first present a summary of Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya's Paper :

I

The paper is divided into seven sections. In section one the author has sought to explicate the notion of 'presupposition' and to describe the variety of Presuppositions. In section two he has shown that Philosophy as meta-science studies certain basic concepts which do not belong to any of the types of presupposition discussed in section one. In section three it is shown that the concepts which are studied in philosophy are facts of different order. Epistemology, as a study of these presuppositions of metaphysics, is a study of third level. In section four it has been contended that there is no higher order study apart from epistemology and, therefore, an unending hierarchy of meta-studies need not to be postulated. Sections fifth and sixth constitute author's positive contribution to the nature of epistemology studies the presuppositions of metaphysics which may be regarded as pure-thought moving self-consciously in an autonomous and

international way. This pure-thought or subjectivity is *being Par excellence*. The seventh section points to the variety of ways in which meta-physicians may differ from each other and which may be based on Presuppositions which would form the subject of detailed study for an epistemologist.

II

Let me now try to place Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya's argument in the perspective of history of thought. It is strange that, unlike other disciplines, in Philosophy we frequently find the discipline itself being questioned both in respect of subject matter and method of enquiry. Almost every great philosopher was dissatisfied with what others had been doing in the name of doing philosophy and had sought to being *de novo*. In our century the situation has headed almost towards a total breakdown. Some of the greatest of contemporary philosophers have thought that almost all past philosophers were utterly confused with regard to what they were doing. They either failed to grasp the nature of language and so were entrapped by its snares or their worries regarding the nature of being were pathological in nature and thus what they needed was some sort of analytic therapeutics for the cure of their anxieties. In short, the official doctrine was that it is wrong to think that philosophers could know and describe ultimate reality. However, no panic need be caused with regard to their professional existence. They had more urgent things to do, for example sort out what kind of linguistic deceptions had misled the earlier philosophers, or what was going around, that is, what the natural scientists and social scientists were doing, what was happening in the campus of historians, artists, and what was going on in the society in the name of action or inaction. The directions which immediately became available to philosophical enterprise were quest for a criterion of meaning; characterizing discourse and its varieties; devising criteria for justification in different realms

of discourse; investigation into the nature, structure and dynamics of scientific theories or theories in any discipline for that matter; quest for an idea (artificial) language; inquiry into the more familier and frequently used concepts in individual and social aspects of life. One very important distinction that emerged and which has a sort of pervasive impact on recent thinking was concerned with object language and meta-language. The enterprise relating to the understanding of the structure of a theory, whatever area it may have been concerned with, involved formalisation as one of the strategies and formalisation required such a distinction to be made. A theory could be treated as a datum or object language to be formalised and meta-language could be treated as semantics of that theory in the narrow sense and as a meta-study in the wider sense. This indicates how the relationship between philosophy and science came to be understood at least in a partial sense but very widely. Now if philosophy were to forego its former pursuits and were to adopt a meta-study approach, then either we give up philosophy (in the later case) altogether or assume philosophy to be a meta-philosophy for it is supposed to be alone as meta-science but also with the older meta-physics as meta-philosophy. 'Philosophy as meta-philosophy' is obviously a paradoxical phrase. It is intriguine to the student of philosophy and compels fresh thinking about the nature of philosophy vis-a-vis a meta-study, and in relation to other sciences. This motivated Sri Mihirbikash Chakravarti to write *Meta-philosophical and model philosophical questions* (1972), and consequently also Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya to take up the problem of redefining philosophy. (K. D. Bhattacharyya 1974, page 1).

III

The basic arguments contained in the paper may be presented as follows :

..5

1. Philosophy studies "concepts like existence, negation, space, time, matter, substance, energy, motion, number, attributes, life, psyche and few other allied to these".

These concepts are supposed to be presuppositions of sciences, but they are neither axioms nor postulates, nor most of them even heuristic principles. (section III, p. 16). They are facts, but facts of "the second order" (section III, p. 19). "So far therefore, philosophy is meta-science, except that unlike the study of postulates it is a study of facts, and yet, unlike in supplementary studies, the facts studied are of quite another order" (section III, p. 19). In this sense philosophy is distinguished from all other sciences. It is also in this sense that philosophy is called metaphysics.

Add to this a remark made on page 22 (section IV) "Metaphysics ...... studies ...... facts ......of a trans-natural world." The facts of such trans-natural world are subtler, universal, abstract, and non-temporal. (section IV, p. 23). Since these concepts formed presuppositions of older science, philosophy is a second order study.

2. Philosophy, too, has presuppositions. It assumes that trans-natural facts may not be amenable to observational verification, that they are knowable through some other method, that they may be found related to observable facts, and that there may be specific ways to know them as apart from these observational facts. It is on assuming these that the study of philosophy can proceed with its investigation of the concepts mentioned in (1). Epistemology studies these assumptions and therefore epistemology is meta-metaphysics or meta-philosophy. These presuppositions are tentatively called postulates (See from note on page 23).

Add to this a remark made on page 30 "Meta-X is thus the study of the movements of thought by thought itself—a type of self-revealing consciousness, not indeed positing itself as an object for itself, for that is a theoretical impossibility, but just

moving self-consciously". In other words epistemology as meta-philosophy studies presuppositions of philosophy as meta-physics and also self-consciousness in a self conscious way, whatever that may mean.

3. No study of postulates whether they be of science or of any other discipline, "presuppose any other postulates for a higher level study, unless, ... the postulates are taken as historical events", that is, in the form of actual movement of thought as presupposing these postulates (p. 26). "The exact nature of the task of epistemology is no subject-matter for another higher-level meta study" (p. 28). Like logic and mathematics, meta-metaphysics is self correcting, not needing correcting from any higher level study. "This proves that there is no unending series of meta studies......" (p. 27) contrary to what Professor Mihirbikash Chakravarti takes to be the case.

4. Meta-meta-physics is a theory of knowledge. But it is not itself a body of knowledge. It is ontologically non-commital. The postulate of meta-physics is no fact or entity but a manner in which "thought (or language) moves in order that something is at all understood as a fact" (p. 30). "Meta-X that studies the postulates of X is only the study of the movements of thought by thought itself ...... " (p. 31).

Note : To summarize, we might distinguish between two aspects of philosophical enterprise : (1) in the form of being a body of belief about the most general features of reality, and (2) in the form of a self-conscious activity of consciousness itself. The second in some or other way illuminates the other.

IV

There are many other insights and thought—provoking statements found in the paper, particularly the ones relating to the criterion of ontological commitment. However, in the context of the present paper it would be convenient to concentrate only on the above arguments. The first thing I would like to state is

my own predilection for accepting the insights involved in the summary above. For quite some time I have been ruminating on the matter and tended to arrive at these very intuitions, without being sure of this myself. One of my main difficulties has been how to support these intuitions. I had great hopes when I started reading Professor K. D. Bhattacharyya's paper. But it appears I am not destined to derive much benefit from his toils. Perhaps that is an indication for toiling for oneself.

Most of my difficulties in understanding Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya's argument have been due to Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya's indifference to the prevalent usage of certain terms, and his effort to use of them in his own way. For example, take his use of the term 'postulate'. According to his usage, postulates are a variety of presupposition which are relative to a system in such a way that questioning them is questioning the system so they cannot be challenged from inside the system though they may be challenged from outside the system. They are further characterized as rules which are instrumental in the construction of the system. They do not have ontological status and they are not necessary about the world (p. 7). Normally, postulates are understood as certain basic propositions which are assumed in the deduction of further propositions in a system. As propositions they belong to the same cycle as other propositions of the system. They are chosen as postulates for pragmatic considerations as they facilitate the deduction of other propositions of the system given certain rules of inference. Thus, as propositions, they have cognitive import also. They are not instrumental in the sense that they are part of strategy alone. Now it is no sin to differ from the current usage and stipulate a different usage, provided that makes things easier.

Unfortunately the use stipulated by Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya does not facilitate the understanding of the relation between the postulates and the subject matter of metaphysics. The position of epistemic presupposition as postulate is not at all clear, but

it is equally difficult to comprehend how 'self-consciousness' can be used as *rule* of construction for the basic concepts which form the subject-matter of metaphysics. What sort of derivation or deduction is stipulated is not at all intelligible. Even if 'self-consciousness' is used as a rule of construction, how shall one reconcile with it the non-commital aspect of a postulate?

Prof. Bhattacharyya does not want to accept the idea of an unending hierarchy of meta-studies. He believes that epistemology as meta-metaphysics is self-corrective and hence needs no higher tribunal to meddle with its affairs. At least, I would also not want to have such an intruder. However, we cannot rest with this, for if we give up the idea of a meta-study altogether, to give up the idea of a meta-metaphysics too. In that case, we shall fail to distinguish epistemology from metaphysics *as* a study belonging to a higher order. Moreover, there is no reason why we should prevent sciences being self-reflexive. Professor K. D. Bhattacharyya comes close to asserting this while he remarks that reformulation of the basic concepts of science "makes modern sciences as much science as also a meta-study, i.e., philosophy" (p. 13). On the other hand logicians, mathematicians, and even philosophers would not accept the elimination of meta-study levels from their respective disciplines.

One may point to a related problem, the problem of the subject matter of metaphysics. The question of territorial rights over basic concepts is not finally settled. Sciences and religion both are concerned with them. Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya does distinguish between religion and meta-physics by asserting that in religion it is the application of these concepts which is dominant. But how shall we distinguish meta-physics from the sciences (even from older sciences) ?

Thus, the haze which surrounds the problem of defining philosophy and meta-philosophy is not dispelled. The way to the far lurking source of light remains still obscure.

□ □

7

*Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy**
A Critical Study

By
(Mrs.) **YOGESH GUPTA**

The present paper aims neither to offer a strengthened version of Kalidas Bhattacharyya's analysis nor to present any new alternative analysis which is different from what he has given. The present paper only attempts to draw attention to some issues which need clarification. Throughout the article many questions are raised which as such do not matter to the central thesis of the first three sections of his article. In this connection, the plan of the paper may be summarised under the following four headings :

(1) The earlier part of the first section gives a general introductory remark related to the author's views. In the latter part of the section, some basic issues concerning the nature of reality in social sciences, natural sciences and philosophy and the inter-relationship between them have been examined.

(2) The Second section of the present article is devoted to K. D. Bhattacharyya's views concerning the presuppositions of science and the analysis of their epistemic and ontic aspects.

(3) Section third is concerned with the examination and evaluation of K. D. Bhattacharyya's views concerning the relationship between study and meta-study.

(4) The central issue underlying Prof. Bhattacharyya's thought has been examined in the last section along with some general remarks.

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* Bhattacharyya, K. D. "*Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy* ", Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan (1972), pp. 1–47.

I

Prof. Kalidas Bhattacharyya's article is encyclopaedic in scope. It gives a synoptic and connected treatment of different cognitive realms such as logic, mathematics, syntax, semantics, epistemology, metaphysics, science, economics, anthropology, psychology etc. In this sense the article is more general and raises more foundational issues relating to these various disciplines than what the title suggests. If I have not misunderstood the author's intention the main issue which motives him seems to be to save metaphysics from the attack of logical positivists and establish its statue as a second order or even a higher order inquiry. For achieving this end, the author wants to make a clear-cut distinction between science and philosophy on the basis of the distinction between study and meta-study. In other words, he argues against those who believe with Quine that Philosophy and Science are continuous with each other or that there is no hard and fast line either between the logico-mathematical truth and empirical truth on the one hand or between the nature of theorizing and the nature of reality, on the other. As against this view, Kalidas Bhattacharyya makes a categorial difference of order between science and philosophy in terms of the nature of the presuppositions they have. In this connection the author also indirectly focuses on such issues as the subject matter of science and philosophy, the distinction between scientific and philosophical reasoning and the nature of theorising in science and in philosophy. The question of the distinction between philosophical reasoning and other types of reasoning is of central importance for the author and he has raised a number of related issues in a very attractive and lucid manner and given a view of philosophy which distinguishes it from other neighbouring disciplines in terms of the difference in the nature of their respective presuppositions.

But if we take a closer look at the author's contention we will discover the possibility of raising a deeper issue which he

has missed, i.e., whether different disciplines are water-tight compartments completely distinct from each other, each having a distinctly different set of its own specific basic concepts with no possible overlapping or relationship with those belonging to other disciplines? If we consider K. D. Bhattacharyya's contention in the light of the above question we would find that the different ideas put forth in his essay are incompatible with one another. The author has used the phrase "division of labour" which, according to him, is only a matter of practical convenience. However, if we consider at a deeper level it seems that the phrase "division of labour" is not just a matter of practical convenience; rather it implies a certain view of reality and subtly impels us towards it. In other words, the implicit idea behind the use of this expression suggests that reality is a single unified whole, and the various fields designated by the disciplines are different aspects of the same reality. They may differ, but qualitatively they are the same. But according to Bhattacharyya, this view of reality or the notion of "division of labour" is significantly applicable only to those realms the study of whose presuppositions does not demand a meta-level study. However, if we look at other domains of knowledge such as logic or mathematics or science or philosophy, the author's views about them seem radically different. Here there is a plurality of discourse or multiplicity of truth. Each discipline is not only autonomous in its own realm but also represents a unique sort of reality. For example, science is concerned with natural facts, events, empirical realities, while metaphysics is concerned with the object which is "spoken of", that is, an object which is of a higher order or which may be regarded as a trans-natural fact. On the other hand, meta-metaphysics or epistemology is concerned with what is merely "spoken" and not even "spoken of". Further, it is not only that science, and metaphysics or epistemology are concerned with different and more and more subtle types of being but they also have corresponding levels of reflection appropriate to them.

But, if we accept the division proposed by Kalidas Bhattacharyya, the issue arises whether in the presence of these incompatible views of reality (incompatible in the sense that on the one hand it gives a horizontal picture of reality where the study of the presuppositions of any study does not demand any meta-study while on the other hand it gives a vertical picture of reality where there is an ordinal or categorial difference amongst the cognitive disciplines), can we truly talk about reality in its totality or unity? Can we hold both the views simultaneously? And if we cannot, then can we resolve the tension by resorting to the logic of alternation ? If not, then does the author's notion of the logic of alternation apply only when a philosopher speaks of either idealism or realism or speaks from the standpoint of knowledge or freedom or value, to use his terminology, or shall we say that the issue of resolution does not arise at all since seemingly incompatible views of reality are not really incompatible? If we accept the alternative that there is no inconsistency in the author's views, then, either it means that since science and philosophy are concerned with two different types of reality, the reality with which social sciences (like Psychology, Economics, Anthropology etc.) are concerned with is of a lower order, inferior to the reality studied in the natural sciences whose presuppositions are studied in metaphysics. If it is so, then what sort of being does the reality corresponding to social sciences, has, and what is the status of the reflection corresponding to them. Further, what relation does it have to the reality which science and metaphysics study and the type of reflection they embody. Also, if this view is not inconsistent in the sense that different views of reality relating to different types of realms cannot be regarded as of a lower or higher order and that social reality has merely a different type of being such that the study of its presuppositions does not demand a meta-level study, then the question which was raised in the beginning, that is, can we significantly talk about the nature of inter-disciplinary knowledge in the presence of

these three types of being and their correlative types of reflection, arises again.

II

The second issue concerns Prof. K. D. Bhattacharyya's notion of presupposition itself. According to him a "presupposition" is a reflective concept, i.e., X presupposes Y means that both X and Y are apprehended reflectively and the fact corresponding to it at the unreflective level is just the fusing of Y in X. Presuppositions, according to him, are mainly of two kinds; those which demand a meta-level are in the form of axioms, postulates, heuristic principles or empirical facts as well as facts of a higher order. But if we accept the author's views on the definition of presupposition and its types, we face some difficulty. First of all, the first half of the title of the paper i.e. "Presuppositions of Science" gives the impression that all types of presuppositions of science will be discussed. But the author has given importance to and discussed only one particular type of presupposition of science; i.e., those which are facts of another order and are studied by metaphysics. But are not all the other kinds of presuppositions equally important ? Or does the author mean to say that all types of presuppositions, namely, axioms, postulates, regulative ideals, facts of higher order as well as empirical facts are not employed in all the different sciences but that each discipline presupposes only one of these types ? If this is not the case then the question arises as to what are the presuppositions of science in the form of axioms, postulates etc. and then which discipline studies the presuppositions in the form of axioms and postulates ? Does metaphysics as a meta-science have the right to study all sorts of presuppositions which science has ? If not, then which other discipline studies them ? Intuitively it seems that presuppositions of science in the form of axioms and postulates are studied at meta-level by disciplines such as logic or mathematics. If it is so, then can we significantly call logic and mathematics as meta-science in Bhatta-

charyya's framework ? And further how are all these meta-disciplines related to philosophy of science ? Is this branch of inquiry futile ? Normally, on the one hand, it is supposed to be a branch of epistemology where it is concerned with questions regarding the validation of scientific knowledge and on the other hand, it functions as a branch of metaphysics or ontology where it concerns itself with the reality of such concepts as space, time, matter, mass etc. But since the author has not used the word epistemology in the sense we have just used, the term philosophy of science cannot, for him, be a special branch of epistemology and hence has presumably no concern with such issues. But if philosophy of science is supposed to study only the substantive issues or, in other words, the reality of such concepts as mentioned above, then obviously philosophy of science will tend to become a part of ontology or theory of reality or metaphysics. But, then, how will it be different from physics proper? Also how then will philosophy of science be considered as meta-science ?

To return back to the original issue, the word used in the title suggests presuppositions of science (not sciences) whereas if we closely look at the presuppositions which the author has stated we will find that these belong not to science as such but to different sciences. Some of these belong to physics, some to life sciences and some to the realms of mathematics and logic. Now if some of the basic concepts belong to logic and mathematics and are studied by metaphysics as a meta-science, then this would mean that logic and mathematics are not self-conscious or self-correcting domains, a position which goes against his main thesis. The issue whether these are presuppositions of science depends on how the word 'science' is to be understood. It is not clear on what basis Prof. Bhattacharyya demarcates science from non-science. On the one hand, the very mention of concepts belonging to life sciences such as psyche, freedom, life testifies to the fact that the world is being used as

referring to a specific subject matter while on the other hand, it also appears to be the case that the word is also being used in a methodological sense as testified by his statement that common sense or common life can be treated in a scientific way. Now if the author is keen to include the basic concepts of common life amongst the presuppositions of science, why does he not include the basic concepts of social science amongst them also when there are such well established sciences, as say, economics or psychology, or sociology or linguistics.

Further, the presuppositions are normally in the form of statements or propositions and not in the form of concepts as the author seems to think. But even if we accept them in this form, the question would arise as to how are these concepts acquired ? According to the author, these are acquired or inferred by a special mode of consciousness which he calls "reflective apprehension" and whose essential characteristic is that it distinguishes entities which are not and can not be distinguished at the unreflecttive level. But can this inference or transition from first order to second order or from empirical to trans-empirical level or from unconscious to conscious or from unreflective to reflective or from undistinguished to distinguished level, be called objective ? The process of acquiring these basic concepts seems a purely subjective act or process on the part of the thinker who reflects. In this sense it seems very similar to the Berkeleyan position, "to be a metaphysical entity is to be reflectively apprehended." However, in Prof. Bhattacharyya's view, the object apprehended through reflection at the second order was already there in the undistinguished form at the first level. Hence in the process of reflective apprehension of a particular thinker it is not created but discovered by him. But if they are not created, constructed or posited by any subjective act of the thinker but only inferred or discovered by him, we may ask whether according to Prof. Bhattacharyya metaphysics infers only those basic concepts which are already admitted *a priori* though in an

undistinguished form at the unreflective level of experience ? Intuitively it seems that such an *a priori* requirement as to what concepts were admissible would not be helpful in understanding any phenomenon. A philosopher as a metaphysician must have the freedom to posit or imagine what might in principle be taken to exist in the world, that is, he should have the freedom to posit some other possible concepts than the ones given in experience.

Further, it is not clear how the basic concepts of science as higher order facts, especially the concepts of substrance, causality, relation, space, time differ from the Aristotelian or Kantian categories ? If they are the same then, can we also talk about conceptual change as we do in respect of the change of categorial framework from Aristotelian to Kantian or even from Kantian to that which is involved in quantum mechanics ? But if the possibility of addition, substraction, abandonment, reformulation or alteration is accepted, then they cannot be treated as *a priori.* And if this is not accepted, can we think of the presuppositions of science as existing independently of any change or progress, or innovation or creation in the various cognitive fields ?

III

The few remaining questions relate to the author's views on the relationship between study and meta-study. According to the author, study and meta–study belong to two entirely different and disparate orders. However, this or the relationship between study and meta-study seems acceptable only if we view metaphysics as a meta-science, as the author does. But as soon as we extend the scope of its application to other studies the solution becomes unacceptable. Take for example, Philosophy of Science as a meta-study of science. When one deals with the methodological issues relating to science or is concerned with the substantive issues pertaining to it, one has to be aware of the actual practice of scientists and take it into account. For example, when a philosopher of science like Hempel or Salmon

as a meta-scientist tries to find out the structure of scientific explanation he has to look at what is going on in actual practice when a scientist explains any particular individual occurrence. Hence, in this sense, a meta-study has to be parasitic on the study itself. It is of course true, as the author points out, that a physicist or a like scientist is not compelled to accommodate or accept the suggestions given by metaphysics as meta-science. But does this mean that science is self-contained, complete and autonomous in itself and does not depend on any meta-inquiry?

Moreover, this relationship does not seem to hold true in respect of modern science if it is to be regarded as a meta-science in relation to classical science. For, according to the author, classical science or Newtonian science or first level science is not bound to accept or consider the suggestions of modern science or quantum-mechanics as a meta-science, even though modern science does reflect upon the question the basic concepts of classical science as postulates of classical science. But in that case shall we say that the same concept may be treated as different presuppositions from discipline to discipline. For the metaphysician they are facts of a higher order, whereas for modern science the same concepts are only postulates and not facts.

But even if we accept the author's suggestion regarding treating modern science as a meta-science in relation to classical science, he would have to accept science itself as a meta-study of commonsense or as meta-commonsense. The author thinks that the process of reformulation occurs only at the stage of modern science where modern science challenges the classical concept of science (in the form of postulates) as it conflicts with some new experience. The point which has escaped his attention is that the same process also occurred earlier in the transition from commonsense belief to science or from perception to conception. In actual practice the concepts of science as embodied in the

language of science are acquired by a continuous modification or radical reformulation of the ordinary notions. For example, a common man believes the sun to be moving or the sky to be blue whereas the scientist explains why they appear as such even though the facts happen to be different.

IV

The crux of the author's contention lies not only in reviving the status of metaphysics as a genuine branch of knowlecge on the basis of his distinction between study and meta-study, but in avoiding the fallacy of *regressus adinfinitum* which is necessary consequence of the distinction, giving thus a unique status to epistemology, logic and mathematics. These realms are unique in the sense that, according to him, they are self-correcting and hence do not demand any further meta-study.

The first question that may be raised in this connection is, why does the author treat infinite regress as a fallacy in this particular context. Actually, a situation of an unending process of questioning should not be treated as a fallacy. And if the author treats it as a genuine fallacy which should be avoided in a healthy philosophical system, then the solution which he presents seems not only arbitrary but also open to the charge of circularity. The author's solution seems arbitrary in the sense that it is not clear why epistemology, logic and mathematics alone are given a secure position. Why are these realms given such an elevated position in relation to truth? Why is it that we can talk about philosophy of science but not about philosophy of mathematics of philosophy of logic which studies formal properties of syntax of the formal logical system. And, what is the interrelationship between all these self-correcting domains (i.e., those which do not demand a meta-level) like logic, mathematics, syntactics and semantics presuppose. Are all the self-correcting domains autonomous, self-contained and independent of each other? If not, then, what are the inter-relationships, for example, between logic and

mathematics. Traditionally, logic is treated as one of the branches of epistemology. Again, what is the relationship of logic with those realms which are not self-correcting. In other words, what is the relationship of logic to science and metaphysics. In a sense, logic must be presupposed by all the sciences, although the word "presuppose" here is not being used in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's sense. Again, does metaphysics have any relation with or effect on the nature of logic. It seems that all these disciplines are not as self-contained or independent, as the author thinks. Rather, they all are intrinsically interrelated. Any new discovery in one realm changes the outlook in others. For example, by incorporating certain assumptions of quantum mechanics we can build a logic which does not contain the principle of excluded middle. Now, if basic laws of thought can be challenged, i.e., not regarded as self-evident, then what will exemplify presuppositions in the form of axioms in Bhattacharyya's framework. Will an axiom, then, be merely a theoretical entity ?

□ □

8

Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and the Existentialist Thought

MRINAL KANTI BHADRA

In his philosophical speculations Kalidas Bhattacharyya has come to the notion of freedom again and again and it seems that freedom is one of his ultimate concerns. This has also been the remark of Jitendra Nath Mohanty in his essay on "Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician" in the book, *Self, Knowledge and Freedom.* Mohanty writes, "Kalidas Bhattacharyya's ultimate concern in metaphysics would seem to be both a theory of freedom and a theory of the possibility of realising that freedom".[1] The present paper proposes to devote itself to a study of Bhattacharyya's theory of freedom, as explicated in several of his essays and at the same time it will try to draw some parallels between Bhattacharyya's notion of freedom and the analysis of freedom as found in the Existentialist thought of the western world.

In his essay on "Freedom"[2] Bhattacharyya wants to show that there is really no contradiction between determinism and freedom. He thinks that there are empirical circumstances which give rise to different tendencies. These tendencies are determined by natural causes. But the situation as given presents different courses of action. Human choice does not mean just

1. J.N. Mohanty, "Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician" in *Self, Knowledge and Freedom*, edited by J. N. Mohanty and S. P. Banerjee, Calcutta, The World Press, 1978, p. xvi.
2. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, "Freedom" in *The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VII, Number 2, February, 1971, Visva Bharati.

giving assent to a particular course of action which depends on natural circumstances. Rather, it means I may choose not to submit to a natural pressure. In his words, " Given a particular tendency determined by empirical circumstances, there is the choice *to submit to it or not* ".[3] But Bhattacharyya adds further, " It is this choice not to submit which constitutes real freedom and it does not clash with complete determination at the empirical level."[4] He points out that I that does not submit is a real agent, as it refuses to submit. " It is ", as Bhattacharyya explains, "......a real free agent who choses not to submit to empirical pressure.......Herein, precisely, we have the idea of freedom as *transcendence*. Free man transcends nature. He is over-natural, even though otherwise he is a part of Nature, too. So far as he is a part of nature his behaviours are fully determined. But in so far as he is above Nature he is free."[5] The question may arise : Is the over-natural man free only in *not submitting* to Nature ? May he not also freely submit to Nature ? Bhattacharyya answers that man refuses to submit to Nature, because he considers it bad, immoral, anti-spiritual to submit that way. He is of the opinion that ultimate morality which is but spirituality itself consists in realizing or re-discovering man's own being and in consciously identifying with it. Bhattacharyya calls it positive freedom. He thinks that man's refusal to exercise this positive freedom may be called immorality. As he says, " In other words, it consists in freely submitting to Nature ".[6] Bhattacharyya talks of negative and positive freedom which we will discuss later in greater detail. For the present, we find that in his opinion " Whenever man transcends Nature he is so far negatively free, and as and when he positively constructs something, by way of reorgani-

3. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

zation or not, he is free positively ".[7] Now this positive freedom may be of two types, one which consists in creating spirituality and the other which consists in deliberate submission to Nature to produce immorality. Though Bhattacharyya at one time says, " Immorality ...... consists in freely refusing to exercise this positive freedom " which in his opinion is the re-discovery of man's spirituality, he says afterwards, " we have already mentioned another form of positive freedom where man deliberately, i.e., freely submits to natural pressures, though this freedom constitutes the immorality of his actions. But immoral or not, there is freedom here—he freely submits to nature—which means that freedom is not incompatible with the acceptance of Nature ".[9] He extends the notion of positive freedom to cover the cases of *moral* freedom also, i.e., freedom, of abiding by a particular course of action which one considers right. In Bhattacharyya's opinion, the question is not whether freedom disallows acceptance of Nature, but, rather, whether such free submission can ever constitute *morality*.

In our discussion so far of Bhattacharyya's idea of freedom we have got the following concepts :

(1) Freedom is an act of choice—either to refuse to submit to natural pressure or to choose to submit to it.

(2) In Freedom, man transcends Nature.

(3) Freedom is negative in the act of transcendence, but positive in construction of morality or immorality, though Bhattacharyya's sympathy is for positive freedom as an ideal of morality.

We shall refer in this context to Jean-Paul Sartre's theory of freedom as exemplified in his Existentialistic Ontology *Being and Nothingness*. Our aim will be to show that the ideal which

7. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

freedom wants to realize may not be identical in both the cases, but there are some positive similarities in the analysis of the basic notion of freedom.

Sartre thinks that the whole order of Nature may be ruled by a universal determinism, but it is man who can always ask a question about natural happenings and may want to know why an event is thus and not otherwise. So he says that man is a questioner and he has "the permanent possibility of dissociating himself from the causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only being."[10] Bhattacharyya has expressed similar ideas in his essay "Formal and Actual Freedom". He says "Freedom is the fact that man sometimes stands outside nature and resists all pressure—physical, biological, psychic, social, etc."[11] Nature, according to Bhattacharyya, means "The field where every event is completely determined by, i.e., predictable in principle, from other events that either precede it or happen after it determining it teleologically."[12] It is through sustained effort that man can acquire a more or less permanent attitude of so standing aside, and whenever he stands aside, he feels, rightly or wrongly, that he is more himself, or this is what Bhattacharyya feels. Both Sartre and Bhattacharyya speak of man's standing outside the causal nexus of nature from where he can raise a question and decide whether he will refuse to submit to nature or accept the submission to nature. Bhattacharyya speaks of choice and he thinks that choice can express itself in two ways. When a man chooses not to submit to nature, we have no difficulty in understanding that it is a case of choice. But if a man submits to nature, it seems that he is not choosing. Bhatta-

10. Jean-Paul Sartre—*Being and Nothingness*, New York, Philosophical Library, p. 23.
11. Kalidas Bhattacharyya—"Formal and Actual Freedom, in *Philosophy, Logic and Language*, Bombay, Allied Publishers, p. 155.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

charyya thinks that it is also a case of choice, for the man himself deliberately submits to nature. In a similar context Sartre says that freedom is the freedom of choosing but is also the freedom of not choosing. In his words, "Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose".[13] Analysed in the light of Bhattacharyya's ideas it may mean that when a man submits to the pressures of nature, he is choosing not to choose the resistance against natural pressure.

Bhattacharyya speaks of freedom first as negative and then as something positive. Freedom as negative may mean in the existentialistic of Jean-Paul Sartre that man wrenches himself "from being in order to be able to bring out of himself the possibility of a non-being."[14] According to Sartre, man is a being who disengages himself in his being as one who questions. This disengagement is a human process. Man, Sartre thinks, presents himself as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world. Thus, Sartre tries to show that "Man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world."[15] Sartre asks what a man has to be in order that through him nothingness may come into being. He gives a name to this possibility which human being secretes and which isolates man from other beings—it is freedom. Sartre goes further and says, "Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom."[16] Sartre believes that "man does not exist *first* in order to be free *subsequently*; there is no difference between the being of man and his being—free".[17] Bhattacharyya has not elaborated on the notion of nothingness, but if freedom is understood as producing something or creating something even with the materials of nature; it is a negative activity, as what

13. Sartre—*BN*, p. 481.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

does not exist comes into existence. The activity of production is negative, though what is produced may be something positive. It may be asked whether Bhattacharyya will call man a nothing and we may point out that in his opinion man is not identified with nature; rather, he is more than nature. We may like to state that this is an important similarity between the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre and Bhattacharyya's metaphysics of freedom, though we are aware that Bhattacharyya will not go all the way to say with Sartre that man is a nothing. But, perhaps, he will not disagree if it is said that freedom is the being of man, though that being is completely different from the Sartrean ideal.

In the essay entitled " Freedom ", Bhattacharyya speaks of the ideal of freedom as advocated by the classical Indian philosophers and in that connection he mentions detachment. He says, " Detachment is primarily my free refusal to submit to the causal determinants stated above."[18] In another essay, " Nature and Freedom " published in *Philosophica*, the International Bilingual Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, Sept. 1975, which was also presented at the International Society for Metaphysics, Second International Conference on " Man and Nature " held at Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, January 7–10, 1976, Bhattacharyya analyses the notion of detachment or non-attachment more lucidly. He says, " Non-attachment " means, " self-consciously withdrawing from a particular desire or aversion which is otherwise compelling. Man *qua* man often consciously refuses to succumb to external or internal pressure ".[19] Detachment, according to Bhattacharyya, is the *negative aspect* of freedom that is trans-natural. He calls it just negation, a vacuum pure and simple, a hole, in Nature itself,—

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18. Bhattacharyya—" Freedom ", p. 35.
19. Bhattacharyya—" Nature and Freedom ", in the papers presented at the International Society for Metaphysics Conference at Visva-Bharati, January 1976, p. 5.

a negation that is still 'natural'. But the moment one understands it as something positive, it has passed out of Nature and that which was thought to be 'natural' stands face to face with trans-natural freedom which had so long been peering through the 'hole'. "Detachment" Bhattacharyya says, "is really the point where nature and the trans-natural meet".[20] About the living body he says that it is natural, in so far as it is subject to natural, nomological laws. But he points out that the living body, in so far as it is also a lived body, marks a level of subjectivity, which was thought to be the first hint of freedom by K. C. Bhattacharyya. For Kalidas Bhattacharyya, however, the living body is consciously used by man for freedom. It is the first means of freedom and so for free man, "the body that is consciously used is no mere part of Nature."[21] Bodily movement which is self-consciously introduced with a view to bringing about change in nature is not entirely Nature's own. In his words, "somehow at some point it has originated freely and out of nothing; and so far Nature's law seems to have been violated".[22] Man's own nature, Bhattacharyya says, is no mere part of Nature; it is itself a microcosm, a tiny duplicate of the entire Nature, it constitutes a world of its own—a Leibnitzian *monad*. Viewed in this way human being is no *part of Nature* and no part can possibly represent the whole. "It is a full empire for each man," Bhattacharyya points out, "with all the offices and rules of management that are found in Nature".[23] This aspect of Bhattacharyya's idea of freedom which speaks of man as living in nature, yet being trans-natural may have some similarity to the concept of human being as understood by an Existential Phenomenologist of the modern age, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. John Wild in his "Foreword" to Merleau-Ponty's *The Stru-*

20. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*

cture of Behaviour says, " Human behaviour is neither a series of blind reactiions to external ' stimuli ', nor the projection of acts which are motivated by pure ideas of a disembodied, worldless mind. It is neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively objective, but a dialectical interchange between man and the world, which cannot be adequately expressed in traditional causal terms ".[24] Merleau-Ponty states that behaviour is neither physical nor completely mental, it expresses itself in the manner in which human being exists. As he says, " The world, in as much as it contains living beings is no longer matter filled with parts next to each other but ' hollows ' itself at the place where behaviour appears."[25] Spiegelberg in his book *The Phenomenological Movement* says, " What this metaphor means is apparently that behaviour is less of a break in the texture of the universe than full consciousness, which, according to Hegel and more recently to Sartre, is not, only a hollow (creux) but a hole (trou) in the framework of being."[26] Merleau-Ponty wants to establish the proper contact between consciousness and the environment through behaviour. He does not accept the materialistic line in which behaviour is a modification of the influences from the environment, nor does he accept the theory that consciousness is completely separate from the world and that human behaviour is not at all affected by the environment. He believes that man is in the world and human consciousness, or rather every consciousness, produces some change or break in the causal order of the environment creating a new form of existence. Merleau-Ponty thinks that there are three orders of nature—physical, vital and human. In the physical order every thing depends

24. John Wild—" Foreword " to Merleau-Ponty's *The Structure of Behaviour*, London, Methuen, 1965, p. xiv.
25. Maurice Merleau-Ponty—*La Structure du comportment*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1942, p. 136.
26. Herbert Spiegelberg—*The Phenomenological Movement*, Vol. II, The Hague *Martinus Nijhoff*, 1965, p. 542.

on the mutual relation between stimulus and response and the external factors maintain a perfect equilibrium. In the vital order a dialectical relation between the organism and the environment takes place. At the human level the pattern of behaviour is established by man's intentions, derived from his social and cultural world. Man has the power to choose, to vary his points of view and his objectives, as he can understand what he should do in terms of his possibilities. He has the freedom to go beyond the present environment and the meanings which have already been established to create new meanings. In the words of Merleau-Ponty, " This power of choosing and varying points of view permits man to create instruments, not under the pressure of a *de facto* situation, but for a visible use and especially in order to fabricate others. The meaning of human work, therefore is the recognition, beyond the present milieu, of a world of things visible for each ' I ' under a plurality of aspects, the taking possession of an indefinite time and space;...... Thus the human dialectic is ambiguous : it is first manifested by the social or cultural structures, the appearance of which it brings about and in which it imprisons itself. But its use—objects and its cultural objects would not be what they are if the activity which brings about their appearance did not also have as its meaning to reject them and to surpass them ".[27] Bhattacharyya says in his essay, " Nature and Freedom" that three quarters of man's being lies immersed in Nature and hence subject to causal determination. But, the living body is in a way more important for freedom than for any mechanical behaviour, cognitive or conative. Man not only uses it *consciously* but also knows that he can study and manipulate it at will. "Free man ", Bhattacharyya writes, " in other words, is directly concerned with his body : his freedom finds scope, primarily and chiefly, in his body—his own nature—

27. Merleau-Ponty—The *Structure of Behaviour*, London, Methuen, 1965, p. 1976.

and through it only, in Nature outside ".[28] Though three quarters of man, according to Bhattacharyya, is immersed in Nature there is a remaining quarter which is his freedom. Merleau-Ponty points out that human existence is a lived body and this body, as I live it from the inside is quite different from the objective body which is observed, though each perspective is legitimate and the two overlap at certain vital points, a situation which introduces an essential ambiguity into the very being of man.

Bhattacharyya refers to the phenomenological concept of freedom in the essay mentioned above. He says that the phenomenologist holds that freedom in its negative aspect is conscious resistance to nature, conscious withdrawal from it. But in the course of withdrawal there is also a recovery of itself. The phenomenologists call it " bracketing Nature ". But consciousness *intends* the whole world progressively and thus the two processes—the negative withdrawal and the positive intention—are in effect one and the same. As Bhattacharyya states, " Just in so far as X is withdrawal from, it is *intended* phenomenologically. This is exactly what we have meant by ' free construction '. Phenomenologists, thus, hold in effect that man constructs the pure strands of his own nature freely and, through them, of Nature outside."[29] But Bhattacharyya does not accept the phenomenological account, as it fails to explain how freedom could construct all the *perceivable details* either of his own nature or of Nature outside. Though it is not mentioned clearly, it seems that Bhattacharyya has in mind Husserl and the phenomenologists who follow the transcendental method with strict phenomenological reduction. But Merleau-Ponty opposes the idea of phenomenological reduction in the sense of complete withdrawal from nature and according to him, " the great lesson of reduction is the impossibility of reduction ".[30] In Merleau-Ponty's opinion the world

28. Kalidas Bhattacharyya—" Nature and Freedom ", p. 21.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
30. Spiegelberg—*The Phenomenological Movement*, Vol. II, p. 534.

is constructed by the meanings human being creates in course of his participation with nature and such meanings depend on man's dialectical interchange with nature as a free being. It seems that Merleau-Ponty's account of the construction of the world is more in agreement with Bhattacharyy's idea of free construction.

Bhattacharyya speaks of freedom as a rational ideal which operates both at the theoretical and the practical level. At the theoretical level he speaks of communicability of perception or of an idea to all human beings. He calls it rational cognitivity Often it is found that what we perceive is distorted by our unconscious identification with egoistic instincts. He says that theoretical reason doubts and questions perception and forbids us to accept the perceptual verdict until it is supported by reason. It does not mean that we have to reject perception wholesale. As Bhattacharyya remarks, " Much of perception has to be accepted which is tested by reason and that much rejected which with the *blind* use of our reason, viz., through its identification with egoistic instincts emotions and passions was distorted ".[31] In the practical field he speaks of a universal ideal which will be acceptable to all. But he thinks that in both the fields the principle is the same : detachment from the ego. When the practical principles become universalized, they are regarded as social norms and it may seem that in many cases such norms are foisted upon individuals as pressures. But Bhattacharyya is of the opinion that just as logical principles may be thought to be pressures initially but become gradually realized as identical with rational freedom, similarly, wise men in their rational practice of freedom come to understand the significance of social norms. Such norms are ultimately accepted gladly.

About freedom as a principle of reason in theoretical and practical areas of life, the Existentialists may not agree with him,

31. Bhattacharyya —*Ibid.*, p. 32.

for basically they are anti-rationalists. But in theoretical investigations they are influenced by Husserl's phenomenology and so when Husserl speaks of the cleansing of mind of all kinds of presuppositions including the naturalistic prejudice, they agree with him and want an unclouded intuition of the given. So they want that mind should be free from the influence of unclarified and unexamined assumptions and should concentrate itself only on the phenomenological datum. At least this is asserted by Sartre in his *The Psychology of Imagination* where he wants to examine the nature of imagining as a mental act. He writes, "We want to know nothing about the image but what reflection can teach us...... For the present we only wish to attempt a 'phenomenology' of the image. The method is simple : we shall produce images, reflect upon them, describe them; that is, attempt to determine and to classify their distinctive characteristics."[32] When Jean-Paul Sartre wrote his *Being and Nothingness* he was accused of subjectivism and anti-humanism. Sartre thought that the accusations were unjust and so he wrote his *L ' Existentialisme est un humanisms* which was published in 1946 and in that book he said, "The world 'subjectivism' is to be understood in two senses, and our adversaries play upon only one of them. Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism".[33] He said further that when it is said that man chooses himself, it is meant that everyone must choose for himself; but by that it is also meant that in choosing for himself man chooses for all men. As was pointed out by Sartre, "what we choose is always for the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all. If, moreover,

32. Jean-Paul Sartre—*The Psychology of Imagination*, New York, The Citadel Press, p. 4.
33. Jean-Paul Sartre—*Existentialism and Humanism,* London, Methuen.

existence preceeds essence and we *will* to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, the image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves."[34] Sartre calls this ideal, humanistic ideal of Existentialism and it is claimed to be universal in its scope. Whether Sartre's ideal is rationally justifiable or not is another question, but it cannot be denied that his theory of free choice has as its target the establishment of universal principles for the betterment of man-kind. Such an ideal is not distant from Bhattacharyya's universal goodness. About the acceptance of social norms Sartre will not object if they are chosen by the human individual in his freedom, for he thinks man to be the author of values. Again, the question whether such a man is selfish or capricious remains, but Sartre will insist on the selection of values and their creation by the human subject. Sartre expresses his view in this way "...... my freedom is the unique foundation of values and that nothing, absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values."[35] Again, we would like to point out that for Sartre the question of justification is not important, even though it is important for Bhattacharyya. To Sartre, value is a matter of choice and commitment and if something is really good for me, it should also be so for the whole of mankind.

The relation between 'I' and 'others' has been taken up by Bhattacharyya in his essay "Self and Others" where he tries to answer the question whether the 'I' with its freedom can harmonize with 'you' who is also a free being. Bhattacharyya elucidates the relation between 'I' and 'you' in a situation of love and he says, "in love which begins with the sense of freedom (unless it be merely natural) and then freely denies that freedom, the free subject is turned into a *you*, not merely in identi-

34. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
35. Jean-Paul Sartre—*BN.*, p. 38.

fying itself with the you that is loved but also in presenting itself as a you to be taken up by that loved *you*. This is literally a process of metamorphosis—*I* completely changes into *you* by denying its I—hood ".[36] He speaks of the realization of the cognitive freedom in two aspects and in both the reference to *you* is present. In the purest level of the realization of the I subject, " the Absolute must be taken as having some special affinity with the purest subject, the possibility of its play with *you* arising only as it was incarnate in the purest subject ".[37] Analysis of this interpersonal relation in the context of freedom reminds us of *Martin Buber's* ' I-thou ' and ' I-it ' relation. Buber thinks that the ' I-thou ' word can be spoken with the whole being but it can never be spoken with the ' I-it '. It is said by Buber that " in the ' I-thou ' relation, however, we relate totally to the other and we do so by becoming open to him. He is not just externally ' there ' for us; nor is he an end to some satisfaction beyond himself ".[38] When the ' I-thou ' relation is lost it degenerates into the ' I-it ' relationship. The person is turned into a thing. There is also the possibility that the ' I-it ' relation may blossom into an ' I-thou ' relation and according to Buber, such relation is also possible between man and nature. A total relation to a tree is possible and Buber says, " it is bodied over against me and has to do with me as I with it...... Relation is mutual ".[39] Buber says further, " I encounter no soul or dryad of the tree, but the tree itself ".[40] Buber insist on dialogue between persons and thinks that the interpersonal relation is dialogical. Buber also speaks of an ' I-you ' relation which res-

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36. Bhattacharyya—" Self and others " in *Philosophy, Logic and Language*, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1965, p. 138.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
38. John Macquarrie—*Existentialism*, Penguin, 1977, p. 108.
39. Martin Buber—*I and Thou*, trans. R. G. Smith, New York, 1958, p. 5.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

pects the personality and humanity of the other, but does not seek to establish with him the depth and intimacy that are customarily associated with the notion of the 'I-Thou'. As we have referred to above, Bhattacharyya speaks of an 'I-you' relation in which the personality of 'you' is given an importance, but he speaks also of the love in which the separate personalities are mingled into one consciousness.

In his essay on "Formal and Actual Freedom" Bhattacharyya speaks of the relation between two kinds of freedom as follows :

Though we start with actual freedom, the formal freedom has been in actual freedom in an undistinguished manner. The formal freedom is an over-natural presupposition of the actual. But as a postulate, it is not dead because it is the source of some basic moral rules. Thus, as a presupposition of acts, formal freedom is also actual. But it can not be regarded as just identical with acts, for it is the original urge and have not reducible to acts. But the original freedom is idle without realisation; it has to be realised in acts. As Bhattacharyya writes, "it follows that if being-good is a state of *realisation*, it must be of the form 'doing good'. There is no self-contained inward realisation called 'being-good'."[41]

If we look to the Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre we find that he makes no such distinction between original freedom and freedom manifesting itself in acts. On the other hand, he is against all dualistic talk. He denies the duality between potency and act. He says that the act is every thing. He points out, "we shall refuse for example, to understand by 'genius"— in the sense in which we say that Proust 'had genius' or that he 'was a genius—a particular capacity to produce certain acts which was not exhausted exactly in producing them. The genius

41. Bhattacharyya "Formal and Actual Freedom" in *Philosophy, Logic and Language*, p. 160.

of Proust is neither the work considered in isolation nor the subjective ability to produce it; it is the work considered as the totality of the manifestations of the person".[42] Though Sartre speaks at the beginning about the rejection of all kinds of dualisms, it is not really true that he has been able to give them up completely. In fact, Sartre is criticised by many phenomenologists as a dualist of the Cartesian type, though the criticism seems too harsh. But Sartre speaks of consciousness as the being of freedom and even though he says that the being of freedom consists in non-being, acts of negation, it cannot be denied that he has some idea of the being of freedom as distinguished from the acts. Sartre says that man's freedom is exercised in the fulfilment of his desires. He has a desire, because he suffers from lack. Desire expresses itself in doing, but ultimately a desire can only be the desire to be. "Thus ontology", Sartre explains, "teaches us that desire is originally a desire of being."[43] Sartre has made in this connection a detailed analysis of the relation between "doing" and "having" into which we will not enter, but this much we may say that, according to Sartre, "...... desire is determined as a desire to be a certain being, which is the in-itself-for-itself".[44] The question may arise in this conncction whether the ideal of freedom which according to Sartre, is also the being of man through its non-being as it does not yet exist, is not also a kind of presupposition. But as it is the presupposition which is for ever attracting man to the distant future, is it not also a kind of formal freedom as well as actual, formal in its character of presupposition but actual in its everpresent living urge ?

Bhattacharyya has mentioned about the limitations of freedom and these are, according to him, physical, biological, psychic and social. He says that no man is born in a vacuum; everyone

42. J. P. Sartre—*BN.*, p. xivi.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 585.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 586.

begins life with a social heritage and environment and his freedom has initially to accept and operate in and through these. He says further "Social structures constitute limitation to actual freedom so far only as we have to start with them ...[45] There will not be any difference of opinion with Sartre on this point, for he would say that the situation, which is a product of contingency and the in-itself and of freedom, is something ambiguous in which it is impossible to separate the contribution of freedom from that of the brute existents. He says further, "Human reality everywhere encounters resistance and obstacle which it has not created, but these resistances and obstacles have meaning only in and through the free choice which human reality is".[46]

Bhattacharyya tries to understand the ideals of freedom in two broad ways, but to him these are equal alternatives. A man can choose either of them as the project of his life, to use an existentialistic term. Freedom, as Bhattacharyya says, can wholly transcend nature and constitute an autonomous region of non-spatial-temporal eternal truths or it may operate within nature freely viewing all natural contents as they should be. The first is called transcendent freedom, while the latter may be, called immanent freedom. The first is spiritual freedom where there is no cleavage between the subjective experience and the object experienced. Even if there happens to be a cleavage, there is a sort of community between the subject of experience and the object and in all cases, "it is some sort of sport with the Absolute itself."[47] Both in the cognitive sphere and the conative sphere of the spiritual freedom, "it is but that spirit narcisistically turning upon itself with a view to accelerating, or even decelerating as the case may be, its spiritual progress, one element of

45. Bhattacharyya—" Formal and Actual Freedom " in *Philosophy, Logic and Language*, p. 162.
46. Sartre—*BN*. p. 489.
47. Bhattacharyya—" Nature and Freedom ", p. 42.

this spiritual experience supplicating, another that stands ahead and repressing or reorienting itself in so far as it stands behind or as the case may be, playing with the advance element and whatever remains behind in an attitude of equality."[48] Bhattacharyya has not explicitly mentioned whether the transcendent freedom is the subject as freedom, like his illustrious father K. C. Bhattacharyya who says "......it may be free even from this distinctness, may be freedom itself that is de-individualised but not therefore indefinite—absolute freedom that is to be evident".[49] It seems that for Bhattacharyya, the transcendent freedom is not limited to the subject as freedom, but it is the non-distinctive distinctionless freedom itself, where the subject and the object are in communion with each other. It may be called the I, the subject, but it is a subject beyond individuality. K. C. Bhattacharyya also speaks of a de-individualised subject which is the subject as freedom and so the comparison between the two on this aspect of freedom should be interesting. But we are not going to explore it here. However, we would like to see what exactly immanent freedom implies.

Bhattacharyya calls it first transcendent—and—immanent kind of freedom. It is the free man who after enjoying his transcendent freedom returns to nature and views it as it ought to be to attain the fulness of his spiritual life. But of the immanent freedom there can be another kind in which the function of freedom is to organise nature in accordance with itself. But in the sphere of immanent freedom Bhattacharyya also talks of a freedom which is wholly immanent in nature. Here freedom is the driving principle which goes to constitute a depth-dimension of nature. Nature proceeds to evolve its best from the stage of implicitness to the stage of explicitness, and such an explicitness shows itself with the emergence of man. Man moves on

48. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
49. K. C. Bhattacharyya—" The Subject as Freedom " in *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, p. 92.

to establish the best form of human society as nature tries to realise 'natural' freedom as its highest. In these different kinds of freedom, each of which is self-contained, we may either continue in the naturalistic attitude or we may adopt the attitude of freedom, or we may combine the two attitudes. But in each case, "The choice is final, i.e., existential".[50]

It will not be out of place to mention that in the thoughts of Jean-Paul Sartre freedom is a project and as such the ideal is "the absolute, being of the self with its characteristics of identity, of purity, of permanence, etc., and as its foundation".[51] According to Sartre, the free project is foundational, because it is my being. Ambition, passion, inferiority are not fundamental projects, rather, they have to be understood in terms of a primary project which can no longer be interpreted in terms of any other project which is total. But this fundamental project is my total being-in-the-world, and as the world itself is revealed in the light of an end, this project points as its end a certain relation which the being-for-itself wills to adopt. The choice must be a choice in the world. Sartre thus speaks of freedom to establish a satisfactory relation with the world or nature. At least that is man's ideal, but Sartre thinks that man is for even a failure, while Bhattacharyya would admit a progressive realization of that freedom which seeks to create a harmony between man and nature. So the ultimate condition of freedom may not be the same in Bhattacharyya and Existentialism, but the framework in which the notion of freedom has been presented exhibits many undeniable similarities.

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50. Bhattacharyya—"Nature and Freedom", p. 46.
51. Sartre *BN.*, p. 93.

9

Kalidas Bhattacharyya on The Indian Concept of Man

RAJENDRA PRASAD PANDEY

Much of Kalidas Bhattacharyya's later writing is centred around philosophical anthropology and philosophy of culture. What makes his contribution in these fields particularly remarkable is his clear and comprehensive presentation of the unique Indian perspective on Man, Nature and God. He develops in and through this perspective an integral humanistic thesis which preserves within its fold both naturalism and spiritualism. The striking features of this humanistic thesis are brought out by Bhattacharyya by contrasting it, on the one hand, with the corresponding western thesis and by showing on, the other, that it in fact represents the original insight of the traditional Indian culture. His discussion pre-supposes, however, what he calls "the Indian concept of Man" as the cornerstone of the aforesaid humanistic thesis. But before we take up Bhattacharyya's analysis of this concept for a detailed study it would be of some interest to note how he develops the unique Indian thesis on Humanism in contrast with the corresponding western thesis.

I

A most remarkable feature of human life is man's quest for happiness. And the quest is a real one for him—in fact its reality constitutes the very foundation of his culture and civilization. Man begins in a life which is full of suffering of all sorts. How to remove this suffering ? Knowledge in this respect requires that man understands the underlying causes of his suffering because only then can he be assured of removing the existing

sufferings and find the means of avoiding them in future. Unlike the dominant modern view which discovers these causes in man's dependence on Nature and Society, the religio-cultural views of yore sought them in human nature itself. The traditional Indian view in this respect, according to Bhattacharyya, holds the human "cognitive imperfection" (mithyā-jñāna) to be at the root of man's suffering—a view radically different from the Christian view which traces all human suffering to the 'original sin' of man.[1] (In fact it can be readily noticed that the said Christian view may be extended to cover all religions of Semitic origin, just as the Indian view would essentially cover all religions of Indian origin.)

Some modern scholars of religions tend to generalize extensively and thereby blur the fine distinctions that obtain between religions belonging to different cultural traditions. Consider, for example, the following remark by a noted sociologist of religion : "......the true believer can only sin within the framework of his own *religious* value system and relational system. The source of morality and, therefore, its requirements of man are other-worldly. Man's primary relationship is to God, not to man; the latter relationship is quite irrelevant, or, at best, secondary and derivative."[2] In his article, "Is Man Originally a Sinner"? Bhattacharyya gives at length the reasons why such a view should apply only to religions of Semitic origin and not to those of Indian origin. The Semitic view, particularly its Christian variation, incorporates sin at the very core of human essence, whereas the Indian idea of 'cognitive imperfection' does not belong to the human essence even as it is associated

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1. See his "Is Man Originally a Sinner?" in *Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission of Culture* (hereafter BRMIC), Vol. XXII, No. 1, Jan, 1971.
2. P. Worsley; *The Trumpet Shall Sound*, 1968; McGibbon and Kee, p. 22.

with it from the very beginning.[3] Some very important consequences follow from this apparently innocuous distinction between the two views. Thus, in considering man's relationship to God, the Indian view, unlike its Christian counterpart, does not drag in God to account for human imperfection and the consequent suffering in man and in the world. "One who is traditionally Indian will be the last person to call a man sinner since-his-birth. That, according to him, would be casting aspersion on divine wisdom and kindness. Why should God so arrange that human being be sinful from the beginning ?...... In Indian tradition, man is essentially only divine or neutral, and all imperfection—moral or otherwise—is adventitious, if not also illusory, and removable largely through man's own effort."[4] Bhattacharyya goes on to caution us that "from the beginning" is not the same as "essential", for "something may well cling to man from the beginning without being essential to his nature". Again, when something is thought to be essential, "there is neither any belief that it will one day be removed nor, therefore, any urge felt to get rid of it." Thus we have a very clear distinction drawn between the views held in Indian and Semitic traditions : it is only in the Semitic tradition that God is one of the essential presuppositions of morality. In the Indian tradition, on the other hand, *dharma*, which in its broad frame work includes morality, is a positive force which may sustain itself without a reference to God, as is most clearly seen in *Mīmāṁsā*, *Sāṁkhya*, *Buddhism* and *Jainism*. Even in other systems of Indian thought, like *Nyāya* and *Vedānta*, Bhattacharyya points out a similar understanding of *dharma* is involved in the sense that *dharma* may prepare a man spiritually for final salvation, even without a helping grace from God; but it is not considered significant just for this reason only. At the more common level, especially in the sphere of the physical and the psychological existence of

3. BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 1, Jan. 1971, pp. 5–7.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

man, *dharma* is practised for its own sake, and for the sake of a healthy social and natural organization of the human affairs.

It is true that somewhere along the growth of ideas the ideal of *mokṣa* emerged as the motive force for *dharma* pursuits—a development to which, among other things, the Buddhism and Islam perhaps contributed most.[5] But, as pointed out by Bhattacharyya, this cannot be regarded as consistent with the original cultural insight of Indians; for, if *mokṣa* were to be the *conscious* motive force for *dharma* practices, that would amount to rejecting the time-honoured principle of *adhikāra*.[6] In fact, Indians had an express motive in thus keeping *dharma* relatively free from the *mokṣa* ideal; it was meant primarily as support of a healthy growth of man in the areas of *artha* and *kāma*—the twin *puruṣārtha* along with *dharma*, traditionally called 'trivarga', as the commoner's ideals.[7] The 'varga' called 'mokṣa', on the other hand, was meant only for a select few and its relation with *dharma* was only this that even as *dharma* is practiced for its own sake, it would ultimately lead one to *mokṣa*.

The reason why humanism in India grew within the tradition of religio-cultural thinking, unlike Europe where it arose as a revolt against the Christian tradition, should now be obvious. The traditional Christian theology depicted a highly deterministic universe in which human freedom was more apparent than real, dominated as it was by the omniscient Father from above and

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5. See his "Spiritualism Not Anti-Humanistic", in BRMIC, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, June 1978, pp. 125–127.
6. Ibid., p. 125. Prof. Bhattacharyya explains in a footnote here that the "principle of *adhikāra* is that people should do their duties according as they are equipped."
7. Cf. Prof. Bhattacharyya's 'general formula of Indian Life': "Do everything that nature demands, but do it under the overall control of *dharma*". BRMIC, Vol. XXIX, No. 9, Sept. 1978, p. 201. His article "Humanism As The Culture Of Active Social Life", appearing in this issue of BMRIC, may be read profitably for an Indian theory of *praxis*.

by the omnipresent Church here on earth. In india, on the otherhand, the belief was that the destiny which guided man, at all levels, including that of spiritual realization, was determined by man's own free action within or without the framework of Nature and with or without the grace of God. In other words, man creates and re-creates himself in his own image, in realization of his primordially unrestricted, but historically developing, will, thought and action. The initial cognitive imperfection of man is no doubt a necessary impediment on the way to this realization, but it is also within his competence to over-come this imperfection through his own efforts (sādhanā). Thus, man is the original being; he is not made in the image of anything else, including an alien God as believed in Christian tradition.

Finally, the point of essential neutrality in man, as understood in the Indian tradition, according to Bhattacharyya, is that the secular aspect of the human life is valuable and positive and is not necessarily infested with sin. It can be pursued for its own sake in an orderly and dignified way. Again, what is secular in life is not by itself antagonistic to the spirirual, though indeed it is not on its own a help to it either. In the hoary past he points out, the Indian materialists called ' Suśikṣita Cārvākas ', like the modern Marxist, Existentialist and Utilitarian thinkers, developed an elaborate humanist thesis based on the secular ideals of *artha* and *kāma* within the general framework of *dharma*. The *dharma* then signified the very philosophy of life. Later when it was oriented to the specific goal of *mokṣa*, even there the basic tenets of humanism were not forsaken : duties to one-self and to others, including the whole Nature, have to be freely chosen and followed by the *mumukṣu*. One can become free from Nature only in so far as one freely incorporates it in his own being and *thereby transcends it.*[8]

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8. Prof. Bhattacharyya writes : "There were indeed philosophies of the Sāṁkhya and (Advaita) Vedānta types which admitted that for a very select few it was necessary to transcend all-

In short, the humanistic view which developed and matured within the religio-cultural tradition of India permeates the whole of man, all his existential levels. Most notably, it secures man in his naturalistic-secular set-up and may yet, unlike its western counterpart, guide him on his spiritual journey to *mokṣa* through *sādhāna.* Bhattachatyya rightly suggests that it is primarily due to such a resilient character of the humanistic idea in India that the Indian tradition and culture survived through the long tortuous course of history.[9]

II

It should by now be clear that the concept of man which the kind of humanism just described must involve as one of its basic presuppositions would emphasize the unity between man's physical-psychological nature, on the one hand, and his transcendental-spiritual existence, on the other. This point of emphasis would appear particularly interesting when seen in the light of the Christian rejection of *flesh*—i.e., the natural side of man with his earthly interests and aspirations—as totally alien to *spirit.* In Indian philosophy and religion the two have rarely been dichotomized that way.[10] Man has not only a kind of spiritual unity with the highest being (God or Absolute), as indicated, for example, in the use of the word *puruṣa* for both,

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nature...... But there was a principle behind this selection...... and one of the requirements was that they had done enough of socio-moral duties......' Natural' life was relevant at least to this extent. What more these systems have permitted is that these men...... (may) come down to nature at times of world-crisis, or even earlier, for the benefit of others. This was also......what the *Jīvanamukta* puruṣas...... were supposed to do". BRMIC, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, June 1978, pp. 124–125.

9. For a brief story of this 'survival', see, *Ibid.*, pp. 125–127.

10. Ibid., p. 123 f.

but also the spirit, even as united with the highest being, *dwells* in human body, in homely association of care and concern for its dwelling, which again is indicated in the significance of the same word *puruṣa*. Bhattacharyya observes, therefore, that this unity between flesh and spirit in man's being is no mere conjunction or juxtaposition of two self-contained exclusive elements, it rather represents "two sides" of man,[11] distinguishable and yet inseparable.

The two sides can be distinguished in what he calls "different levels of dissociation of the spirit." In his elucidation of the concept of man this idea of "dissociation" plays a key role. At each level of spiritual dissociation, that aspect of man's being from which the spirit gets dissociated is held in clear relief so as to be seen in its own true and un-affected being. What is more, one moves deeper into understanding its being in the light of the fact that now it is projected as a creation of the spirit, which, however, coincides with its real nature.[12] In other words, man moves in a world which from a higher standpoint is his own construction, but which nevertheless is a real world if his spirit does not attain a higher state of dissociation. Progressive dissociation of the spirit, however, is a basic feature of the historically developing being of man. The occasion for it arises "because at each lower stage (the gross Nature being the lowest) we discover some paradox which cannot be solved except by postulating a higher stage of dissociation of the spirit by and treating the paradox in question as just symbolic, pseudo representation of that dissociate spirit in the self-defeating language of the lower."[13]

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11. "The Indian Concept of Man : Unity of Spirit and Matter", BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1971, pp. 222.
12. "The Indian Concept of Self" by Prof. Bhattacharyya, in BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 8, August 1971, p. 305.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

We may now note the kind of significance human body, in the form of the 'flesh' side of man's being, achieves in the light of spiritual dissociation. In its meaning as the "physical body", as flesh proper, it no doubt remains the most basic and irreducible category. Bhattacharyya describes its basicality thus: "......nothing can belong to the material side of man that has no connection with the physical body." On the negative side, even *spirit* may be distinguished only with reference to the physical body, as consisting of "elements, acts and dispositions that *do not* owe their origin to the physical body......"[14]

However, when viewed as an item in the 'unity' which defines man's being, the human body tends to give its more significant meaning in the form of "vital body". In fact, the said unity itself is marked with a kind of "life",[15] which cannot be interpreted in its entirity if one were to consider the body or the spirit exclusively. As remarked earlier, the unity constitutes the primordial beginning of man in life; and, moreover, it is because of such a beginning that the matter identified as the human body is endowed with life, i.e., it is treated as a living body, a purposively attuned organism. For the same reason, the spirit is identified to be the life-principle having a definite material context. In the words of Bhattacharyya, "the lowest form of this spirit is life."[16] To say, therefore, that the human body is a living body is already to affirm that it is in a necessary association with the spirit. "Even the primary cell or cells which first formed the embryo in the mother's womb were *living*; in other words, the spirit in question was somehow associated even with them...... What it all means is that though, to whatever extent, the spirit may be recognised in its

14. "The Indian Concept of Man: Unity of Spirit and Matter", BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1971, p. 219.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

autonomy...... the material side which is transcended is never dead matter...... "[17]

We may note here that his elucidations on this point are not always clear. He seems to be suggesting, on the one hand, that a human body, even when dead, is not a pure and simple matter, *because of* its association with the 'life-principle' spirit which imparts a kind of spirituality to the body.[18] But, on the other hand, he appears to attribute this 'life' only to the given unity of the body and the spirit. Perhaps the obscurity here may be resolved by referring it to the Upaniṣadic idea of *koṣa.* In each case, *koṣa* represents a 'life-unity' having the body as its locus and the spirit as the located *puruṣa* therein—the former as the 'filled-in' and the latter as the 'filler'. In fact, this Upaniṣadic idea seems to be at the root of his idea of "dissociation of spirit". In both cases the spirit or *puruṣa* moves onwards to subtler states of consciousness and in each case of such movement the body acquires a new meaning.[19]

Again, in so far as 'life' cannot be properly understood in terms of matter as such, one may be tempted to attribute it to the spirit—much in likeness of Henri Bergson's '*elan vital*'. That he does not seem to subscribe to Śaṁkara's Māyāvāda, or to Hegel's "movement of the Absolute", nor again to Vijñānavādin's dynamic phenomenalism, may strengthen one's impression of Bergsonian influence on him. There is no doubt, however, that there is much beside Bergsonianism in Prof. Bhattacharyya's thinking. His closeness to *Sāṁkhya* and *Mīmāṁsā* standpoints may in fact suggest that he would ascribe to the human body a certain irreducible functional vitality—the asso-

17. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
19. See, e.g., the changing meaning of the word *koṣa* in the sense of body in forms of *annam, prāṇa, manas, vijñāna* with the corresponding forms of Puruṣa or Spirit as *prāṇa, manas, vijñāna* and *ānanda*—the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 2. 2–5.

ciation with the spirit helping only to render it transparent to understanding and which at the level of the spirit may emerge in the form of 'life-principle'. That the human body as living body is only one beside many other animal bodies, perhaps requires that even as a vital body it is distinct from all others. This requirement seems to have been met by associating with it the spirit as its life-principle. There is yet another way to account for its unique vitality. In the *Aitareya-Upaniṣad* it is suggested that the finely evolved senses, having reached the luminosity of gods, reject animal bodies in preference to the human body.[20] This 'divine choice' of the human body must therefore be a singular feature of the reality of the human body. In philosophical parlance it finds expression in the form of '*my* body', where 'my' or 'mineness' signifies as much the body itself as the spirit in respect of it. Bhattacharyya's assertion therefore that the said 'unity' of the body and the spirit gets expressed in the "I-feeling" of man[21] may be understood in this light.

Now, regarding this "I-feeling" we need note that it stands both for immanence and for transcendence of the 'I' or the spirit. In so far as the spirit is immanent in the body, so that the body in each case is '*my* body' a transcedence of the body itself in respect of the Nature is involved. In view of such a transcedence, the Nature becomes 'body-centric'. Or, as Bhattacharyya puts it : "The placement of *my* body, however, makes the Nature 'body-centric'—i.e., where 'my body' is at the centre of the Nature—Nature is understood from this standpoint as *experienced* or *to be experienced—bhoktā* or bhogya".[22] This "body-centric" view of Nature may remind one of Merleau Ponty's phenomenological description of the synthesis of the

20. *Op. cit.*, i. 2. 1–3.

21. "The Indian Concept of Man: Unity of Spirit and Matter", BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1971, p. 219 f.

22. *Ibid*, p. 223.

human body. Bhattacharyya seems to prefer, however, a more basic approach to such a synthesis—an approach suggested in the ancient Indian religious texts. Merleau Ponty settles for a cognitive synthesis of the human body, whereas the ancient Indians thought that the human body finds its meaning at a more basic material-vital level. The human body is no doubt an "observation post", but it is so only as a part of its more comprehensive meaning as a *bhogāyatana*—i.e., a means or medium of experience, *bhoga*.[23]

It may be mentioned in passing, however, that the synthesis of the human body at the cognitive level achieves something which is generally not attainable at the material-vital level of its synthesis. In cognitions the body is considered at the level of "*manana* or thought",[24] where 'mind' emerges as the principle of understanding the body as distinct from the spirit. In 'bhogya-bhoktā' considerations, on the other hand, the understanding of the human body "consists just in alternation between the end and the person who strives for the end, the means being as much a sub-end to the person as a part, as it were, of the person striving".[25] In other words, in cognitions the body tends to be dissociated from the spirit, and therefore, in *manana* or thought, it generalizes itself so as to extend beyond 'mineness' to cover within its significance other bodies, human as well non-human, laying thereby the foundation for 'natural sciences'. In other words, it is generative of the autonomy of the body and thus the autonomy of the matter. In 'bhogya-bhoktā' bhāva, it is the individual human body itself which emerges as an autonomous

23. *Ibid*,

24. *Ibid*., p. 221. The Spirit signifies the "post-*manana*" stage. It happens, according to Prof. Bhattacharyya, to be merely an intellectual account, which as admitting alternatives tend to be formal.

25. *Ibid*., p. 224.

natural entity, the natural 'ego' (ahaṁkāra) which is generally bracketed with the *tamas* category of being. Here the spirit does not dissociate. On the contrary, the body seems to spill into it. This appears to be the idea of *asrava* in Jainism and Buddhism, and it clearly points to Bhattacharyya's idea of the primordial 'unity' in its most basic state. Again, it is this very basic state which accounts for man's 'ignorance' which haunts him at the very beginning of his being.

III

An interesting distinction that Bhattacharyya may draw, though actually he does not, is the one between 'natural man' and 'scientific man', corresponding to the aforesaid distinction between the "bhogya-bhoktā bhāva" and the cognitive level of existence. In respect of this latter distinction, he does however seem to distinguish what he calls "intellectual-formalistic"[26] from the 'hedonic-existentialistic".[27]

The essence of natural man, according to him, lies in "submission to Nature", which is made possible due to the "pre-willed" state of the spirit with the physical body. With the exercise of will on the part of the spirit, the spirit becomes dissociated, whereas in its absence it is naturally associative. The "pre-willed" activity of the spirit implies the sense of 'non-freedom' and Nature is the region of this 'non-freedom'. Thus, on Bhattacharyya's interpretation, the pair "Freedom-Nature" is something basic in our understanding of man at all levels.

Bhattacharyya defines *Nature* as "the totality of contents that are in space and/or time and are causally determined.[28] Material bodies, including human bodies, are its physical con-

26. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

28. "Nature And Freedom", *in Man And Nature*, Ed. G. F. Mclean, p. 109.

tents and they are both in space and in time. Mental contents such as images, thoughts etc., are only in time. These contents, physical and mental, are held in a causal nexus which forms the unified field of Nature. In so far as, therefore, 'life' is taken to be a natural phenomenon, "it includes all mechanical, bodily and mental behaviour",[29] i.e., "such human behaviours that are not self-consciously free", the behaviours which do not "begin with resisting Nature". In other words, the natural man's being has a sort of unbroken continuity with Nature. Man's "bhogya-bhoktā" level of existence points to this fact of natural continuity. Accordingly, *my* body in relation to Nature seems to enjoy the same kind of freedom which otherwise is the prerogative of the spirit in its dissociate states. The body here assumes the role of the *bhoktā*; though, at the same time, it remains the bhogya, too, being the means of the presentation of the *bhogyas* to the *bhoktā*.

Now, in man's being Nature is reflected in the form of body-mind : "mind-body complex is itself a microcosm, constituting a whole world of its own, a Leibnitzian *monad*."[30] The suggestion here seems to be that, since in man's being body and mind thus form a complete causal nexus, its operation makes it possible for man to understand the whole Nature. The natural man, Bhattacharyya observes, is strictly subject to the laws of matter and life.[31] In fact, only as obeying these laws is he the natural man. It is, therefore, possible to view human nature as a part of the total Nature and then try to interpret all human behaviour, like other animal behaviour on a physical-physiological basis.[32] But he soon points out that in so far as there is no 'life' without some form of consciousness[33] and since the

29. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 110–111.

consciousnes sense of freedom, signifying human spirit, cannot be interpreted on a physical-physiological basis, man *qua* man must be more than natural man—he must be capable of such behaviour as opposes and transcends the causal nexus of Nature.[34] Hence also his observation : "Each man's nature is only accidentally attached to him." Indeed, in so far as man is free, each man's nature is his. It is what he has earned and carved out of Nature in order that it may be managed by him. It is what he has taken over from Nature in order that it may be brought in line with his genuine freedom, bettered and perfected. The possibility however lurks that he may succumb to Nature's determination and thus turn his possession into an animal's den.[35]

But, now let us ask : what is man's nature ? According to Bhattacharyya, it has to be understood in the light of what he calls "dynamics of Freedom" or "Movement of Dissociation", i.e., the way consciousness moves through the human life, revealing a set pattern of human relationship to Nature and to oneself. Methodologically, it is distinct both from "phenomenological epoche" which signifies movement in the direction of a meant ego and from "existential edification" in which subjectivity transverses a lonely path. Rather it signifies movement of a being, both within and without. As consciousness moves in and through different life-behaviours, its varied levels of refinement may be noticed. At the lowest level are the *organic sensations*, always with somatic overtones.[36] These sensations are "the body and its changes as experienced from within."[37] Being a form of experience, however, it is nearer to spirit than to the body itself and therefore it is already a form of dissociation.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
37. BRMIC, Vo. XXII, No. 6, June 1971, p. 224.

And when this dissociation from the body itself is realised in that form, it becomes what is called ' feeling '.[38] Above sensation is *perception*. As contrasted with sensations, a perception is an experience of the body and its changes *from without*. However, like sensations, perceptions too, can be seen as a form of dissociation. When perceptions are thus seen as dissociated from the body concerned and its changes, and equally, when perceptions of an object through the medium of the body are realised in dissociation from it-as-the-medium as well as from the objects, they signify *mental* phenomena, more specifically perceptions, involving such factors as memory-images, ideas, decisions etc.[39] Perceptions in such dissociate states, however, involve no active thinking. The subtle dispositions and traces somehow involved in perceptions—which make possible active thinking at a higher level[40]—get entangled, tied or confused with given matters. They are there in the form of unconscious, even instinctive, dispositions and traces of a lower origin in the form of unexplicit remainders. Such unexplicit remainders may obtain even at the level of thinking but they are not necessarily tied and confused with the thought—process. "Dispositions and traces maturing into thinking take up matter softly, tackling them from outside, as it were, whereas in perception they mature only in so far as they impregnate sense-matters."[41]

The mental behaviour described above is mechanical, i.e., causally determined. Beginning from the organic sensations, at the lowest, to the mechanical thinking, at the highest, they all signify the cognitive side of the mind of the natural man. Corresponding to this cognitive side, there is an equally mechanical

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38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. " Nature And Freedom ", in *Man And Nature*, Ed. G. R. Mclean, p. 112.
41. *Ibid.*

conative side of the natural man to which belongs conative behaviour with appropriate affective tones. The affective side of the mind of the natural man, however, is always an overtone and never substantive. However, the whole picture changes radically when this mental region of the natural man, along with its corresponding system of bodily behaviours, is looked at from the point of view of freedom.[42]

IV

Bhattacharyya's analysis of the natural being of man follows generally the Sāṁkhya account. This account has more or less found acceptability in the Indian tradition. One of the main features of Sāṁkhya account is that it considers "I-feeling"—*ahaṁkāra* or ego—to be the critical point in the manifest unfoldment of Nature, responsible for bringing about a clear division between "physical nature" and "mental nature".[43] The latter two form a well co-ordinated system of our understanding operative at two different levels—the level at which Nature has the gross body at its centre *and* the level at which Nature has the mind or the subtle body at its centre. The "I-feeling" remains present at both levels. At the mental level, however, it attains a higher degree of refinement. The point of higher degree of refinement, according to Bhattacharyya, is that mental behaviour is more subtle than bodily behaviour.[44] But the point of his assertion here is not quite clear, because he refers back to subtle bodily behaviour as an evidence of higher refinement of mental behaviour. In his own words: "as they also involve increasingly subtle

42. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 105. Prof. Bhattacharyya's expression for 'mental nature' is 'natural mental', which expression he prefers to use because he would later distinguish the 'mental' which collates with spirit rather than with nature.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

bodily behaviours mental behaviours are higher in the scale of refinement."[45]

Perhaps the point of the aforesaid 'subtility' would come in when we consider that feature of mental behaviour, which Bhattacharyya calls, "detachment". In contrast with bodily behaviour which displays only its positive or objective side, mental behaviour is capable of displaying a positive as well as a negative side. In so far as mental phenomena are positive, i.e., are in strict co-ordination with physical nature, they are also natural. In their mode of detachment, which is their negative side, they remain natural, but as withdrawn from the gross nature they are now "like a hole in the Nature itself."[46] The sense of 'negation' or 'detachment' should not therefore be confused with that of 'freedom', as is often done by 'natural psychology'. Detachment is really the point where Nature and transcendence, i.e., Freedom, meet.[47] And it is also the point where Bhattacharyya seeks to supplement the Sāṁkhya account of "I-feeling", with the Vedāntic account of "I-consciousness".

Now, like the "subtle body" and the "gross body", the mental nature and the physical nature of man, are also both mediums, and only the former may be said to be the medium of experiencing Nature in a proper sense : sensations, perceptions, imagination and thought in their totality constitute this subtle medium.[48] These experiences do not just occur at definite points of time. Rather, as Bhattacharyya points out in a phenomenological strain, they are spirit itself, i.e., consciousness, at different stages, discovered at different levels of dissociation; and it is their discovery at different levels that is episodic, not they them-

45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
47. *Ibid.*
48. "The Indian Concept of Man ......", BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 6, p. 224.
49. *Ibid.*

selves.[49] Each such experience is the experience of an extra-bodily nature and its items. As associated with an object, the experience is but the object-as-experienced; but as dissociated it is the experience itself, even though still referring to an object. An experience of the latter form, however, is more spiritual than the experience of the former kind.

The point of a mental phenomenon having a reference is, according to Bhattacharyya, of great significance : it is at this point that dissociation takes place. Indeed, at the natural level of man's being, "natural" is the direct concern of the mental and therefore it appears inevitable for it to refer to Nature and its items. One way of understanding this apparent inevitability may be to see it in the light of the fact that the "reference" here is not uni-directional, i.e., from the mental to the physical. One may as well use "physical" as a sign to refer to the "mental". But, as Bhattacharyya points out, such a equi-directional "reference" is made in the second and third person reference by signification. In the first person use, in which we have the primary use of the words like 'knowledge', 'awareness', 'cognition', etc., all reference is determinately one-sided : "it is knowledge which refers to the item concerned and not *vice versa*".[50] In fact, here, referring is the same thing as knowing. Cognitions by their very nature refer, irrespective of whether such a reference involves any first person assertion to that effect. Such being the nature of reference in knowledge, it is not only shows that knowledge, as a mental affair, is dissociated from the item of Nature referred to; it also shows that knowledge cannot but refer to whatever it actually does. This latter compulsion, as described in Indian philosophical systems, is due to the fact that "a particular cognition refers to only that item of Nature which has *specifically caused* it".[51]

50. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
51. *Ibid.*

Knowledge, even as dissociate by virtue of its act of reference, still carries "some dead load of matter". It requires, therefore, that dissociation be carried further so that it sheds its dead load off and moves nearer to the spirit. And this further step, according to Bhattacharyya, is taken as soon as it is realised that, even as the object known is the special causal determinant of knowledge, the act of referring is knowledge's *own* function. This implies that knowledge *might not*, also, refer to the object.[52] Thus, in a case of *illusion*, the object actually referred to is not the same as one specifically causing it. In a *hallucination*, the knowledge seems to create its own object. The same thing may be seen to happen, even more clearly, in constructive imagination and thinking. In such cases we have the second level of thought and imagination—the one in which they are self-conscious. The evidence for such self-consciousness not being caused by anything in Nature is that it is not found in animals and sub-human species which are endowed only with first level mental processes. Still another evidence, says Bhattacharyya, in favour of self-consciousness having a being of its own is that it is *sui generis*, i.e., it is realised in its own being or in immediacy. Self-consciousness realised in this manner is called "introspection".[53] Every first level mental affairs discovers itself to be thus self-conscious and therefore it is not numerically different from introspection.[54]

In fact, according to him introspection—which in each case is a process of thinking or imagination—ever accompanies the mental and is indeed at the root of all dissociation. At the first level mental processes—memory, sensation, perception etc.,—it

52. *Ibid.* This is what elsewhere Prof. Bhattacharyya calls "spirit's free reference to Nature" which makes possible creation of its objects. See Prof. Bhattachryya's "The Indian Concept of Self", in BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 8, August 1971, p. 305.

53. BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 6, p. 227.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

is of the form of self-conscious thinking having a reference to them. But as referring to the first-level mental processes it refers, also, through them, to their objects. The first level mental processes, on the other hand, refer only to their objects, which happen to be some items of Nature. These items they simply find as 'given'. In introspection, however, a reference to them is not in this manner : introspection refers to its objects *freely*, as if it created its objects; and the 'given' objects coincide exactly with the 'created' objects. This leads Bhattacharyya to assert that the spirit, which is of the form of introspection, "exactly overlaps the Nature".[55]

In so far as introspection refers to first level mental processes, it need be noted that it does not at that level distinguish itself from them. Its reference here may therefore be understood only as a pseudo-reference—a kind of reference which makes possible, according to Bhattacharyya, *sākṣita* of the spirit.[56] The spirit being not clearly distinguished by itself at this stage helps also the first level mental processes to elevate their conscious character to a sort of self-consciousness, which means in effect "that it (a mental process) has set itself free from its naturalistic setting and shown itself as the spirit in its full autonomy".[57]

A notable feature of introspection, which demonstrates that it is over-natural, is that "though it is a process it is not realised as covering a stretch of time"[58]—which is possible only if introspection is not a natural process : imagination and thinking which, as items of Nature, cover a period of time are, as introspection, realised as non-temporal. And this means, concludes Bhattacharyya, that introspection is spiritual.

55. *Ibid.*
56. "The Indian Concept of Man : The Unity of the Spirit as Disjunctive", BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 7, July 1971, p. 257.
57. "The Indian Concept of Man : Unity of Spirit and Matter", BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1971, p. 228.
58. *Ibid.*

Spiritual introspection is numerically the same though it associates itself with different first level mental processes and though these latter discover themselves to be introspection at different occasions. Accordingly, introspection or spirit has the peculiar feature of being associated and dissociated at the same time. Considered in its aspect as associated it is manifest, and as ever dynamic not unlike Hegel's Spirit—it moves along with mental processes and through them along with natural processes. But the same spirit, as dissociated, remains unmoved and static; it is beyond all time and is therefore immovable and changeless. However, it seems that, for Bhattacharyya, the associative feature of the spirit is not as fundamental as its dissociative aspect; perhaps, because even in its associative aspect the spirit remains basically dissociated, there being no occasion to confuse consciousness with any natural item, including mental processes amongst such items. Hence his remark that it is the 'dissociate spirit' which "alternates between staticity and dynamism, neither of which, here, is a phenomenon in Nature".[59]

Now, just as spirit is seen as progressively dissociate in the field of cognition, so also may it be seen as dissociate in the field of volition and emotion-and-feeling. But Bhattacharyya points to a basic difference in the manner of its dissociation in the field of cognition and in that of emotion-and-feeling and volition. Its progressive dissociation in cognition culminates in complete withdrawal from mental processes, or from Nature, whereas in the case of volition there is not only no such withdrawal, there is not even any tendency in that direction. For, "Volition, as volition, has to be positively connected with Nature all through",[60] in the sense that it is meant to be an effort to change the existing order of Nature according to a rule and for a definite

59. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

60. "The Indian Concept of Man : The Unity of the Spirit as Dissociative", BRMIC Vol. XXII, No. 7, July 1971, p. 258.

purpose. In the field of volition, therefore, spiritual dissociation obtains only when such rules and purposes become free of mechanical-biological rules and self-interest. Volition as a primary mental process does of course operate within a naturalistic framework, but at this level it is wholly immersed in Nature. As Bhattacharyya writes "the moving forces behind them (that is, behind such mental processes immersed in Nature) are fondness (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) which are but principles of Nature."[61]

However, so far as volition becomes self-conscious it is capable of discovering itself as the dissociate spirit. In fact, this discovery is at the basis of all true morality. The occasion for it arrives in disinterested action which turns natural volition into spiritual volition by setting it free from rāga-dveṣa as its determinants. Such edification of volition may be called "existential" as it arises freely.[62] It has the effect of freeing *you* from *my* field of interests and positing myself as a possible *I* rather than as an actual *I*—a possible or spiritually free man as against the actual or natural man. Further, since "the possible *I* is only one of the *you's* or he's",[63] the 'good' towards which the spiritual volition is directed is the 'good' which covers all persons equally; in fact, it creates an actual impersonal person covering all persons, and is therefore over-natural. Thus, it is exactly what is called 'moral'. Again, unity, of all persons may be taken to constitute *God*, and from this point of view the spiritual volition may be called 'religious'. The unity of *morality* and *religion* in the sense of *dharma* as understood in the Indian tradition may be interpreted in this light.[64]

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61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*,Prof. Bhattacharyya rightly draws our attention to a need to distinguish spiritual morality and spiritual religion from social morality and ritualistic religion. Indeed the former is the ground of the latter, but the latter is meant-

Finally, the spiritual dissociation in the field of emotion-and-feeling make *bhakti*, love and devotion possible. *Bhakti*, according to Prof. Bhattacharyya, is its highest and pure form, as worked out in some Vaiṣṇava schools. This is however not reflected in the main line of Indian thinking. The dominant Indian view in this respect is to combine it with spiritual volition as its hedonic tone, or treating it as an alternative means of discovering the cognitive spirit all at once. All, however—except the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists in general—are unanimous on one point, namely that if the spirit proper is cognition and volition in their complete dissociation from Nature, it is also unintrupted bliss, *ānanda* or spiritual joy, which is in fact the essence of all emotion-and-feeling. It is this same *ānanda* which turns into suffering when cognitive confusion (mithyājñāna) comes to bear on it. The question as to how this happens and why a similar situation does not arise of spiritual volition, have not been answered by Indian thinkers. Nor does Prof. Bhattacharyya venture to suggest an answer to the above questions.

VI

Thus, to sume up Bhattacharyya's analysis of the Indian Concept of Man, he begins by aserting the unity between body and spirit and explicates it by emphasizing the distinction between the gross and the subtle body and then showing how the principle of dissociation of the spirit operates to explain and unify the two within the same dynamics of spiritual signification. This leads him to elaborate the three-fold movement of the spirit in man—cognitive, volitional and emotional, and correspondingly to the three-fold spirit itself, in forms of pure knowledge, pure volition and pure bliss.[65] And in the course of his elaboration

mainly for the common people. Social morality and ritualistic religion obtain indefinite social and natural contexts and therefore may vary with the variation in the corresponding setting. Spiritual morality and religion, on the other hand, remain the same amidst such variations.

he demonstrates that before reaching its pure form, the spirit in its dissociative movement makes possible disciplines like ethics and religion. Even in its associative movement the spirit is shown by him to be helpful in the rise of scientific disciplines. The highest manifestation of the spirit, however, is freedom as transcendence; "Free man transcends Nature. He is over-natural, even though otherwise he is part of Nature too. So far as he is part of Nature his behaviours are all fully determinate. But in so far as he is above Nature he is free."[66] This amply shows that the spiritual realization of purest form by man is thought attainable in this very life. But then the Indian tradition does not consider human life valuable and meaningful only for this reason : it recognizes and recommends yet other positive fulfilments of life in the physical and psychological areas of life, both individual and social.

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65. *Ibid.* pp. 257–262. Prof. Bhattacharyya raises and discusses the metaphysical problem in this respect, as to whether the Spirit as identified with pure cognition, pure volition and pure feeling-and-emotion is really one or three. In answer to this problem he discusses the notion of *śakti* and *śaktimān*, *śakti* and *Śiva*—cognition volition and feeling-and-emotion being threefold *śakti* of the Self as the *Śiva*—showing that these form a system. This system he describes as 'disjunctive unity', i.e., "The unitary *I* is *either* pure knowledge *or* pure volition, *or* pure feeling-and-emotion; it is a disjunctive unity ...... " (Ibid., p. 264). Each is realised as the *I* proper, but in alternation, in the sense that when one of these is realised, the other two are absent.
66. "The Indian Concept of Freedom", by Prof. Bhattacharyya, in BRMIC, Vol. XXII, No. 9, Sept. 1971, p. 351. In this article Prof. Bhattacharyya discusses in detail the Indian view of morality and immorality, showing that what is called *puṇya* is but the spiritual morality and correspondingly *pāpa* is the spiritual immorality. In this connection he mentions *vairāgya* and *abhyāsa* as the two recognized means or ways of spiritual dissociation to attain Freedom.

10

Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated

K. J. SHAH

In a paper like this, it is impossible to do justice to Kalidas Bhattacharyya's book *Possibility of Different Types of Religion*, for it gives scope for discussion at various levels. I propose, therefore, to select one of the central group of problems and discuss his thought with reference to it. I propose to present Professor Bhattacharyya's account of sophisticated and unsophisticated (or primitive) religion. I shall not give a full account of these, but only to the extent it is required for a meaningful consideration of the problems that I want to raise, without distorting them. I want then to point out some of the problems that can be raised, and the bearing of these on his understanding of religion and the relationship between religion and philosophy, etc.

In the first section, I give Bhattacharyya's account of sophisticated religion. In the next, I give his account of primitive religion. In the third section, I discuss some of the problems arising out of these accounts. In the last section, I end with some concluding remarks.

I

Sophisticated Religion

Let me begin with Bhattacharyya's account of sophisticated religion. According to Bhattacharyya, religion "originates *with* a sense of freedom'. But what is this sense of freedom? "Freedom is either free cognition as we find it in science, or free action as in the moral field, or unattached aesthetic view of nature." But "religion is not just one form of freedom, co-ordinate with science, morality and art : it is a total attitude a

scientist, a moral man or an artist has toward life and the world as a whole" (p. 1). It is necessary to point out that any of these freedoms involves that man step aside nature (I am sticking to a phrase used by Bhattacharyya) or transcend nature, though he himself is a part of nature. This sense of freedom can be understood in many ways. The understanding involves on the one hand man's relationship to nature and, on the other, man's relationship to the Absolute (though these two are closely related, Bhattacharyya rarely discusses it). Man's relationship to nature can be understood in one of three ways : (i) it is a dialectical movement within nature, and therefore a phenomenon belonging to nature, (ii) the transcendence is to be understood as strictly transcendental, i.e., as belonging to the transcendent field, peopled with trans-natural entities called spiritual truths, (iii) besides these two, there is a third position in which transcendence is neither wholly a dialectic of nature, nor wholly trans-natural involving spiritual entities, but a dialectic of nature which is functionally spiritual.

Man's relationship to transcendental entities raises a number of questions : Bhattacharyya has a number of things to say on this issue, not all of them in one place or in one context :

1. Which is the highest entity, Absolute or God ? Another question is whether man is identical with the Absolute ? The answer to this question will be different accordingly as one thinks of man as pure consciousness or man as a natural being. And what is, or what should be, our relationship to the Absolute—love, devotion or action ? According to Bhattacharyya, we are introduced into this realm not only by love and morality at their best, but also by *natural knowledge at its best*, i.e., by knowledge at the highest sub-level to buddhi...... knowledge which is ordinarily called thought or reason. Such knowledge, love and morality are ordinarily the pre-requisities for relationship with the transcendental.

2. But we may do without these in special cases.

3. As the Absolute is the truth of everything, it is also the truth of the pursuant self.

4. The Absolute is to be understood as the ideal of life, i.e., the goal of life :

(*a*) it is an aspiration and not merely a reality,

(*b*) as an aspiration, it is a whole,

(*c*) as an ideal whole, it is a regulative principle,

(*d*) it is also reflective of a sort (pp. 26–27).

5. Faith (in the Absolute) is not entirely divorced from knowledge, it being a sort of knowledge of what ought to be (p. 18)...... Faith is essentially a sort of absolute assurance, or absolute acceptance of, and absolute commitment to some ought-to-be, and following Thomas, we have just seen that this assurance, acceptance or commitment is some form of direct cognition of the ought-to-be as ought-to-be (There is a lower form of faith based on the authority of saints etc., but not on direct cognition).

6. Religion (involving relationship with the Absolute) is a form of knowledge-realization.

7. The Absolute in-itself and the Absolute as a function are mutually dependent on each other (pp. 48–49).

It is both a strength and a weakness of Bhattacharyya that he leaves these different accounts which are related without considering how far they are the same and what is their relation. Another point that remains undiscussed and is enormously important is that of the relationship between the three kinds of freedom—of knowledge, moral activity and aesthetic experience. It is true that it is these three together that are involved in the sense of freedom as realized in religion, but there are problems (of hierarchy, conflict) that might arise in this. I am mentioning only these two points, because I propose to raise them later on.

II

Primitive Religion

Let me begin with Bhattacharyya's conclusion about primitive religion : "Primitive man has religion proper, only it is less conscious and therefore less mature. The quality is the same, there is only a degree of difference. He is not sophisticated enough to distinguish one approach as religious and the other approach as something else. It would be too hasty therefore to underestimate the religion of some such primitives as animal worship or tree-worship pejoratively (p. 57). Thus, K. D. Bhattacharyya is in no doubt about the primitive religion being religion inspite of the fact that there is a difference. True, he says that it is a difference merely of degree, in maturity or sophistication. However, his account does not show this as we shall see.

1. Does primitive thinking involve stepping aside nature ? And what is primitive man's relationship to nature, and his relationship to the Absolute ?

According to Bhattacharyya, thinking at this stage is intuitive. It remains unrecognisedly fused in the intuitions and concrete actions. It is not self-conscious. But it is different from animals' response to nature, because some incipient thought has intervened. Somehow we have begun to subordinate nature to our purpose and utilise it in that way. Transcendence is only vaguely felt.

2. There is, therefore, no question of relationship to the transcendental entity—the Absolute...... Primitive minds are in no need of overstepping nature self-consciously, do not require a God as transcendent and substantival, not even as a self-consciously apprehended regulative principle, unlike what people belonging to higher cultures do. Primitive people do indeed speak of God or Gods. This looks like substantivization, but it does not involve self-conscious transcendence which requires the existence of arguing about it—to a great extent, though not com-

pletely. In the case of the Gods of the primitives this is absent (pp. 50–51).

Thus, in the thinking of the primitive people, there is no transcendence, maturity or sophistication. How can, then, the difference between this and the sophisticated religion be only one of degree? Bhattacharyya puts forward the following considerations in favour of his view.

(i) K. D. Bhattacharyya says that there are three types of reflection—any one of which may be meant by the use of such words as "thinking", "thought", or "reason"; (*a*) reflection which is free and fused (undistinguished, because immersed in nature), (*b*) free reflection which operates on some experience from outside, (*c*) free reflection in which experience becomes self-conscious. (K. D. Bhattacharyya's distinction between these three types of reflection is indeed valuable, but it is not valuable for the purpose he has in view—namely that which will make the difference between sophisticated and primitive religion one of degree. As K. D. Bhattacharyya points out very often, the second type of reflection is taken as paradigm for the other two types, but the other two types, are also sui-generis to be distinguished from each other as also from the second type of reflection. It is indeed interesting and important to distinguish these three types of reflection. To recognize primitive thinking as thinking and reflection enables us to recognize it as religion; without it primitive religion would lack its character of being a religion and it would be difficult to relate it to sophisticated religion).

(ii) The concrete thought of primitive man and his myths serve in a way the purposes of science and philosophy.

(iii) K. D. Bhattacharyya points out that in the thinking of primitive man there are the roots of the future development of transcendence (p. 54).

(iv) This develops further in the context of inter-cultural contacts.

(v) But even the highest stage of primitive man's thinking, according to K. D. Bhattacharyya, does not show the awareness of the Absolute-in-itself and the functional Absolute, or of their mutual dependence.

III

Religion—Sophisticated and Primitive

Given the foregoing accounts of sophisticated and primitive religion, it is not possible to take them both seriously as religion; if we take one seriously we have to doubt whether the other account is an account of religion.

1. If transcendence and relationship to the Absolute are necessary characteristics of religion then primitive religion is hardly religion. As K. D. Bhattacharyya points out, there is certainly thinking among the primitive people, both a kind of thinking about the external world, and a religious thinking in terms of myths. But this is not what, according to K. D. Bhattacharyya, characterises religion.

2. There are occasions when K. D. Bhattacharyya unequivocally attributes spiritual experience only when sophisticated self-reflective thinking is present. For example, he says that there alone is genuine spiritual experience, where experience is itself reflective.

3. But K. D. Bhattacharyya is dissatisfied with a situation in which the character of being a religion is denied to primitive religion. Is this dissatisfaction justifiable on any grounds other than those suggested by K. D. Bhattacharyya ? I think a look at the various accounts of the Absolute and their interrelations could help us out. As K. D. Bhattacharyya says, the Absolute is also the ideal for life, the goal of life, an account of what ought to be as a whole, what ought to be life as a whole. To be religious is to be committed to the ideal as a whole. Now this commitment can be present among the sophisticated and such a thinking

cannot avoid philosophy. But to think of thinking in terms of myths or similies as philosophical is to stretch the point a little too far.

4. In so far as this is so, K. D. Bhattacharyya's account of the origin of religion is unsatisfactory, because it makes the origin of religion wait upon man's stepping aside nature. Not only that, though K. D. Bhattacharyya talks of the togetherness of the three kinds of freedom as a totality that is required, he does not consider the possibility of conflict between them. Perhaps it is possible and worthwhile to consider these three freedoms and their interelationship in terms of the *four puruṣārthas* and their interrelationship. I have attempted to argue that it is better to think of the puruṣārthas in terms of a matrix of interacting elements rather than as a hierarchy; such that to exclude some of them eliminates not only those puruṣārthās, but also the others. Would the same be true of the three elements mentioned by K. D. Bhattacharyya—scientific knowledge, moral action and aesthetic experience ?

5. As has been said by K. D. Bhattacharyya, the propounding of the ideal can raise questions and doubts of various kinds. A consideration of these helps remove the doubts and establish the ideal. This is specially important when a living example of the ideal is not available; and even when such an example is there, the need for philosophical reflection is there for those who are not convinced of the ideal.

6. Is it possible to carry on this kind of philosophical activity without reference to something transcendental ? According to K. D. Bhattacharyya, reference to something transcendental is necessary, even if it is transcendental as functional. When it is not there, any ideal will border on the irreligious. However, the function of *Ānvīkshiki* may be described as bringing into focus, bringing a unity to, and illumination to all our thoughts, actions and feelings, and Kautilya mentions three examples of *Ānvīkshiki*—Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. If the last mentioned

can also perform the function, reference to something transcendental is not necessary.

7. The foregoing considerations show that polytheism also could be the theory of a religious life, and there is no need for it to border on irreligion, if it is not related to the Absolute.

8. But if we accept all this, what happens to the types of religion mentioned by K. D. Bhattacharyya ? (*a*) The different types of religion may be seen as answers to different kinds of problems felt by individuals or groups. (*b*) Different philosophies may be seen as having some relationship to the different accounts of the experiences of religious people and (*c*) in the details of living, there could be as many religions as there are individuals.

IV

Some Concluding Remarks

I must end by saying that I have enjoyed my work for this Seminar and I have found it fruitful in many ways even when I have disagreed with K. D. Bhattacharyya. Professor Bhattacharyya shows a healthy disregard of definitions, and he has not allowed them to smother and restrict his thinking—e.g., his use of "knowledge-realization", "the Absolute" and so many other words. However, in spite of this, there is a readiness to see important problems, e.g., the three different uses of terms such as "thinking", "thought", "reason", arising out of the possibility of different types of reflection. What is more important, there is a readiness also to the larger problems like the nature of religion, relationship between philosophy and religion, primitive religion and sophisticated religion and theism and polytheism. The bearing of many of these on the history of Indian Philosophy is indeed very important. Even when one does not always agree with his reasons, one has to admire his insights and understanding. Another important feature of his thought is the positive use he makes of arguments—rather than a negative use.

□ □

11

Kalidas Bhattacharyya as Metaphysician

J. N. MOHANTY

Those of us who had the good fortune of listening to Kalidas Bhattacharyya's lectures on metaphysics and theory of knowledge at the University of Calcutta during the late forties and also of taking part in the philosophical discussions that continued, seemingly endlessly, in his office during the years he served at the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, and later at the Visva Bharati (and which were, to our regret, interrupted when he took over the Vice-Chancellorship at the last-mentioned institution)—and many of the contributors to this volume of essays are amongst them—would fondly recall the exciting experience of being in the presence of, and participating in, a truly authentic philosophical discourse. If the authenticity of a philosophical discourse consists in submitting to the rigor of concepts and yet also in a dissolution of the sense of authority and the consequent possibility of genuine communicative participation, then I must say that I have not found another philosopher who can generatet philosophical discourse in such an authentic manner.

In this introductory essay, I intend to bring out some salient features of Kalidas Bhattacharyya's philosophy. In his case, this indeed is difficult to do, for more than in the case of most philosophers, Kalidas Bhattacharyya's philosophy is almost inseparable from his on-going process of philosophising. However, the effort is worth making. For many of us, trying to reflect on Kalidas Bhattacharyya's philosophy is, in varying degrees, reflecting on the genesis of our own thoughts—he has played such an important role in giving shape to the way we think. It is reflecting on one of the major forces in contemporary Indian

philosophy. In various ways, Kalidas Bhattacharyya has been a powerful force in moulding the thought of the younger generation of Indian philosophers—not as much by his own system as by engaging them in a genuine process of dialogue.

In Kalidas Bhattacharyya's lectures during the forties and also in the two major publications of those years[1], there was one central thesis which he sought to amplify, illustrate and defend by showing the application in various domains and to various philosophical issues. This is the thesis that in philosophy there are, in the long run, theoretically undecidable alternatives. Between realism and idealism—to the controversy between their advocates he devoted a great deal of his time and attention—no final decision can be made, no decisive refutation of any is possible. There are, at the end, based on commitments which are theoretically neither defensible nor refutable. As a consequence of this elaborately worked out position, Kalidas Bhattacharyya's lectures and writings of this period were marked by attempts to defend every basic philosophical position against all possible criticisms, to give it as plausible a formulation as possible, to trace it back to the strongest arguments in its favour and to lay bare its most basic presuppositions. The roots of this liberalism lie, no doubt, in Jaina doctrine of naya, but also in the thoughts of his father K. C. Bhattacharyya. In this essay I do not intend to go into this aspect of Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought. I rather want to restrict myself to his later thinking, as documented in the books published since the sixties.

Kalidas Bhattacharyya is essentially a metaphysician. But he wants to take into account all anti-metaphysical arguments of our times. Furthermore, his metaphysics is deeply traditional, rooted in Advaita Vedānta and Śaivism. But he is willing, and in fact eager to learn what he can from the principal contem-

1. *Object, Content and Relation*, Calcutta, *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*. Calcutta.

porary philosophical movements viz., logical empiricism, Linguistic analysis and phenomenology. His basic commitment to orthodoxy is founded on a prior liberalism. The merely liberal who reveals in ceaseless evaluation of abstract possibilities is, as he writes in an essay, *A Modern Defence of Orthodoxy* " a useless gymnast "[2]. Liberalism should be, for him, only a preparation for recovering security in either the old accepted view, or " if conversion has taken place, in another ".

Further, true to his basic commitment to phenomenology, he wants to avoid any hasty system-building which refuses to take into account other dimensions of our experience. For example, although basically his metaphysics is idealistic, as we shall see, he rejects an idealism that, at the very beginning, disavows the objective attitude. " Our normal attitude to life is objective." He writes, " To start with the objective attitude, to think in terms of the object, is at least less confusing than idealistic effusions and is therefore initially a more reliable method of procedure".[3] Although he does not himself give us a system of metaphysics, he does tell us in broad outlines what metaphysics is about.

Metaphysics, which he sometimes identifies with philosophy, is concerned with the non-empirical, the a priori. The non-empirical which metaphysics deals with is initially discovered as the structure of the empirical, but subsequently recognised as autonomous. Metaphysics is not, according to Kalidas Bhattacharyya, construction of a system. It does not aim at explaining the empirical. Its aim rather is to discover the non-empirical

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2. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, *Philosophy, Logic and Language*, Bombay : Allied Publishers, 1955, p. 87. This book will be referred in these notes as *PLL*.
3. *PLL*, p. 100.

and the a priori. The method for such discovery is reflective, phenomenological, transcendental and intuitive in one.[4]

One of the pervasive concerns of Kalidas Bhattacharyya has been with the nature and function of philosophical reflection and its relation to unreflective experience.[5] The way he formulates the issue is this : if reflection leads to knowledge of anything, such knowledge must be of something which all along has been there, for reflection is not felt as bringing into being what it lays bare. If the object of reflective knowledge was all along there why is it that it was not perceived, recognised, known in pre-reflective experience ? After rejecting various answers to this question, Kalidas Bhattacharyya offers his own solution, which in fact constitutes a corner stone of his thought. What reflection brings to light was there in pre-reflective experience, but only as undistinguishedly fused. This state of fusion is not a mere subjective failure to distinguish, not a mere confusion, but rather an objective implicitness. Reflection is an act of distinguishing, whose objective correlate is the distinct entity qua distinct. Space, time or self, which are objects of metaphysical knowledge, are all given in pre-reflective experience, but only as undistinguished from, and fused with the empirical world. It is the task of metaphysics to let them emerge in their distinctness and a metaphysical entity.

There are two more things we need to keep in mind in order to appreciate the originality of Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thinking. First, the distinctness and autonomy of the metaphysical entity is such that this entity, though objective, is at the same time the

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4. *PLL*, pp. 15, 93.
   Also : Kalidas Bhattacharyya, *Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy and Other Essays* (to be henceforth referred as *PSP*). Santiniketan, 1972, p. 173.
5. See the essay "The Nature of Reflection in Metaphysics", *PLL*.

correlate of the subjective act of distinguishing i.e., of reflection. Reflection does not produce the distinctness. If the latter depends upon the former, this relation of dependence is not unlike that which holds good between comparative properties such as 'larger than' and the acts of comparing, or between the illursory snake and the illusory perception. It seems to me that the relation which Kalidas Bhattacharyya seeks to isolate is that which holds good between an intentional act and its noema in Husserlian phenomenology. The sense or noema is objective, and yet is also the correlate of an act. There is, it would seem, a difference between the two cases : the case of the dependence of a comparative feature on the appropriate act of comparison, and the case of the dependence of an illusory snake on the illusory perception. The comparative feature is objective in a sense in which the illusory snake is not. The same comparative feature can be the correlate of numerically many different acts of comparison, whereas it is difficult to see in what sense identically the same illusory snake may be perceived by different percipients or by the same percipient on numerically different occasions. It is the former that comes closer to the Husserlian correlation, and more appropriate for Kalidas Bhattacharyya's purpose.

In the second place, it would be a mistake to say that there is an X that passes from the state of fusion to the state of distinctness. Although it is the indistinct x which becomes the distinct x, x proper is x as distinct. 'X as indistinct' is not analysable into x and indistinctness. X appears as x only through reflection, so that when speaking of 'indistinct x' we are in fact describing unreflective experience in terms of what is revealed in reflection. Unreflective experience however reveals an unanalysable whole. Reflection distinguishes within this whole a distinct entity x which, in retrospcect, we ascribe to unreflective experience, as though it was there all along in an indistinct state. At least at one place Kalidas Bhattacharyya writes that these essences

were given in unreflective experience as generic images or schemata.[6]

Kalidas Bhattacharyya often illustrates his thesis with the help of the concept of form. In the object of pre-reflective experience, form is not distinguished qua form. It is rather fused or implicit. Reflection distinguishes it as form. The perceived table, for example, is not matter plus form—the form 'table'—but is rather a not further analysable whole. It would be philosophical common place to say that when the form is abstracted from this whole, what is left over is the indefinite matter. But Kalidas Bhattacharyya totally rejects this thesis, and does so on good grounds. According to him, "The table is the fused state of the table-form, not that form plus matter".[7] Abstraction as Husserl argued in the Second Logical Investigation, is not real separation. What is left over, the remainder after reflection distinguishes the form 'table', is the same total object of pre-reflective experience. Wherever this holds good, we seem to have a typically metaphysical entity, which Kalidas Bhattacharyya often calls an 'essence', or 'ideality'. This fact that even when A is taken away from an x what remains over is not x–A, but that x itself is precisely what, according to him, is meant by 'transcendence'.[8]

Kalidas Bhattacharyya does not regard the essences as 'real'. In order to explain why essences are not real, he makes use of a general principle which runs as follows: "nothing that is distinguishable in itself and yet constitutes another reality can be real".[9] A chair is made of wood. The wood constitutes the chair, but can never be distinguished in itself, it is always a wooden something, it is therefore real. But an essence, though

6. *PLL*, p. 55.
7. *PLL*, p. 103.
8. *PSP*, p. 168.
9. *PLL*, p. 55–56.

it constitutes real things, is yet distinguishable in itself by reflection : it is therefore not real. To be more specific, qua essences they are not real. The essences were real qua constituting another real entity. But they are not for that reason unreal either. Consequently, Kalidas Bhattacharyya regards them as possibilities which demand to be realised.[10] What sort of reality do they demand ? Or, in other words, how is this demand to be satisfied ?

The rationalist answer would be : even if a single essence taken by itself is a meie possibility, a coherent system of such essences must be real. Kalidas Bhattacharyya rejects this answer.[11] The resulting system of essences would only be another coherent and complex essence which has no more reasons to be real than the single essence to begin with had. Nor would the empiricist answer do, the essence cannot be put back to existence in the world of unreflcetive acceptance for the latter cannot contain an essence qua essence. He therefore looks for an entity such that it is real but not an item in the wirkd if ore. refkectuve acqyaubtabce. There is only one thing which satisfies these requirements, i.e., which is discovered in reflection and yet is felt as having been present prior to that discovery. (We have noted earlier that an essence was not, qua essence present prior to reflective discovery.) This is nothing other than pure consciousness. Although discovered by reflection, pure consciousness was present, in unreflective experience, as the enjoyment of one's own mental states, an enjoyment (Kalidas Bhattacharyya borrows the term from Josiah Royce, but uses it in the Vedāntic sense of Kevalasākṣivedyatva) which was not itself another state.

There is still another difference between pure consciousness and an essence : we have noted that an essence, though objective, is the correlate of a subjective act of reflection. Pure conscious-

10. *PLL*, pp. 55, 57.
11. *PLL*, p. 58.

ness, though discovered in reflcetion, is not correlate of another consciousness. The reflective distinguishing of pure consciousness and the pure consciousness that is thus distinguished are one and the same.[12]

Thus Kalidas Bhattacharyya is led to his final thesis : when the essences demand reality, it is to pure consciousness that they refer or lay claim.[13] "......the reality that is demanded by objective idealities is in the end the intrinsic reality of subjectivity".[14] We need to ask at this point : what precisely is meant by this ? In what precise sense are we to understand the statement that the essences refer to, lay claim to, the reality of pure consciousness ? This is indeed one of the most difficult questions in connection with interpreting Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thought. Nicolai Hartmann, of all philosophers belonging to the phenomenological school, recognised a certain "nearness to consciousness" (Nahe zum Bewusstsein) as characterising the idealities.[15] But by this Hartmann meant that consciousness has a direct access to ideal objectivities, an access which may be characterised as an intuition, an intuition of a higher order : but it would be a mistake, according to Hartmann, to suppose that idealities do not possess an autonomous being of their own. On the contrary, he recognises the category of 'ideal actuality', which implies that the idealities are not mere possibilities. Certtainly, he would be far from assimilating all essences to values, as Kalidas Bhattacharyya seems to be doing when he regards them as possessing an inherent demand to be realised. A closer relation to consciousness may be found in the case of the Husserlian noemata, but the latter are to be carefully distinguished from essences strictly so called. Perhaps, Kalidas Bhattacharyya's

12. *PLL*, p. 60.
13. *PLL*, p. 61.
14. *PLL*, p. 32.
15. Nicolai Hartmann, *Zur Grundlegung der Ootologie Meisenheim am Glan*, 1948 (Dritte Auflage), Ch. 43, Sec.ia.

thesis may be understood as an attempt to assimilate 'essences' to 'meanings' and then to trace meanings back to their original source in the domain of consciousness—a move that certainly characterises Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. [16]

The thesis that essences are meanings[17] and have their constitution in pure consciousness is carried through in two stages. First, essences are constituted in thought, and thought is (implicit) speech[18]. Essences therefore are constituted by language which, in the long run, is but speaking consciousness. An anti-essentialist may precisely use this linguistic constitution of essences to make the point that there are in fact no essences, which may very well be the Buddhist view and also seems to have been Merleau-Ponty's view as well.[19] Kalidas Bhattacharyya does not draw this conclusion, chiefly because he has a truly phenomenological concept of constitution and does not regard constitution as production. We need not here go into his interesting thoughts on language. It would suffice to mention that, for him, essences are intuited, but the intuition of essences is linguistic.[20] The next step is taken by maintaining that speaking consciousness makes a demand for, and in this sense, is founded on pure, non-linguistic consciousness, which though not des-

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16. There is also another strand of thought that fits in well with the idea of alternation. According to this, metaphysical entities may be regarded either objectively or subjectively—an irreducible alternation. Cp. especially, *PSP*, p. 169.

17. Kalidas Bhattacharyya does not explicitly identify meanings with essences. But his discussion of 'meaning' (see esp. *PLL*, pp. 82 ff.) would support such an identification.

18. *PLL*, pp. 41–43.

19. Cp. Merleau-Ponty : "The separated essences are those of language." (*Phenomeuology of Preception*, E. Tr. by C. Smith, New York : Humanities Press, Preface, p. xv).

20. *PLL*, p. 41.

cribable is immediately enjoyed—not merely in specially cultivated attitudes, but always as a fringe around everyday consciousness.

It is important to note that this is a theory of constitution of essences, but not of the everyday world of unreflective acceptance. The actual world, as Kalidas Bhattacharyya wants to call the latter, does contain analogues of the essences, perhaps what can be called their schemata : actual space, actual time, actual self and empirical universals. We have noted the sense in which essences are said to belong to the actual world. There is a sense in which the essences constitute the actual world, there is another sense in which the essences are constituted in pure consciousness. Neither of these senses of ' constitution ' annuls the autonomy of that which is constituted.

Especially with regard to perception, Kalidas Bhattacharyya recognises its claim to validity as being sui generis and as 'natural'.[21] The reliability of perception, descpite errors and illusions, is not matched by memory and thought. Both memory and thought ' transform ' the fact that was perceived. Memory ' transforms ' it into an image, thought into meaning. The sense of ' transformation ' again is peculiar. It is neither subjective and arbitrary, nor purely objective change. In ' thought ', the domain of facticity is transcended. Thought, and therefore, language, constitutes new entities and structures such as the predicative relation and the inferential ' therefore '. In this constitution, thought reveals its freedom from the actuality of the given. It constitutes pure possibilities as an autonomous domain.

Kalidas Bhattacharyya's ultimate concern in metaphysics would seem to be both a theory of freedom and a theory of the possibility of realising that freedom. Although thoughts on freedom pervade all his later writings, in this exposition I will draw only upon one of the latest essays on that

21. *PLL*, p. 79.

theme. This essay is entitled "Nature and Freedom". In it, Kalidas Bhattacharyya both explores the meaning of freedom and brings out the relation between nature and freedom. To begin with, freedom for him is trans-natural. Nature is understood as the totality of things in space and/or time and subject to causal determination. Material movement, (both macro and micro) as well as behaviour of living beings considered as biological organisms, are taken to be 'natural'. Human action, when and in so far as it caters to biological needs and yields to natural pressures, is 'natural', it can be 'mechanically' predicted. But even in such cases, the counterfactual "He might not have let himself be influenced by pressure" makes sense. This counterfactual is 'realised' in the attitude of non-attachment, in self-conscious refusal to submit to pressure (external and internal), in withdrawal from nature. It is with this negative withdrawal, standing back, detachment, that freedom begins. Positively, freedom points to something beyond nature, which may be called 'spiritual'. The very possibility of such standing back shows that nature is not all 'natural', or—more appropriately—that there is a 'hole' within the nature itself, as Kalidas Bhattacharyya puts it.[23] It is also suggestive of a meeting point of nature and spirit. The withdrawal and the standing back are acts on the part of the natural man, and yet they are not amenable to purely natural, mechanistic explanation.

The same is also true of living body. Body is natural, in so far as it is subject to natural, nomological laws. But the living body, in so far as it is also lived body, marks a level of subjecticity with which, as the late K. C. Bhattacharyya wrote, "the first hint of this freedom" (freedom as detachment)

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22. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, 'Nature and Freedom," in : *Philosophica*, Calcutta, Vol. 4, No. 3 and 4, 1975.
23. *Philosophica*, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 23.

is reached.[24] Kalidas Bhattacharyya goes further than his father : for him, living body is consciously used by man for freedom. It is the first means is no mere part of Nature"[25]. Bodily movement which is self-consciously introduced with a view to bring about change in nature, is not entirely Nature's own : "somehow at some point it has originated freely and literally out of nothing".[26] In fact, the mind-body complex of man, which he calls "his own nature" is a Leibnizian monad, a microcosm reflecting the whole of nature within itself, and so is not a part of nature. For, "no part can possibly present the whole".[27]

Positive freedom may be understood, and cultivated, in many different levels, of which two are emphasised by Kalidas Bhattacharyya : these are 'reason' and 'reflection'. Reason brings about the first stage of positive freedom by 'rationalising' nature, making it amenable to intersubjective communicability and universalising the natural principles that operate in mental life in its natural course. Reason operates both in the cognitive and conative domains. In the former, it operates in the form of logical principles, in the latter as moral norms. In both reason confers objectivity, removes selfishness, universalises, and transforms 'natural pressures' into acceptable 'social norms.' At this level, social norms do not oppose freedom. To the extent, these norms develop through rationalisation and are not felt as having been foisted from outside, they are means of freedom. Kalidas Bhattacharyya does not adequately distinguish, in this context, between the 'natural' process by which externally foisted norms are 'internalised' and the self-conscious rational process by which the rationality of a set of norms may come to

24. K.C. Bhattacharyya, *Subject as Freedom*, Amalner, Bombay : Indian Institute of Philosophy, 1930, p. 103.
25. *Philosophica*, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 18.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

be realised by an individual. In fact, for Kalidas Bhattacharyya, an altogether 'naturalistic account of social norms is not possible.[28]

Whereas reason is the highest level of human mentality, there is a higher level of positive freedom, which may be called reflective consciousness. Reflective consciousness withdraws from nature, either in the manner of phenomenological 'epoche' or in the manner of Yoga; it realises its own autonomy and purity. But it may go even further, and seek to reduce nature to its own construction. Nature, then, becomes 'Nature-as-intended'. To demonstrate that the world is constituted in pure consciousness would be the goal of this route, but Kalidas Bhattacharyya is aware of the limitations of this procedure. He recognises that even if in principle such constitution may be worked out, it cannot be extended to the details. The phenomenologist fails to explain, "how freedom could construct all the perceivable details of his own nature or of Nature outside."[29]

In the long run, for Kalidas Bhattacharyya there are several alternative modes of realising freedom. Freedom may be either transcendent or immanent. Transcendent freedom, in either of of its two sub forms, cognitive and conative, transcends natural life; it purports to be entirely a life of spirit. Immanent freedom may be either transcendent-and-immanent, or wholly immanent. In the former case, freedom lies in "organising nature in accordance with itself, not in seeking a special being of its own."[30] In the latter case, freedom is construed as a new dimension of nature itself, nature itself at its best. It would be an interesting task to try to identify these major types in the history of thought. For Kalidas Bhattacharyya, the choice between these types of freedom cannot be rational. There cannot be any external criterion by which one may choose one rather than the others.

28. *Philosophica*, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 11.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Reason itself is a type of freedom, it cannot be used to choose from amongst the various types of freedom. Ultimately, the choice has to be existential. We are back with the conception of an ultimate ' alternation ' in philosophical thinking with which Kalidas Bhattacharyya's philosophical thinking had taken its start.

This brief exposition of some of the most promising thoughts of Kalidas Bhattacharyya cannot give the readers any idea of the extreme richness and vitality of the philosophical reasonings which sustain them. For that one has of course to read his works. But more importantly one has to converse with him on philosophical matters. It is also necessary to add that these should not be construed as representing the final form of his thought which is still in the process of growing and developing.

□ □

MY REACTION

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

My Reaction

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

I am thankful to all the contributors for the trouble they have taken to go through many of my published books and papers and present my points as appreciatively as possible and, wherever necessary, either correct them or suggest improvements or simply point out what they have considered to be the many errors and inadequacies in my theses.

I

The best way I feel I can demonstrate my reaction to all they have said to begin with restating my theses as I have developed them in different ways throughout my philosophical career.

My philosophical career started some time about 1938. Even the manuscript of my first book *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, published as late as 1953, was completed some time about 1942 when I was only thirtytwo. Naturally, nothing of excellence could be expected of it. I wonder how yet many of the participants in the seminar took so sympathetically to even this my earliest work.

I do admit, as some of the participants have pointed out, that the notion of alternative absolutes which I too immaturely, and only in rudiments, took over from my father K. C. Bhattacharyya and developed in my own way in my first systematic book has remained with me till this date, and I confess too that I have presented it in different ways, not always commensurate with one another, in my later writings. What I insisted on in my early days was (i) that there is no *one* definite final Truth (Absolute), (ii) that there are several claimants to this ulti-

macy, (iii) that all their struggle with one another for this ultimacy is only in the region of theoretical possibility and (iv) that 'theoretical possibility' is only another name of actual alternation, i.e., alternation in the region of actuality, unless, of course, (v) on clearly statable and acceptable solid ground, logical or experiential[1], all but one of these alternatives stand condemned, (vi) which, however, never obtains when it is a question of ultimate Truth.

In many of my later writings, however, I confess that I could not so forcefully deny the *one* Truth (Absolute) : I was inclined rather to admit it, though I insisted all the same that it had to be *formulated* in different alternative ways, meaning that every one of these formulations would, logically (or on the ground of experience), be as good as every other. We may add that each is also as bad—if there is any pinpointable defect—as every other, for if any one of these formulations can be shown to be an overdoing or understatement this is true of every one of them, though each time in some other respect. This idea I first developed in my second book *Object, Content and Relation* and stuck to it for a long time.

By 'formulation' I meant more the *idea* that one has of the nature of the Absolute than its linguistic expression. This idea is a part of the life of one who entertains it. Linguistic expression is only an attempt to clarify the idea, whether to others or to oneself, though I have always insisted that there is equally a non-linguistic method of clarification also. If perception could be both vague and clear, both indefinite and definite, and if for the clarification of perception one need not resort to language necessarily, so may well be the case with image and idea too. Language is necessary for *another* type of clarification, one that operates *ab extra*, a clarification *imposed on* the percept of the

1. Such 'experience' may have nothing to do with sense-perception directly or indirectly.

image or the idea and required for communication, whether with others or with oneself—in both the cases, from outside.

For such linguistic formulation, i.e., clarification *ab extra*, there may not be any scope for ultimate alternation. But for any living grasp of an ultimate idea in its fullest clarity there is, I have claimed in my later writings, always the scope for the alternation I am speaking of.

Probably there is not much of significant difference between these two positions—between the absolute itself as alternating and alternative formulations of the absolute. It is only the difference between 'A or B or C, etc., as the ultimate absolute' and 'the ultimate absolute as A or B or C, etc.' In the latter case the absolute is a substantive, though always grasped in its adjectival (one may even say, functional) character like A or B or C, etc., never by itself while in the former case there is no question at all of any substantive Absolute, 'to be ultimate (absolute)' being itself but a functional (adjectival) character of A or B or C, etc. The former is more or less like the ultimate (absolute) of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, particularly of the Mādhyamikas, and the latter like that of the Vaiṣṇavas and the Śaivas. It is only the Advaita-Vedāntins of the traditional Śaṅkarite school who hold that the Absolute can be grasped-and grasped definitely (in their language, *known*)—all by itself, apart from being grasped as A or B or C etc. And, midway, there are the agnostics who admit that there is a substantive absolute but hold, at the same time, that it is knowable neither by itself nor even as A or B or C, etc., they hold that it is altogether unknowable.

As for these last two possibilities, I have, in my later days, learnt to discount agnosticism altogether. If the absolute is grasped as A or B or C, or then either it is known as verily that A or B or C, or it claims at least to be known, at whatever distant stage, apart from these characterisations. Anyway, there is no scope for agnosticism or scepticism anywhere.

As for the extreme form of Advaita-Vedānta where the Absolute is said, or claimed, to be known all by itself, i.e., apart from all characterisation. I have maintained, in a Bengali monograph published by the University of Burdwan,[1] that it itself is one of the many alternatives, meaning that the absolute ultimately stands either by itself, or as A or B, or C, etc. Add now to this the other two alternative absolutes—though they obtain apparently at a higher level of transcendence—viz., (i) the absolute as A, B or C and (ii) A, B or C as the absolute—and we have a formidable list of ultimate alternatives. Later on we shall have occasion to add further alternatives, all in a way basic, i.e., ultimate.

If 'by itself', 'as A', 'as B', etc., are the different forms in which the absolute is grasped, or sought to be grasped, these constitute the philosophies of the absolute—philosophies primarily as enlightened living grasps but, secondarily too, if one so likes, as intellectual philosophies *ab extra*. At the fag end of my philosophical carreer, I feel increasingly inclined to believe—and precisely this I have now been working out—that the alternation of 'itself', 'A', 'B', 'C', etc., is as much a full sympathetic understanding of the positive *possibility* of each of these philosophies through cultivating, as far as possible, an authentic catholic attitude to each possibility as not also to not committing oneself permanently to any one of them, and thus maintaining a scrupulously neutral attitude between them. It is a sort of authentic spiritual neutrality—a sort of genuine averaging—steering a safe middle course by not committing to any of these though permitting, at the same time, the possibility of every one of these—a sort of full exclusion and full inclusion in and the same attitude. This last attitude is precisely the awareness that these philosophies are only alternative philosophies, each equally acceptable and yet each to be kept at an equal distance. In

1. Its title is "*Bhāratīya Saṁskṛti O Anekānta Vedānta*".

short, it is to have no special philosophy of one's own but to maintain a sort of free sympathetic aloofness from all philosophies of the absolute developed, or to be developed, anywhere in the world at any time. And this itself is no philosophy. If one likes, one may call it super-philosophy—a strict attitude of neutrality, a transcendence equidistant from every one of these.

Three clear points have to be noted in this connexion. First, among the different philosophies I do not include pseudo-philosophies—philosophies which are palpably erroneous or inadequate. I include only those perennial philosophies which, resiling against unceasing attacks, have asserted themselves again and again. The second point to note is that the super-philosophy that I am driving at is in an important respect very much like that of the Mādhyamika Buddhists. They prescribe that we should transcend all philosophies (*dṛṣṭis*) and that yet this transcendence of theirs is not another philosophy co-ordinate with others. But though agreeing with them so far, we, however, differ in another important respect from them. (And, this is our third point). While for them all existing philosophies, including the resilient ones, are erroneous, we are rather inclined to hold that all these are correct though, certainly, we have to transcend all of them in order that we may view each in its full possibility from a super-philosophic distance. It is only then, i.e., when we view them from the super-philosophic standpoint, that we feel we must not commit ourselves to any of them. If we call them erroneous or inadequate, it is only in that very restricted sense.

So far with the substantive absolute as either itself or as A or B or C, etc. In the case of the functional absolute, on the other hand, i.e., in the case of 'A or B or C etc., as absolute', there is no question of transcending the philosophies 'A', 'B', 'C' etc., except trivially in the form 'X' = 0 (zero). In such a case we have perforce to content ourselves with the alternation I developed in my first few writings.

One may ask at this stage how any of these notions of alternation stands compared to the Jaina theory of *Anekānta*. The reply, however, is as I understand that theory, not far to seek.

According to the Jains, 'A', 'B', 'C' etc., are each an apparently self-complete philosophy from a particular standpoint which, however, being always truncated in whatever measure, misses Reality as it is in its fullness. It is only the *kevalin*, the truly wise, who is free from any such standpoint and who, therefore, knows Reality in its fullness. This Jaina view, stated so far, is not, however, clear enough. Does it mean that the *kevalin's* philosophy is just the sum of all the truncated philosophies, or does it mean that it consists of only that which is common to them ? It cannot mean the former. Each of the truncated philosophies was *coloured* in a particular manner because of the peculiar standpoint from which it was developed, and such coloured philosophies, put together, would only present a bizarre fabric, no uniform texture, no proper unity. The trunk, a leg, the tail, etc., *each of an elephant*, when put together, do certainly present the elephant, but what could possibly result from the totalling of 'the trunk as the elephant', 'the leg as the elephant', 'the tail as the elephant', etc. The *integral* philosophy of the *kevalin* cannot be of this naive form. Nor could it be like the total of the trunk, the leg, the tail etc., unless each of these was already known as having belonged to an elephant.

It cannot also consist merely of what is *common to* the different truncated philosophies developed from different angles of approach. What possibly could be common to the trunk, the leg, the tail, etc.? If the Jains intend what is common to 'the trunk *as elephant*', 'the leg *as elephant*', 'the tail *as elephant*' etc., that would certainly be an elephant, but one that would have no content : it would scarcely be anything more than the word 'elephant'. Attempts to settle disputes among different contestants by seeking to extract what is common to their

different claims have ended oftener than not in fiascos, and that would doubly be the case when it is a question of settling *fundamental* disputes in *philosophy*. Only two other solutions are left and the Jains must have meant one or the other of them. The solutions are :

(i) The *kevalin*, standing at a *higher level*, just views the different philosophies to be each as true and/or as false as every other, and holds that this view is not just another philosophy over and above these. He knows fully well the worth of each of the contesting philosophies, he knows their distances from one another, the relative merits and defects of each and draws a cosmic map, as it were, of these philosophies, locating each in its proper place. This map is neither anything other than nor co-ordinate with these philosophies. If this be the correct interpretation of *Syādvāda*, and if the *kevalin's* wisdom is understood this way, the notion of alternation that I have tried to develop at different stages of my philosophical career may not be very different, at least in principle, from it.

(ii) Or, much as many Mādhyamikas have claimed—and in a sense what is claimed by the Sāṁkhyists too—the *kevalin*, as the very etymology of the term shows, simply withdraws from all such philosophies, permitting all of them as of equal validity and equally defective, and remains quietly aloof. But, assuredly, the Jains will not accept this interpretation, though they would not disfavour the quietude in question. What probably they meant is some sort of synthesis of this '(ii)' with the '(i)' above—full enjoyment of quietude and yet looking detachedly at the different philosophies in the way they have developed from different points of view. This is essentially the attitude of the *sākṣin*, viewing things (including philosophies) *sub specie aeternitatis*, unattachedly from a distance, and therefore, enjoying all thorugh the bliss of quietude also.

'Unattachedness' does not mean rejection. Were the philosophies iejected wholesale there would be no interest even in

viewing them and having a comparative estimate. Yet, again, the *kevalin*—more correctly, the *sākṣin*—does not also get committed to any of these philosophies. However, there is always a *possible* commitment to all of them, followed, as occasioned in turn, by a *possible* rejection of each. This possible commitment (followed by rejection) is as much theoretical as practical, as much cognitive as actional. Is this not exactly what I have in my writing called alternation ?

An Indian by birth and temperament, whatever I have developed in my writings is some Indian view or other, only formulated in philosophical idioms that are Western, and if in developing these views I have, by way of clarification, often brought in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel or modern phenomenology, existentialism, and naturalism—whether in the form of crude and logical empiricism or in that of naturalist humanism or Marxism—that is just to show where in fundamentals Indian philosophies agree with and where they differ from Western philosophies.

What I have written here so far on the concept of alternation has concerned alternation only as method. In my different books and papers I have, in considerable detail and as systematically as possible applied this method of alternation to study in depth, almost all the fundamental notions that philosophers have ever been interested in.

II

I have in this connection—mostly, of course, in my later publications—tried to understand the precise relation between epistemology and metaphysics, for which latter I have often also used the wider and more commonly used term 'philosophy'. By 'philosophy' I have understood a systematic study of such basic notions as space, time, substance, causality, matter, life, etc., with the help of which, accepted and used uncritically, classical science explains, i.e., gives a systematic account of, all that happens in the diverse fields of the world we experience. For

classical science, these basic notions, including many that are logico-mathematical, are no mere postulates, no mere working concepts; they are all reals, never doubted, never questioned and the propositions representing them are never treated as merely analytical in character. In Kantian language, they are all *synthetic a priori.* It is these presuppositions of classical science—not those that pass under the names 'axioms' and 'postulates'—that constitute the subject-matter of metaphysics. They are reals of another order altogether, unquestionable reals that are willy-nilly accepted by all who say that they know this, our common world. Only, while for common men these basic reals stand undistinguished from ordinary real situations of our life, working, one may say, only functionally there—ordinary situations, for them, being *spatial* or *temporal*, etc., with neither this space nor time nor any such basic features standing in any way apart in their own right—classical scientists use them *as though* they stand so distinguished, i.e., consciously use them without, however, seeking to apprehend them as they are in themselves. The task of philosophy, in contrast, is exactly this apprehension of the basic *a priori* reals *in themselves* and also in their interrelation, and not merely in the way they relate themselves to things of our common world and, therefore, of these things in relationship with one another. This trans-natural study of the *sui generis* behaviours of the basic reals is possible only through a new transcendental method, viz., reflective immediate awareness of these as distinguished (in their self-containedness) from all natural situations that contain them as undistinguishedly fused, i.e., adjectival or functional. That there must be some such transcendental awareness is clear from the fact that there are clear and normally unchallenged, words precisely for these autonomous basic reals *qua* autonomous. If modern empiricists dismiss these words as fake, or as usurpers, this they do either arbitrarily or in undue deference to science which, according to them, is the final account of reality.

But classical science is not the final account. Philosophy, another name of which is metaphysics, has gone beyond it to study the basic rules as they are in themselves and also in their interrelation, i.e., systematically. The difficulty arises for the first time when modern science seeks to supersede the classical. To this modern science space, time, matter, causality, self, etc., are none of them basic *realities*. For it, all these are only postulates, just necessary methodological requirements, for constructing systematic explanations of or theories about what happens in this our common world. The truth of these theories and, by implication, of the postulates too, is constituted, first, by their systematic interrelation, i.e., their logical propriety, and, secondly—which is more relevant to our present consideration—by their reference, however distant, to the things of our common world. These things of our common world are at least those that we start with as reals; and if all other reals, the reals, for example, that metaphysics so proudly parades as more fundamental, could only be made intelligible in *their* context, as only methodological requirements for understanding them, then all solid reals would only be available in this our common world. This is how modern science and, pinning absolute faith on it, modern empirical philosophy have sought to do away with all transcendental basic reals.

For classical science, theories are mostly in one–one correspondence with solid facts of the world. Facts are, of course, allowed any measure of subtlety, down to the subtlest, and even such subtle entities as look like mere *working concepts* are given the status of solid worldly facts on the ground that other cruder solid facts could be predicted on their basis and that way verified. Modern science, on the other hand, takes most of the subtle entities to be mere theories—in appropriate cases, only postulates—*justifiable*, i.e., acceptable to the scientist, necessarily on a subtler ground. Logical positivists have worked hard on this task of justification, and some, like Popper, have taken these

theories and postulates as constituting quite another world, all by themselves. Lest, however, this world be confused with the backdated transcendental world of the 'speculative' metaphysicians, these thinkers of the Popperian group have insisted on at least the falsifiability of such theories and postulates by the crude solid facts of the world.

Modern science is at a level ahead of classical science. It is more self-reflective in that while classical science has no freedom with the basic concepts which represent, for it, unalterable (*a priori*) reals, modern science is absolutely free to manipulate them, its whole purpose being to construct such a theory as, not needing justification through any crude observation of nature, is sufficiently justified if only it is, first, self-consistent, secondly, consistent with other theories, and, thirdly connected with some data of observation, however remotely and indirectly or, less still, if it is simply falsifiable by the tiniest datum of crude observation.

Modern science as so self-reflective and a level removed from classical science appears, indeed, to be on a par with philosophy (metaphysics). But the two disciplines have developed in the service of two quite different interests. While modern science builds up elaborate *theories*, philosophy *describes* all basic reals as they are found in themselves and in interconnexion. While stating these basic reals as they are found, philosophy has, of course, to analyse, define and classify these reals, and justify too, through ratiocination, the descriptive account, as immediate findings may not always be faultless. But all this is in the interest of communication, not for one's own learning except that even for one's own learning such analysis, definition, classification and ratiocination may be necessary at the initial stages, though to be superseded, sooner or later, by immediate finding (often called intuition). About things present before me, no awareness is more *convincing* than perception. To be convinced is here the primary, if not the only, desideratum, and even though,

on occasions, immediate perception betrays us we have to revert to some other *perception* for final conviction. That other perception may also betray, but there is no way out other than resorting to still another perception. Ratiocination proceeds in quite another direction. It never yields *conviction*; it only makes a content *socially* acceptable, so that all may work in unison on the basis of the knowledge already derived—a consideration which is always more or less pragmatic. Reason, everywhere, performs only this much task : it builds a bulwork of social defence *after* one is convinced of something, or demolishes contrary social pictures (theories) wrongly woven round it (or round some other immediate conviction wrongly taken as this one), or only escorts others guardedly to it along the pathway of suggestion and symbolization.[1] The final desideratum in philosophy is always (direct) conviction; and other than philosophic intuition there is no way to it when it is a question of basic realities, exactly as we resort to such (direct) conviction with regard to the ordinary reals of our daily life also. What produces immediate conviction is direct contact (intuition or observation), all ratiocination only deputizing for it at the most, and that too not efficiently enough. If in classical science we have relied so much on theories (hypotheses), that is because direct verification through observation is either not possible there or cumbrous enough. This is why many modern empiricists have insisted on 'weak' or 'indirect' verification, managing with whatever (though within manageable manipulation) data of observation they could afford.

It is only in the case of modern science that, as we have pointed out earlier, not even this type of weak or indirect veri-

1. Reason may have another task to perform, though that is not our present concern. It may *analyse* that of which we feel we are convinced, and that analysis is done mostly to offset the possibility that we are not as aware of the thing, i.e., of its details, as, we feel, we are convinced of it.

fication is considered necessary. Modern science is almost wholly a body of *theories*; its only relation with actual facts of our daily life is that its task, after all, is to explain these facts; and whether the theory it offers as explanation is acceptable or not depends on whether it can or cannot be falsified by *any* fact of this actual world—by *any* observable datum—assuming, however, that logically the theory stands self-consistent. It is concerned *almost entirely* with conceptual constructions—with ratiocination consisting formally in the use of logic (including mathematics) and materially of more and more efficient postulates. This use of logic and postulates, is, however, reflective all through. It is self-conscious, not instinctive, no mere unreflective use. This precisely characterizes the particular level of study here. Unlike classical science, and very much like philosophy, it is a meta-study from the beginning to the end, very consciously using logic and sorts of postulates, which no classical science ever does. Yet just as philosophy (as metaphysics) need not study itself as a subject or the logic and the method it has used, though consciously, nor even what this philosophy is really about—need not, in short, deal with the question 'what is philosophy', so also modern science need not study these problems, viz., the nature of logic and mathematics involved in its methodology or the question regarding its own nature, that is, 'what is science?'.

This means that in either case there is scope for a further meta-study—in the case of philosophy, for what is normally known as epistemology and in the case of modern science, for what normally passes under the name 'philosophy of science.' As a matter of fact, however, as philosophy has often included epistemology in its own field, understanding by the term 'philosophy' both metaphysics and epistemology, so has been the case with modern science and the 'philosophy of science' too: modern scientists themselves have sought to develop their 'philosophy of science'. This means that once we transcend our daily

world of solid facts and engage in a meta-study there is, theoretically, no end to the series of 'meta behind meta' : once we are self-conscious, there is theoretically no limit to the increasing degree of self-consciousness. Yet, however, the paradox of reality is that there is no meta-study beyond either epistemology or philosophy of science, or if one includes epistemology in philosophy and 'philosophy of science' in modern science itself beyond either philosophy or modern science. This is so because self-consciousness, though of different degrees of clarity, involves no self-bifurcation, meaning that no half of consciousness knows the other half as an *object.* It is not consciousness folding upon itself; it is self-evident, luminous consciousness, one that requires no other consciousness to illuminate it. For, had it required that—were consciousness, in other words, knowable by another consciousness—there would be no end to the series 'consciousness behind consciousness'; and this would in effect, mean that there is no awareness of consciousness—an evident absurdity, because, whatever be the paradox, consciousness does stand apprehended. That there would be no end to the series 'consciousness behind consciousness', had not consciousness at some stage—in the absence of any reason to the contrary, at the very first step—been self-evident, is, as we have just seen, only another way of saying that there would be no end to the series 'meta-study behind meta-study', had not meta-study at some stage—in the absence of any reason to the contrary, at the very first stage, i.e., the very first meta-study—been so self-conscious that whatever could be more meta, meta-meta, etc., stood self-consciously revealed in the very first meta-study. Or, if, for whatever reason, epistemology could be considered, as by the Kantians and other deontologists, to be a level removed from philosophy (metaphysics) and, similarly, 'philosophy of science' from modern science, we could admit only three levels of study, viz., classical science, philosophy paralleled by modern science, and epistemology paral-

leled by 'philosophy of science'; and similarly about consciousness too—consciousness of an object, consciousness of consciousness which may be regarded as psychological introspection, and self-evident consciousness, i.e., consciousness not of another consciousness but just of itself., This third may be understood in the traditional Advaita Vedantic line[1] as luminous (*svaprakāśa*) consciousness; one may also understand it as consciousness folding upon itself, provided the 'itself' is in no way regarded as broken into two parts, the unbroken itself somehow illuminating that unbroken itself, the illuminating being in no way different from the illuminated except that one is the act of illumination and the other the illuminated—in short, one and the same thing as both an act—power and itself. This is the view of the traditional Śaivas and many Vaiṣṇavas.

The series 'meta-behind-meta' could be continued non-stop if only at some stage it were not qualitatively different and had not exposed all its mysteries all at once, only to be deciphered through patient self-enumeration, not by moving beyond to another level. Similarly about the seires 'consciousness behind consciousness'. Those—the Naiyāyikas, for example—to whom this self-exposition has no appeal whatsovever, who consider all things to be after all ultimately *dense*, always capable of standing as object, capable in other words, of being 'taken up' and viewed from outside, and for whom the viewer too has the same fate (like a torch which, enlightening things outside does not enlighten itself, for which latter enlightening another torch is required, and so on)—these people would indeed speak too easily of consciousness behind consciousness *ad infinitum*. But this would be like understanding an ideal as only asymptotically approached from the empirical point of view rather than having it bodily in a trans-empirical transcendental awareness. To a

1. And also in the line of wholesale dynamists like the extreme Śāktas and many Buddhists. Corresponding to all the views stated in the text above we may find representative Western views also.

large extent, indeed, there is a sort of alternation—a sort of long-running tussle—between this asymptotic empirical approach and the transcendental bodily grasp. But, as I have shown in many of my later writings—specially in "Comparative Indian Philosophy"[1] and "Spirit and Matter in Man"[2]—, the transcendental always gets the upper hand in as much as while epiricism always falls short of the transcendent, unable to bridge over an ever-anew yawning gulf, for transcendentalism such gulfs are always somehow negotiable from the beginning : while empiricism, unable to cope with the transcendent, *has to condemn* it outright, transcendentalism always extends protecting hands to empiricism and asks it only to moderate its obstinacy.

What is true of self-consciousness (consciousness aware of itself without any rigid self-bifurcation) is true, we have seen, of every meta-study.

III

The absolute alternation that I spoke of in Sec. I is intelligible only at a level of meta-study. At the level of daily normal experience, whatever *appears to be* is either really there or not there, and when it is known to be not there it is rejected, so that there is no scope, at this level, for our taking more than one thing to be alternatively real in one and the same spatio-temporal context. We can indeed—and often do—speak of more than one thing to be real at different places and times but not easily enough at the same place and time, and even where we do say that, never in the same relation. A paper and its whiteness obtain at the same place and time but never in the same relation. Thus, no two things of the world of our daily experience are ever alternative to each other.

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1. Published in the Souvenir Volume, *All India Oriental Conference*, 1980.
2. Published in *Visva-Bharati-Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, Numbers 1 and 2, 1981.

At the first level of *study*, too,—a level which is relatively a stage removed from our normal daily experience of the world but not, for that reason, meta in any true sense of the term—a study which, in other words, only presents *systematically* what we so experience, the *system* in such cases consisting partly of factual relations and partly of logic that we *use* without our being (reflectively) conscious of it in its autonomy—at such first level of study too there is no scope for alternation. The term 'meta' is ambiguous. For example, to *talk of* something is, relatively, a stage removed from *experiencing* it, but this talking, therefore, is not at a meta-level in the sense in which we have been using the term here. If mere talking of X is at a meta-level relatively to our experience of X, this is only meta in a mechanical *verbal* sense and such 'metas' may be multiplied indefinitely one behind another. The meta that we, on the other hand, have been speaking throughout is some *living meta-experience.* The notion of alternation is valid only at some such living meta-level of experience, Philosophy as epistemology claims, clearly, to be at one such meta-level : it is a sort of experience—no mere mechanical talking—and so is modern science as 'philosophy of science'. Classical science, on the other hand, is neither mechanical talking nor meta-experience. It, as we have said above, presents systematically what we experience in our daily life, and what this systematicness consists in we have already seen.

Meta-experience proper is otherwise called in the history of philosophy 'transcendental experience'. It is experience of things that belong to a higher order, an order higher than that to which the things of our normal daily experience belong. They are precisely the metaphysical realities we spoke of earlier, realities like space, time, matter, life, self, etc., which, though they remain ordinarily as undistinguishedly fused—normally experienced in our daily life as things that are spatial, temporal material, living subjective, etc.—, come to evidence themselves as distinguished

and therefore, experienced in their intrinsic autonomy at this higher level, Consciousness of these entities as by themselves stands in a peculiar relation to them. In our normal daily experience, consciousness, whether co-ordinate or not with the things of which we are said to be conscious, is always extrinsic, accidental to those things. But the basic reals, in so far as they are distinct in themselves, can be experienced only the way we have distinguished them. If they had been there before we distinguished them, that was in undistinguished fusion with, i.e., as adjectival to or as functional characters of things of our daily life. In their distinct autonomy they could not be there *unless we had distinguished them*, i.e., extricated them from their state of fusion. Had they stood there all along in their full autonomy, it passes our understanding why we did not experience them that way in our ordinary daily life. We cannot specify any defect that we could be suffering from, unless it be all an *ad hoc* hypothesis yielding no real explanation. We cannot also point to anything that could at that time stand between us and those basic reals, shading either our vision or their autonomy.

But this is not the full story of these basic reals. Paradoxically enough, we cannot deny too that they were there all along in their truest autonomy : we never feel we *created* them the first time we found them in their autonomy. The only intelligible explanation of this situation is that though they distinguish themselves, they do so only when we distinguish them,[1] extricate them, from their fused condition. What we mean is not merely that the two distinguishing are strictly simultaneous[2] but that each in a way conditions the other. We mean, in short, that

1. Or, it may be, *after* we have distinguished them, i.e., when we refer to them retrospectively. In any case, our self-consciously distinguishing them is a necessity as much for their autonomy as for their apprehension.
2. This has, of course, to be interpreted in the light of Note 1 above.

they show themselves as autonomous only as we approach them *reflectively*, i.e., self-consciously, and they lapse into fusion as soon as we revert to our normal naturalistic attitude. Reflection or self-consciousness, we have seen, is consciousness aware of itself in an inward attitude. Hence what we mean in sum is that consciousness, turning inward on itself, discovers the metaphysical reals as constituting the *essences* of natural phenomena. There is no reason, again, why these essences should not have being. If natural phenomena, though correlates of our (normal) experience, are yet normally accepted as beings over there, why should not the same logic apply to the case of *essences* ?

So far with philosophy (metaphysics) as meta, i.e., as transcendental experience of self-distinguished autonomous basic reals which in contrast, were experienced in our normal daily life as fused, functional or adjectival. If epistemology, as meta-experience at a level further ahead, has to be distinguished from philosophy, it would be the explicit experience of the very distinction between philosophic experience and our ordinary experience of normal daily life. It would be the living story of how, precisely, metaphysical reals are experienced, how they stand related to one another and to the matters of our daily life, why one level is hierarchically different from the other, and equally the living study of the method i.e., logic whereby all this, experienced by one, could be communicated to others.

This, in a way, is the story of modern science *vis-a-vis*, 'philosophy of science' too. The only distinction between philosophy (metaphysics) and modern science is that while what we call basic reals are truly real to philosophy, for modern science they are one and all only conceptual constructions, postulates of a sort; and 'philosophy of science' is the explicit awareness of this very status of the basic reals, an awareness, therefore of what modern science is all about, including a general awareness of the logic and mathematics it employs, all special detailed awareness

of this logic and mathematics belonging to logic and mathematics as special disciplines. Again, exactly as the basic reals are understood in two altogether different ways in metaphysics and modern science, the logics and the types of mathematics they use also differ : the logic and mathematics that the metaphysician employs, whether for his own understanding or for communicating intelligibly with others, are intuitional, while those that modern scientists seek to use are only formal. There, of course, may occur unauthorised intermixture, philosophy and modern science tending to get confused with each other, and so, too, epistemology and ' philosophy of science '.

Two points need to be specially mentioned in this connexion. They are :

(*a*) We have by now come across three ultimate alternations, viz,. (i) between naturalism and transcendentalism, (ii) between philosophy and modern science (which is the same thing as that between epistemology and ' philosophy of science ', and (iii) between subjectivity and object. More of all these alternations later.

(*b*) Alternation is intelligible only at the transcendental level (which, as we have already seen, may have different sublevels). At the level of nature, the level, i.e., of our normal daily life, there is no question of alternation. Everything there is exactly as it is experienced to be, and if different people, or the same person at different times, experience it as of different characters, then all but one such experience is sought to be rejected, even though dispute goes on for long about which one precisely is to remain. So when in Section I we were elaborating our notion of ultimate alternation we were talking all through from the transcendental standpoint. And, that is now evident in another way too : we were, in that Section, studying the position of different ' philosophies ' *vis-a-vis* one another, we were seeking to unveil the mysteries of our experience at the epistemological level. Disjunction at the level of nature is always privational;

it is only at the transcendental level (at any of its sub-levels) that alternation can be, and often is, *final* disjunction, disjunction, in other words, that stands unreduced. What it means is that at this level we oscillate, from the beginning to the end, between alternative experiences without seeking to fasten specifically upon *one* of those : we refuse to apply the naturalistic logic here and do not repent this. It is this precisely which constitutes the full joy of freedom at this level, the joy not only at the absence of restraint but, more positively, for the *possibility* of accepting *all* the alternatives, i.e., everything that is offered, and the beauty of the whole thing is that we do not feel in the least disintegrated. The perpetual swing between the alternatives—whether they are alternatives at one and the same sub-level of transcendence or at different sub-levels, alternating with one another, or whether it is a case that transcendence and our daily natural experience are alternating is itself the final decision the final resting place, the final integration (unity), if one so likes. Only, as unity it must be some *disjunctive* unity as opposed to all forms of conjunctive unity.

Obviously, this disjunctive unity does not itself alternate with the philosophies that alternate among themselves. It is a level removed viz., that of epistemology. There is an alternation even here. One may experience it as absolute silence complete withdrawal from all possible commitments, without however experiencing it, for that reason, as existentially nothing —without, in other words, committing suicide : it may well be the absolute non-committal as itself the final (and, to that extent, positive) anchorage, though keeping completely aloof at the same time, from all these philosophies. This, however, is only one grand alternative, and even this grand alternative may be experienced in two alternative ways—in one, the positivity *goes on thinning non-stop* with unceasing withdrawal from the many philosophies, and in the other the positivity is at its maximum, being very self-consciously enjoyed as absolutely self-

contained and equally and absolutely aloof from all these philosophies. Then, again, there is another grand alternative : far from being non-committal to the different philosophies one may feel like committing equally, and at one and the same time, to all of them—to be more precise, *capable* of such equal but alternative commitments–and, actual opportunity forthcoming, actually committing to this or that of them wholeheartedly. There are two further—the fourth and fifth—grand alternatives which, however, offer themselves only to be rejected, but why we cannot say. One of them, which I tried to develop in my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, is that the different philosophies are the final alternatives and that there is no ulterior unitary grand pedestal from where one could view these philosophies as alternatives; and the other is that at one and the same time one stands actually committed to all these philosophies.

Before we consider the point (*a*) stated above, and the alternatives stated there, with or without other alternatives, let us first, in the next Section turn to a more basic consideration, viz., why should one admit transcendence at all, over and above the normal experiences of our daily life and these as organised in the different *classical* sciences. The question, in other words, is about the necessity and propriety of anything that claims to be trans-natural. Philosophers, known variously as empiricists, naturalists and materialists, have always fought against this notion as one that is not only unnecessary but, more importantly, *illegitimate*. Why are we then speaking so confidently about the trans-natural, the transcendental ?

IV

Whoever admits a transcendent level of reality admits it on any one or several of the grounds to be shortly stated and elaborated. But the first question here is—why *levels of* reality ? Does it mean that one such level, viz., the transcendental, is at least more real than the other, viz., the naturalistic (empirical),

if not the only reality, the other being condemned as either wholly or partially unreal? But then, again, do not the naturalists also speak of two levels (at least 'types') of reality and then reject the transcendental as all nonsense ?

What should be particularly noticed in this connexion is, that there is a difference here. The naturalist will not allow right from the beginning, any serious talk about the (so-called) transcendental except that some foolish philosophers had, in the history of philosophy, admitted it. According to them, it is all *nonsense*, a sheer prejudice, a linguistic misfire. When, on the contrary, a transcendentalist speaks of the empirical level he grants it, from the beginning, some provisional reality—a type of reality which, he holds (and that not very wrongly), is enough for our ordinary daily life, whether it be the sheer creaturely life or even human life provided, in the latter case, it is completely determined by natural laws. They hold that, living the life of this *provisional reality* for some good time and, for that period, in all seriousness, we, in quite a new interest—call it *spiritual* but it is nonetheless cognitive at the base—, come to know, initially in an indirect fashion, i.e., through thought or reason but eventually in some form of intuition, a *higher*, reality —'higher' in the sense that when it is known the natural reals that we had been knowing till then as real on their own right come to be detected as having only borrowed that reality from what is now known at the higher level. What it all means is that either the lower reality—the 'nature' of our daily experience —is, from this higher point of view, i.e., ultimately only a *mode* of this higher reality which (i.e., the latter) alone is real in its own right, *or* this 'nature' is, from the higher point of view, nothing at all—a rootless dream, a fleeting show, a total hallucination. The transcendentalist, thus, is more moderate than the naturalist in condemning the 'so-called' real he does not recognise: he permits it some provisional being only. Nature, for him, is real just as long as one lives the life of nature. The

naturalist, on the other hand, never allows even this much reality to the transcendent : the transcendent, to him, is absolute nonsense from the beginning to the end. Transcendentalists not only permit the provisional reality of nature, some of them go a step further and understand the natural as a *mode* of the transcendental itself. And as the latter is reality in itself, the natural as its mode is also to that extent, real. It is not provisionally real, to be in the long run abjured; it is only partially real tending always to be somehow integrated with other such reals, that way either approaching or getting transmuted into the ultimate reality.

This is a substantial attitudinal difference between the naturalist and the transcendentalist, and it explains why modern scientists and, among the older philosophers, the Greek atomists, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas cannot, in spite of all their doctrines of atoms, electrons, God, *adṛṣṭas*, etc., be called transcendentalists, i.e., trans-naturalists. These their atoms, God, etc. may all be beyond the furthest limit of perception (observation)[1], but still they are, first, inferable from perceived data and therefore—and that is our second point—intelligible only in terms of those data, whatever be the status of the formal logic that is involved. Have the modern scientists, for example, ever called atoms, electrons etc., trans-natural, i.e., transcendental, entities? So is the case with the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas.

1. When the Naiyāyikas understand them to be supernaturally perceived by the yogins, this is no concession to transcendentalism. This perception, though supernatural, is not trans-natural. The so-called supernatural perception is here still all natural, though supernormally natural like the perception of a universal when any corresponding particular is perceived. They, including the Mīmāṁsakas' *adṛṣṭas*, are also natural in the sense that they are convincingly, unchallengedly (according to them), inferred from empirical data. When, in contrast, the transcendentalist looks like inferring

Between transcendentalism and naturalism there could be a sort of alternation only if, from their respective points of view, they were equally strong and/or equally weak. So far, however, we have found transcendentalism better placed. It has permitted naturalism some provisional validity, not only in the sense that it has after all to be started with but also in the sense of putting up with nature till the transcendental point of view is attained admitting that way that till then one will have to remain in nature—partly, till the transcendental point of view is fully attained and wholly till it first emerges in a rudimentary form. And, not merely this, often too—and that is almost the general rule—it is liberal enough to take everything that constitutes nature to be even as good as a *mode* of the transcendental itself and, therefore, real to that extent. In contrast, we have seen, naturalism *rejects* all form of transcendentalism as *non-sense* from the beginning.

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reals this, as we have already seen, is always a weak, less convincing procedure : it is either a strong *suggestion* or additional *confirmation* of what is already known or is only a mode of demolishing contrary theories, assuming that the thing concerned is already known. We do not subscribe to the modern philosophers' distinction between belief and knowledge in the senses in which they use these terms. For us, anything is said to be known when it is admitted on acceptable grounds, including sense-perception. Sense-perception is an *acceptable* ground, because where I, so sense-perceive a thing others, present there, also sense perceive it, unless, of course on some specifiable (and acceptable by-all) ground someone's sense-perception comes to be doubted or rejected. This logic applies equally to the cases of inference and other forms of knowledge. In place of the modern philosophers' distinction between belief and knowledge, we like rather to bring in the distinction between *knowledge* and its *confirmation*,the question of confirmation arising whenever one likes to *communicate* his knowledge to others or, in an imagined social context, to himself.

Except, of course, one form of naturalism, say that of Kant in his first *Critique*, which permits the transcendental, not indeed as knowable, i.e., as anything real, but only as regulative, as an *ideal*. But this form of transcendentalism is not easily digestible. It is not certainly the empirical, merely running non-stop beyond better and better situations. For Kant, it is bodily the ideal, a *priori* in its nature, though not *known*, i.e., certified as *real*. But if Kant refuses the name 'knowability' or 'reality' of it this is because he confines these two terms to whatever is natural, i.e., sensuously given or giveable, meaning by 'giveable' whatever possible empirical is connected with any given empirical by means of a *priori* 'categories'. But, first, the giveable, obviously, cannot be taken as real (knowable) unless *either* the categories, by means of which it is connected with something actually given, are themselves also somehow known or knowable, i.e., real, *or* if the categories as mere *a priori* necessities, not by themselves knowable or real, could confer reality (knowability) on the eventual construct simply because, by themselves, they apply necessarily to some given empirical data. But then—and that is our second point—why should not the same considerations apply in the case of *a priori ideals* too ? If only Kant's own view of transcendental ideals be accepted, only then would transcendentalism be as strong or as weak as naturalism; and only in that case could naturalism and transcendentalism be genuine alternatives. Otherwise, however, the way we have so long understood transcendence—except, of course, in the extreme case where it denies nature all types of reality, even the provisional reality normally granted to it in our day-to-day life[1]—makes transcendentalism more comprehensive than naturalism, and not an alternative to it.

But let us revert to our main question, 'why admit the transcendent at all ?'

1. *Vide Ajātivāda* and later Śaṁkarite Vedānta.

It is admitted on different grounds.

First, people have been admitting it untutored, in some form or other, since the earliest days. Some people, claiming the monopoly of culture, have indeed been rejecting it from time to time as prejudice, illusory anthropomorphism, illusion born of misuse of language, hortatory statements misunderstood as assertory, sheer nonsense and what not ? But it is a fact too that inspite of such condemnation, every time stronger than what it had been earlier, transcendentalism has been reasserting itself, which proves, as Kant so strongly claims, that there is something behind it—something, indeed, of cognitive import. If Kant himself has refused to call it *knowledge*, though unlike any modern empiricist or linguistic philosopher he takes it still as some exercise of theoretic reason, we have seen where precisely he strayed.

Lest this is too easily waived as a historical accident we add the following more solid reasons :

(i) If we have any reasonable occasions to account for the world as *a whole* and if such holistic talks are, logically, not inadmissible, we have to admit something that is somehow beyond the world, i.e., transcendent. We do have such occasions, as when we seek the way out from *all* suffering, all sort of suffering, suffering as a whole. That we seek such way out is a fact : everyone seeks it. Ask any one and he will say he does not like to have *any* suffering; it is almost an analytic proposition. In cases where we seem to *court* some suffering—say, for the sake of reaping substantial pleasure through some smaller suffering, or, say when a mother courts suffering for the pleasure of her child, or a lover for the beloved—it is still true that could the same amount of pleasure be derived *without* this pain everybody, including the mother and the lover[1], would favour that. It is

1. Except, for the lover, in the case stated in next line in the text.

only in two cases that some doubt arises as to whether suffering is desired to be got rid of. One is the case where suffering chastens a pleasure that without it would have remained rugged and coarse; and the other where it is an inevitable ingredient of the spirit in a certain mode, like the suffering that Christ, for example, courted for the sinning mankind. The first of these two cases, however, is not very different from those already disposed of. If those rugged pleasures could be chastened by other means, that alternative would certainly be preferred.[1] Only, in so far as such alternatives do not present themselves we have perforce to tolerate these sufferings, as in the case of a mother suffering for the child. More difficult is the case of pathos or tragedy in art where, apparently, it is the suffering that lends beauty to the whole situation. But even there we may say that in so far as it lends that beauty to it, it does not remain there any longer as suffering, except retrospectively as what *was* a suffering. In the context of art it has been sublimated; only a shadow of suffering, continuing, lends the distinctive colouring to that particular art.

It is a different case altogether, we admit, with Christ's suffering : it continues as suffering—even intenser than other sufferings because at least quantitatively it is greater than any particular man's whole-life suffering. Christ took up the sufferings of *all men*, and these continue *as suffering* even in fhe spiritual body of Christ which, otherwise, is divine bliss incarnate. That way, suffering is certainly courted (by Christ). But it is by no means any welcome accorded suffering at the naturalistic level. It is suffering granted quarter at a *trans-natural* level, which means that transcendence stands already admitted. Our

1. Sometimes, indeed, a suffering, like that of separation or one derived from contradiction, lends a special weight to the joy that involves it. But this, in quality, is not very different from Christ's suffering discussed a little later in the text.

task was to prove transcendence on the basis of man's undeniable tendency to avoid, or get rid of, *all* sufferings, the whole 'open class' of sufferings; and if in order to counter this the opponent puts forward Christ's case, then he can do so only if he admits that where suffering is at all genuinely courted it must be at a transcendent level. That way, the opponent's argument rather proves what he was out to refute. Integral perfectionists too, in all ages and claimes, have incorporated suffering, though as digested and transmuted, in ultimate bliss which, according to them, is concretely absolute. This is possible solely because perfection, ultimate bliss, etc., are all concepts that belong to the transcendent level.

The premise we started from was that man wants to avoid or get rid of the entire 'open class' of sufferings. But it is not precisely here that modern empiricists, and even Kant in a sense, have taken exception ? How possibly, they argue, can an open class be a closed class at the same time ? We reply : what, empirically, is an open class is, transcendentally, a closed one. This, evidently, is a reply on Kantian lines. Only, while Kant would not take such transcendent closed classes as *knowable*, i.e., *real*, we have already seen why we need not be so apologetic.

It is difficult, indeed, to understand how man, decidedly an item of nature, can question, and talk about, this very nature as a whole. Can a part ever comprehend the whole ? But our reply is straight and simple : it is a *fact* that man does raise such questions and talks about the world as a whole, which means that somehow—whether we understand it or not—he is as much a part of nature as beyond it too. This ambivalence we shall discuss in detail in the next Section and make it intelligible there.

We are seriously concerned with the world as a whole not only in our attempt—instinctive or calculating—to be away from

all[1] suffering but also in our attempt—equally as much calculative as instinctive to find a cause of this world as a whole. It has almost always been a moot point with the empiricists to deny the admissibility, on whatever ground, of such first cause, the cause of the whole world. Formerly they used to criticise the details of the Cosmological Argument in whichever form it was formulated whether in the West or in India. Some of them talked indeed of the inadmissibility of the problem itself on the ground that the very notion of transcendence was, for them inadmissible. But that was mostly a lesser issue in those earlier days. What they advanced most in this line was a denial, as for example, by the Susikṣita Cārvākas of our country, of the validity of any inference from empirical data to anything that could be trans-empirical. It is only in recent days that the very concept of the trans-empirical has come to be challenged on the basis of self-contradiction and/or linguistic misuse. In the present context it has assumed a form like this :

If there be a cause of the world it must, like every other cause, be an event and, that far, obtain within this world; and yet it cannot do that, because, as a cause of the world *as a whole*, it has to be placed outside of it, as is the lot of every cause in relation to its effect.

Our reply to this challenge is exactly on the Kantian lines except that while for Kant the whole world as having a cause or not, though intelligible from the transcendental point of view, is nothing that could be called real or unreal—i.e., a matter of

1. There is no sharp distinction *here* between 'all' as a closed class of an indefinite number of individuals and 'any' i.e., self-instantiation of the corresponding universal, for here we are either at the transcendent level or on the bordering line between transcendence and nature. Where we speak of 'open' class, i.e., indefinitely of 'any' member of the class, it is all from the naturalistic, empirical, point of view.

knowledge—for us, as we have claimed several times earlier, it is real, knowable. Our reply, in brief, is that, normally satisfied with causation within the world, i.e., among natural phenomena, we could at all raise the question about the cause of the world itself if only we were already aware somehow, in and whatever measure, direct or distant, of transcendence. That we are already so aware we have shown in connexion with our attempt at getting away from *all* sufferings. 'All sufferings' naturally involves *all* causes (objects) of all sufferings, i.e., the whole world; for there is nothing in this phenomenal world, both physical and mental, that does not cause some suffering in some context[1]. Another name of *all objects* is 'the world as a whole'.

One may raise an objection here. One may argue that what is here meant by 'first cause' is not the cause of the *whole world* but only the first in the series of causes behind causes in the phenomenal world. The objection, in other words, is that the first cause has nothing to do with the transcendental level, that it is in nature itself, quite as much as every other cause. But, so formulated, the argument is equally, if not more, vulnerable. If that first cause is in nature—wholly in nature—it, in its turn, must need a cause, for all that is wholly in nature has a cause; and in that case it cannot be the first cause, which means that all phenomena as causes form an 'open class'. This, of course, could be a clear alternative if not for the disturbing consideration that some entities like space, time, the general law of causality etc.—in short, all entities that are considered to be basic, i.e., metaphysical—are as much in the world itself as also transcendent.[2] To be in the world is not necessarily to be *wholly*—better,

1. This last also is as much a transcendental truth, though initially only dimly understood, as that we have to get away from all sufferings.
2. This we have developed and substantiated in an earliear Section.

merely—in it : it may be transcendent at the same time. The 'first cause' of the famous Cosmological Agument is exactly of this status. As *in the series* it is in the world, i.e., a phenomenon; but, at the same time, it is transcendent too, meaning that the very transcendent First Cause chose to behave also as a worldly phenomenon, though, because of its transcendent nature, it possibly could not have another phenomenal event preceding it as cause. This is the true character of all genuine transcendents—God, self, space, time, etc. Continuing in their transcendent status they appear also in the phenomenal world and behave like other phenomena there except that they evince their transcendence too throughout, their autonomy, their in-itselfness in each case. One may say that here—and only here—transcendence and the phenomenal world alternate; for which some pin their faith entirely on the transcendent, some on the phenomenal and some, robustly enough, on the transcendent that, evincing transcendence, shares seat, at the same time, with other phenomena (but with this difference that it is always a special seat, a royal seat). The phenomenal world is, in this third alternative, a democracy where "all are equal but some more equal than others". In each of these alternatives the penultimate phenomenon is, in this sense, the cause of the world as a whole.

The state of affairs, thus, is not as simple as we find it in text books dealing with the Cosmological Argument. The Naiyāyikas, aware of such complication, have formulated the Causal Argument in a different manner altogether. They would not, as we have seen earlier, permit any transcendence and would, therefore, understand the cause of the world as much as possible in the language of ordinary causation—a conscious agent, like the maker of a table, but of supernormal powers, though by no means qualitatively different, i.e., transcendental, meaning all the time that he, himself, uncaused, belongs after all to this very

world—one among its various items, though of immence dimension almost in every respect. That he is the cause of the world does not mean, the Naiyāyikas hold, that he is beyond it. The world here does not mean the *totality*, a *whole*, of items; it means *any* item—*every* item that anybody chances to come across—and not a whit more than that. 'Any', according to them, does not mean a *transcendent viewed from the empirical standpoint*. It rather means the corresponding *universal* as so viewed, and universals are, according to them, all empirical, belonging to nature as some of its items. The Naiyāyika's nature = world does not consist merely of events that happen at definite instants of time (and very often continue too, however briefly) and the cease to be, it consists equally of eternals which are either non-temporal altogether or, unborn and never ceasing, continue for all times.

The Naiyāyikas have tried desperately to remain empiricists from the beginning to the end, and this is why even though they have admitted reals which others have mostly recognised as transcendent (metaphysical) they have struggled hard to interpret them empirically all through, never, indeed, in the line of modern empiricists, as mere postulates or conceptual constructs—for that was entirely foreign to their line of thinking—but as every bit real and empirical.

It is because of this empiricistic predilection that the Nyāya argument for the existence of God has perforce been half Cosmological and half Teleological. The Teleological Argument of the Western thinkers is, more than three fourths of it, empiricistic, and the little transcendence that one is forced, say, by Kant, to recognise in it is but the transcendence which necessarily characterizes God whichever way it is argued and which, as we have just seen, the Naiyāyikas tried so desperately to get rid of.

The Teleological Argument, as an argument, is, thus wholly in the empiricistic attitude. In contrast, the Ontological Argu-

ment is, *even as argument*, and certainly in the concept of God it arrives at, wholly in the transcendental attitude. It starts with the notion of perfection, the ideal, the maximum (kāṣṭhā) as Yoga in Indian philosophy has it, and each such notion is patently transcendental, something which not only the empirical process of continued betterment approaches to unceasingly, never attaining it, but also constitutes the main driving force behind this never-ceasing approach never ceasing from the empirical viewpoint but ever touching, ever itself, from the point of view of transcendence.

V

There are other grounds too for admitting transcendence. Only one of them we propose to discuss here, and that because it concerns a very important department of transcendental philosophy. We propose to show that every man's authentic awareness of himself as free posits transcendence in the most evident and convincing form. It is this notion of authentic man as freedom or transcendence which I have developed in all my later publications. I have developed it chiefly, indeed, in the traditional Indian manner but have not hesitated to borrow copiously, though not without considerable modification, from Kant, post-Kantians, Hegelians, phenomenologists and existentialists, and even from Marx where necessary.

Qualitatively, man's acts differ as much from the movements of physical things as from the behaviour of sub-human creatures, which latter differs from physical things in being *living*. Movements of physical things are all fully determined, every bit calculable. If sub-atomic micro-movements are largely indeterminate, the corresponding macro-movements, even as computed statistically, are completely determined, perfectly calculable, there being no exception at the macro-level. Smaller or larger deviations are all at the micro-level. It is precisely here that the movements of living beings, called organic behaviour, differ from physical

movements. If organic behaviours are indeterminate and unpredictable, it is so at the very macro-level at which their average behaviours are uniform and predictable. There is no level-gap between their macro and so-called micro-behaviours. Though there are evident deviations from their normal behaviour, the deviations that are major are not frequent and those that are frequent are always minor, i.e., not of much significance. This means that organic behaviour is almost as determined and calculable as physical movements but contains, nonetheless, some rudiments of freedom. As distinct at the macro-level from mere physical movements, they are, even at the level, partly *sui generis*, i.e., free, but that is only to an insignificant extent. Freedom just emerging, the behaviour yet remains, almost fully under the control of physical matter that largely constitutes them.

Some of these creatures, at higher and higher levels of evolution, develop even sorts of mind—we mean, better forms of freedom. But even there these minds are only rudimentarily free. At lower levels, they just *feel* their surroundings and at higher and higher levels may even *know* them, and in either case respond fittingly but except at very high levels—say, where man proper first emerges and, may be, at some high-grade animal levels too[1]—there is no attempt at getting away from Nature's clutches. Things are taken in exactly as they are presented and any original response, whether cognitive or emotive or conative, is at its minimum, practically nil. There is no self-consciousness anywhere, no self-conscious remembering of the past or anticipation of the future and no use of means as means anywhere. At the intermediate levels we are speaking of, practically the entire organic and mental life is in the same old iron grip of Nature.

It is in the case of man—man unambigously understood as man—that we find for the first time a sort of resistance against

1. These latter we deliberately leave undiscussed. I have tried to throw some light on this in my later-day publications.

nature, a refusal to sacrifice one's originality, refusal to be bulldozed into stale uniformity with others. Here for the first time emerges the 'freedom' of man. It emerges equally in a positive form, not merely in the negative form of refusal. In the positive form it is, first, assertion of man's original status, his essential humanity that, in refusing to submit animal-like to nature, has, in effect, asserted itself as self-contained, *sui generis*. Obviously, as any such self-awareness of originality is *against* bondage to nature—against, in other words, his naturality—and as this nature includes as much his mind as his living body and the dead matter that belongs to it, this free man, this freedom, this his in-itself, is something beyond these, something that, in this assertion, self-consciously dissociates itself from the natural body and mind; and what could this self-dissociating entity be if not consciousness-in-itself, consciousness conscious of itself, as what, though so long referring to objects without being aware that it was so referring, is now aware of *itself* as so referring. This *itself* as referring is the *subject* = subjectivity, self-evidently aware of itself even though it is referring (in Husserl' language 'intending'). Whatever that be, this consciousness or subjectivity in its capacity as what is referring, is *transcendent* in relation to whatever is referred to—in relation, in other words, to *all* that is object; for whatever is referred to is, for that every reason, an object. This consciousness is transcendent not merely because as referring to objects it is categorially different from those objects but, more primarily, because in that capacity it refers to *all* objects, objects *as a whole*, object-in-general. Consciousness to refer to a *particular object* is at all possible only because intrinsically it refers to *all objects*, object-in-general. This referring (intending), thus, is not to be understood in terms of what is referred to, not in any manner hyphenated with it—in the phenomenologist's language, in terms of the 'essences', far less, therefore, in terms of the objects that are items of nature. It is to be understood in terms of itself, whether as mere referring act or simply

as that which so refers; in the latter case, even the act of referring is sought to be withdrawn from. These are the two alternative ways of understanding subjectivity—either as *that* (understood in itself) which had been referring or only as that referring act without any talk of what it is that is referring.[1] And, just in this context, there is a third alternative too, viz., the—subject (in itself)—*as referring*. The Vedāntists of the Śaṁkarite school have opted for the first alternative, the Mahāyāna Buddhists and Kant largely, and the Husserlian phenomenologists for the second alternative and all other transcendental subjectivists for the third. There is a fourth alternative too, to which we shall refer toward the end of this essay : it is that the ultimate reality is a sort of amalgam of the subject (and/or subjectivity as the referring act) and all objects that constitute nature.

Whichever of these alternatives one chooses, one has to admit that there is a sharp, categorial difference between subjectivity (consciousness) and object, meaning that consciousness, i.e., pure consciousness, consciousness as the quintessence of freedom, transcends *all* objects, the entire world of objects, Nature. If according to many transcendental subjectivists free consciousness somehow *comprehends* objects—whether essences or natural objects—that too is intelligible only from the transcendental point of view.

If negative freedom consists in resisting, withdrawing from nature, positive freedom is, first, this consciousness itself in its absolute purity. According to Kant (in his first *Critique*) and many phenomenologists this freedom = pure consciousness is nothing *real*. But they could hold this view only because, according to them, the real consisted of objects of nature, Kant insisting as much on 'objects' as on 'nature' and the phenomenologists solely on 'nature'. But there is no reason why 'reality' should

1. Very soon we shall be expatiating on this as one of the many alternations that constitute philosophy.

be confined to these. Kant's and Husserl's choise has here, at the very basis of their philosophies, been obviously arbitrary. If in search of the ultimate we have to transcend nature, that is no reason why we should refuse the name 'reality' to it (the ultimate). Rather, it is the very search for the real which has pushed some philosophers, this way, beyond nature and made them find it eventually in the transcendent ultimate, called absolute.

Positive freedom is, first, consciousness in its absolute purity. But this is not the only positive form of freedom. To many, thus far it is only a truncated form of positive freedom, mere 'freedom from', not the more concrete 'freedom to'. This 'freedom to' is at least a second *alternative* form if not the only ultimate form of positive freedom. It is *free manipulation* of natural entities and is in its turn again either cognitive or emotive or conative bringing that way *another set of fundamental alternatives.*

If freedom transcends and is, therefore, more than mechanical submission to nature cognition would no longer, from that point of view be mere recording of presentations (or, better presentations just got recorded) and their getting mechanically combined into unit wholes though mechanical revival of unconscious and subconscious traces to develop, and that too mechanically, into animal dispositions. The field of feeling would no longer get exhausted in basic creaturely comforts and discomforts, developing mechanically, in more and more complicated natural circumstances, at most into sorts of disposition like fear, anger, attraction, repulsion, etc.; and the field of conation would contain much more than mere instinctive and physiological responses, sometimes even supplanting them. Cognition, emotion and conation would, from now on, take on quite different forms, mostly initiated and developed from within and all self-conscious (except where they had turned into habits).[1]

1. If man often knows, feels and exercises his conative faculty unconsciously (i.e. not self-consciously), this is because man is largely an item of nature also, an animal.

In the case of man proper cognition turns into viewing nature—and, therefore, things of nature—anew from the transcendental point of view. In a previous Section we have noted that there are sub-levels in the sphere of transcendence and that there is a wide enough region where nature and transcendence more or less border upon each other, higher and higher regions of nature being more and more consciously impregnated by, more and more evidencing the role of, transcendent consciousness. Cognition, from this point of view, more and more transcends animal cognition, developing, at the first few sub-stages, classical natural sciences of different grades of development and then the modern science that seems to form a world of its own—a world consisting mostly of theory-constructions and yet retaining some last lingering link with the old world as it was presented to animals. Higher than that there is metaphysics *as a construction*,[1] still higher the metaphysics that reveals itself and yet, in deference to the 'nature' that we have been transcending, goes on constructing itself speculatively; etc. etc. At still higher levels there are subtler and subtler phenomenological self-revelations of the truths (essences) of pure consciousness and, at the highest level—let us presume—pure consciousness itself, the unadulterated subject, in all its self-contained and self-expansive ('intentional') grandeur.

Emotion, similarly, passes through stages, evincing transcendence more and more. These are the different ascending stages of art and emotional-religious approaches. Details we need not enter into in this essay. I have worked it out in one way in my first publication *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* and in a somewhat different way in some of my later publications like *The Possibility of Different Types of Religion* and most syste-

1. Generally called speculative metaphysics, with its last link with nature either snapped or on the point of disappearance.

matically in my latest essays 'Spirit and Matter in Man', 'Religion—What it means exactly' and 'Some Reflections on Art'.[1]

Conation too passes through similar different stages. At the lowest stage where it first transcends nature it comes out, initially, in the form of defending one's community against aggression and doing it internal good; then, through different sub-stages, as social norms rendered more and more self-conscious and then rationalized into more and more systematized and convincing moral norms, and finally as sorts of intuited, self-explanatory, norms or a body of norms called categorical imperative (*niṣkāma*, *nirabhimāna*, *lokasaṁgrahārtha* and *iśvarārpitaphala Karma*) as we find these developed, say, in Kant's second *Critique* (and *Metaphysics of Morals*), Hartmann's *Ethics* and Srīmad-bhagavadgītā (better known as '*Gītā*').[2]

The three ways toward transcendence—cognitive, emotive and conative—being thus alternative to one another, transcendence at its highest stage of self-evidence may also be understood as of three alternative forms, viz., as the absolute of cognition, that of emotion and that of conation. As noted earlier, these three alternative absolutes may, again, be understood either as one and the same absolute (indeterminate in itself) appearing

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1. Published or to be published (in press) respectively by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, *Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, Nos. 1 and 2, 1981, The Punjab University, Philosophy Deptt., Anthology and *Visva-Bharati Quarterly*, Ramkinkar and Benod Behari, November, 1981. Also The Notion of Transcendence the Philosophy of Gopinath Kaviraj (Published by the University of Calcutta).
2. Vide *Comparative Indian Philosophy*, published in instalments in the *Bulletin of the Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture*, 1981. In this series I have discussed, though in a somewhat different manner, different stages of emotion and cognition, also. Vide also my 'Ways of *Jñāna*, *Karma* and *Bhakti*' published in *Philosophy : Theory and Action : S. S. Barlingay Felicitation Volume*, Deptt. of Philossphy, Poona University.

as of three alternative forms, or as three ultimate absolutes, with nothing that is even indeterminately common to them. Neither of these, however, necessarily implies that at least the *ways* to the absolute, if not the absolutes themselves—whether one absolute in three alternative forms or three alternative absolutes—, are independent of or at least indifferent to one another. *On the way to* the absolute, cognition, emotion and conation do run together—this is obvious enough; and not only that, each depends too, to whatever extent on the other two. But, first, on each of these ways to the absolute, only one attitude remains dominant, engulfing the other two which, one may say, remain only involved in it and never assert themselves. May be, at the start they go merrily together, hand in hand, but, sooner than expected, one of them gets the upper hand depending on the path to follow, whether it is going to be cognitive or emotive or conative—and then the other two, in each case, remain as only subordinate, losing their dominance more and more with every step forward. If this gradual loss of dominance has sometimes been understood as gradual ceasing to be—the idea being that ultimately there is either *pure* cognition or *pure* emotion or *pure* conation—this has been an over-simplification.

As remarked in an earlier Section, wherever one perceives an alternation it is perception from a level higher than that at which this alternation obtains. So this perceiving the alternation between cognitive, emotive and conative attidudes is no fourth attitude co-ordinately alternative with them, nor does what is perceived at this higher level—one might call it the highest conceivable level—alternate, co-ordinately, with the cognitive, emotive and conative absolutes (in K. C. Bhattacharyya's language, Truth, Value and Freedom[1]). Yet, however, —and

1. K. C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, 'The Concept of Philosophy' and 'The Absolute and Its Alternative Forms'.

that is the greatest paradox *here*—this so-called final alternation is not that way at a level removed; for were it so, there would have been no end to transcendence behind transcendence—there would have been no reason why the very perception of this 'final' alternation should not constitute a still higher level. This so-called final alternation is nothing but the so-called penultimate alternation evidencing verily itself, which, in effect, means that the so-called three 'final' alternations are absolutely identical with one another. It is either silence itself getting alternatively *identified* with each absolute—by itself, absolute, nought—; or perfect equidistance, i.e., equal dissociation and equal commitment to all these alternatives; or it is but these alternatives themselves, with nothing more in addition to them. What it all comes to is that the last alternation between silence, equidistance and just-the-ultimate-alternatives is not at a stage further transcendent than the three alternative absolutes—cognitive, emotive and conative.

VI

The last alternation that we would like to discuss in this essay is that between subjectivity (consciousness) and the things[1] that stand to it as its objects. If in place of the simple word 'object' we here use a more complex expression 'the thing which stands to subjectivity as its object', this is because we here mean alternation between such *thing* (standing over there in nature and on its own right, as the realists understand it) and subjectivity (that refers to it): we do not mean any alternation between subjectivity (in Husserl's language, ego = noesis) and content (in Husserl's language, object = *noema*). Between the latter two there is indeed a sort of alternation that we touched

1. We intend here no distinction between substance, quality, action, event, etc. The term 'thing' is here, and elsewhere also in this essay, used in a wide enough sense to include all these.

in a previous Section—the alternation between 'consciousness as withdrawn into itself' and 'consciousness as referring to (intending)'. But that we studied in a previous Section. Our present concern is with alternation between such consciousness, on the one hand, and the realist's *thing*, on the other, another name of which latter is nature. This too we know we have discussed in a preceding Section in another form, viz., as the alternation between transcendence and nature. Our task in the present Section is to study the alternation (and whether also there is at all any such alternation) between one form of such transcendence, viz., pure subjectivity, on the one hand, and nature on the other; and that too we shall study, as far as possible, with reference to the three alternative forms of this subjectivity, viz., cognition, feeling and conation. (Alternations, thus multiply in different permutations and combinations. This side of the problem, however, viz., how many such alternations could be there through different permutations and combinations, we propose to leave undiscussed in this essay.)

There is never any simple togetherness of cognition and the thing said to be cognised, nor any mere causal relation like the thing—whether simple items or ever-expending getstalts—producing some 'change in consciousness', which change precisely is that cognition, or, contrarily, as these 'causal theorists' equally hold, cognition producing change in the world of things.[1] There

1. As a matter of fact cognition never changes the world of things; it is will that does that. What cognition does is only adding something, *either* arranging things in some order-system or hierarchy—that order being all its own contribution in the sense that logic is nothing but pure cognition (subjectivity) itself moving among things and that way clasping them together, *or* projecting something anew on them, and that too in the form of presentation, the projection being derived from unconscious or semi-conscious traces and dispositions stored in every individual mind.

is never any simple togetherness or mere causal connexion. From the side of cognition, it refers *sui generis* and when it is found referring to any particular thing this is because that particular thing has chanced to be there. This, again is not the whole story. As referred to, i.e., *qua* taken up by cognition—phenomenologically speaking, *intended* by (cognitive) consciousness—, it stands there as *content*, i.e., phenomenologically speaking, within the noetic field itself, as noema, precisely from which the realist (naturalist) seeks to distinguish the 'thing'. The thing taken that way as within the noetic field may also be called 'object' (the Naiyāyika's *viṣaya* as distinct from *padārtha*), provided this object is not, contrary to what is very usual, misidentified with the realist's *thing*. This is why we prefer here the term 'noema' or 'content'. From the side of cognition we may say that we start with content and at the same time inevitably *believe* it to be a thing as having an autonomous status of its own absolutely independent of the cognition in question. As human beings, however, this is the only way we are in contact with nature.

As sub-human animals, on the other hand, unaware of ourselves, unaware of our freedom, unaware that we ourselves are not just things among things of nature, our standpoint would be entirely that of *things*. All causal theory is valid from that standpoint only. What we, as animals, are said to be aware of are all the realist's *things*, though as animals we have no awareness of that awareness. It is fundamentally in contrast with this that *human* cognition is said to be *free*. The fundamental standpoint in an animal's cognition is that of *things* that constitute nature, animals themselves belonging wholly to that nature. One may develop a whole theory of cognition from this realistic point of view, but then he would fail to explain the typically *human* form of cognition like *thought* that involves logic, constructive imagination, communication through a whole system called language, and, above all, self-consciousness or introspec-

tion, all of which, directly or indirectly, involve transcendence that is trans-thingly, trans-natural, i.e., freedom.

So long as there is no dawning of this sense of freedom which constitutes the man proper in creatures known as men there is, decidedly, no scope for any idealistic theory of knowledge such as what naturally suggests itself to one who speaks from the side of cognition, not from that of things. That does not, however, mean immediately that from the side of things all theory of knowledge would be realistic. From that point of view there is, as a matter of fact, no scope at all for any theory, any self-conscious awareness of the situation one is in. All realism is but a retrospective account from an actual idealistic point of view, an account, viz., as to what that situation was from both the side of the body—mind being understood as only subtle body of a sort—and the side of what that body responded to. The whole idea of the realist is obviously this : (self-) consciousness, subjectivity, freedom is *either* a useful epi-phenomenon which is used but cast off as soon as the use is over or, as in the world of nature, a genuine development but nothing of any intrinsic status or value, all its status consisting in handling thingly situations as best as possible but in an animal way, after all. The idea, in other words, is that between man and animal there is no *fundamental* difference, no gap that cannot be bridged over in terms of animal *efficiency*. Man, according to all genuine realism, is the most efficient animal conceivable and, therefore, more complicated in constitution. One may go even further and hold that according to these realists—sometimes in their extreme forms they are called materialists—even animals are but complicated units of matter—combination, units that are just as much more complicated than dead matter as man is in relation to animals. In a way, thus, realism and materialism coincide, and this materialsim is obviously as strong an alternative as idealism (transcendental subjectivism) developed from the side of cognition as autonomous subjectivity. This is the same funda-

mental alternation between transcendence and nature now understood restrictedly as that between cognition as consciousness *sui generis* and things that are said to be known.

In the case of feeling and emotion also, and equally in that of conation, there is the same alternation between consciousness *sui generis* and the *things* to which it is directed. The difference between feeling-emotion and conation, on the one hand, and cognition, on the other, is that whereas with progressive self-consciousness in the former, the content, the noema, at each advanced stage stands more and more dissociated, even as objects, from the things of nature, this, as we have seen, is not the story of cognition. What stands dissociated more and more in cognition is primarily the consciousness, the parallel progressive dissociation of *contents* from things of nature being only consequent on this. In feeling-emotion and conation, on the other hand, it is the *contents* that primarily get dissociated from things and the progressive dissociation of consciousness is only consequential —even from the side of consciousness what we are immediately and primarily concerned with, interested in, are the contents, the noema, in their progressive purity or transcendence, dissociation of consciousness as such being always a secondary affair, either so secondary that it only happens without our being interested in it at all, as in the case of purer and purer, i. e., more and more transcendent, feeling or emotion, or we get interested in it but just so far as it is directed toward purer and purer contents.

In all the three cases of cognition, feeling-emotion and conation there is, at each sub-level of transcendence, a *content*, *noema* or *essence*—purer, more in itself, more distant from things of nature. In all the three cases, this content is identical with what we have in some earlier Section called basic metaphysical realities and is never the realists' thing, indifferent to the consciousness of which it is a content. The very concept of *content* is unintelligible except in reference to the consciousness we have of it just as, what many phenomenologists have held, and much

as what is true up to, what one may call, the penultimate level of transcendence, consciousness too is unintelligible except as consciousness of, i.e., directed to, some content. The difference between cognition, feeling-emotion and conation lies in the fact that while in cognition the content is secondarily consequent upon the consciousness that has dissociated itself, in feeling-emotion it is rather the content that first distinguishes itself, distinguishment of consciousness only following upon it; and in conation consciousness and content, simultaneously distinguishing themselves from the world of things, stand hand in hand to the end even in the region of transcendence and at all its levels. The phenomenologists have almost as a rule confused cognitive, feeling-emotive and conative transcendences with one another.

So, we arrive at a third type of ultimate alternation, this time between cognition, feeling-emotion and conation, as they seek transcendence.[1]

One might talk of still another ultimate alternation, viz., between the dynamic absolute, i.e., ultimate dynamism, and static absolute, i.e., ultimate staticity, as we find it in the form of never ending tussle, often made to resolve itself in some acceptable form of integration, between the philosophies of ultimate dynamism ('nothing' or 'becoming') and ultimate staticism ('being'), both in India and the West. It could well also be shown that the so-called integration of the two is either another alternative co-ordinate with them or an ulterior transcendence of equidistance from them as much in dissociation as in commitment. Never before in my philosophical career I have discussed this alternation even half systematically. So I leave it intouched here.

1. The central idea of alternation between cognition, feeling-emotion and conation I have, as I noted earlier, taken from K. C. Bhattacharyya, though I have diffeied in some details from him.

VII

Now that I have stated 'my philosophy' as completely as possible, I need not exercise myself overmuch in stating my reactions to the Seminar papers.

Regarding quite a few of these papers, I find little that I cannot endorse almost whole-heartedly. These are (i) M. K. Bhadra's "Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and the Existential Thought", (ii) K. Bagchi's "'Subjective and 'Objective' Attitudes as Alternatives", (iii) R. P. Pandey's "Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya on the Indian Concept of Man", (iv) Daya Krishna's "Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation", (v) J. N. Mohanty's "Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician" and K. L. Sharma's "A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya". The authors of these papers have taken very sympathetically to my philosophical theses at different phases of my literary career, have often placed them in better perspectives in order that these could be as properly appreciated as they should be, have sometimes, as in the case of J. N. Mohanty's paper, connected the different phases of my philosophical advanture in a beautiful whole the like of which I could not have done; and they have sometimes regretted—quite reasonably—that certain points in which I was very much interested in the earlier phases of my philosophical career I had only half developed and then left ever uncared for, to get engaged in other pursuits; and rightly too they have sometimes regretted that from time to time in my latter career I have reverted to those deserted theses, say, the thesis of ultimate alternation, without however, properly developing it any further. I admit all these charges and I thank them all for the sympathetic consideration they have paid to my thoughts. Indeed, I accept all their points.

Some of them have advanced my thoughts in their own lines which happen to be largely the same as mine. I refer here special-

ly to Bhadra and Bagchi. Bhadra has very helpfully compared—and, where necessary, contrasted—my theses with those of accredited contributors in the field, like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Martin Buber, Spiegelberg and J. N. Mohanty. All these points in this comparison and contrast I gratefully accept.

Bagchi, in his paper, appears to have followed a different line altogether. Just starting with my thesis—particularly with what I have called subjective and objective methods—he has, in a way, advanced much beyond and suggested thereby, and that wisely enough, that I should have proceeded further. I do admit I ought to have, and I am prepared to accept all that he has written in his paper except that I feel I have not exactly, at least not always, meant by 'objective method' what he means by it—a method, viz., which is intelligible only as the forward-looking attitude of the subjective, once it has been dissociated from the *things* of Nature and thus, to whatever extent, possessed in itself. This was not always what I meant by 'objective method' in my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* and *Object Content and Relation*, but I admit that I ought to have meant this unambiguously. That it was at the back of my mind will be clear from what I have written on it partly in Sec. III and more fully in Sec. VI above.

One point on Bhadra again before I pass on to Pandey's paper. On pp. 84-85 of his paper he writes :

> " When a man chooses not to submit to nature, we have no difficulty in understanding that it is a case of choice. But if a man submits to nature, it seems that he is not choosing. Bhattacharyya thinks that it is also a case of choice...... "

In quite a number of papers I have distinguished between *freedom*, *freedom not to use freedom* (i.e., freedom to revert to nature) and *freedom even to misuse freedom* and I have distinguished all these three from a fourth phenomenon, viz., *lapse*

which is always indeliberate and, therefore, an indeliberate, i.e., natural, fall from freedom to nature. If I have not drawn that distinction in the paper to which Bhadra has referred I plead guilty. My only defence is that various phases in my philosophical career I have clearly distinguished *indeliberate* lapse from the other three attitude of freedom.

Pandey has very wisely taken up for critical and comparative study my theses on the concept of man in general and the Indian concept of man in particular. He is right in insisting that the humanism I have sought to develop through my various published papers mostly written in my fifties and later—is basically the traditional Indian form of humanism that has been developed since the Vedic-Upaniṣadic days, through all the Dharma-Śāstras, right up to the systematic philosophies that developed later in this country. I am particularly thankful to him for having so nicely placed my thesis on humanism in the proper perspective and filled up its gaps and corrected in its errors and near errors in that light. That way he has placed my theses, as much as possible, on rational and factual grounds too. I unqualifiedly accept whatever he writes on my thesis, whether elucidating it further or criticising it and suggesting improvements. A master of Indian concepts *vis-a-vis* those that form the basis of Semitic culture and constitute the living force of the West even in the modern period, he has improved on my thoughts on the genuine Indian line and in diverse details.

I confess—and I never hesitate to proclaim it—that none of my theses are original in content. They are mostly some typical Indian theses rendered in the language of modern Western philosophy, a language which alone is intelligible in the philosophical circle of the world today. Some of these theses are originally of my father K. C. Bhattacharyya and I only elaborated these in my own ways—immaturely in my earlier writings, but better in my later ones. And I sincerely believe that my father's ideas are all essentially Indian. He dived straight-away to the

very fundamentals of Indian thought and rebuilt it from there in the language of the Western philosophy as far as possible I have, to the best of my capacity, followed the same line. Hence, Pandey is very much correct in absorbing me wholly in the Indian fold and suggesting improvements in that light at right places.

Daya Krishna, concentrating almost wholly on my first publication *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, has presented my 'logic of alternation', as developed in that book, (particularly with reference to my analysis of disjunctive judgment and the concept of disjunctive unity) much better and in a more straight forward manner than I did it myself. That book was written in my early thirties, and, naturally enough, it lacked the necessary logical regour. Daya Krishna, fully conscious of this weakness of mine, has presented all my relevant points as guardedly and convincingly as possible and in a style much better than I could write. Often, indeed, in some of my later writings I have reverted to my first love, the concept of alternation—notably, for example, here in this 'My Reaction'; but a *logical demonstration* of this concept I attempted only in my first publication. Daya Krishna, without committing himself to any of my theses, has presented that logic as best as one could non-committally. A more sympathetic consideration could hardly be expected.

Also, he has given a full account, and masterly one, though all as briefly as possible, of how I applied that logic of alternation to some of the basic human attitudes, viz. first, the subjective, the objective and the dialectical and, then, of knowing, feeling and willing. He has also offered the best possible defence, again without committing himself anywhere—and that is the style he follows throughout in his present paper—to my attempted identification of cognition, feeling and will with the subjective, objective and dialectical attitudes respectively. Though in my later years I have strayed considerably from this my first philosophy, now that I go through Daya Krishna's sympathetic exposition

of it, I feel like going back to it; and, what is more, to my pleasantest surprise I discover that after all I have not strayed too much. I discovered this while I was writing the preceding sections of this 'My Reaction'.

Only one lacuna I discover in Daya Krishna's paper. He has paid scant attention, practically none, to two further alternations I developed in my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*. If I am here referring to this lacuna, it is because in my later years I feel I have leaned more and more heavily towards these *further* alternations. What these further alternations are will be clear from the passage I quote below from the Preface of my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*.

"The rest of the chapter is concerned with two further *alternations*. One of these obtains between the pure positive infinite as of the Advaita, the finite-centric negative infinite as of the Empiricists and the comprehensive infinite as of Hegel. The other alternation is more significant. It is between philosophy itself, on the one hand, and reality, on the other—we may say, between thought in general and reality in general. The alternatives in this last alternation are—(i) There is no reality whatsoever which philosophy is said to represent, so that all philosophy is after all an empty, though necessary, fabrication, (ii) the alternative philosophies are but realities themselves, so that Philosophy as Philosophy has to be ignored, and reality itself is disjunctive, and (iii) The ultimate is a type of super-philosophy in which the alternative philosophies and reality are *dialectically* comprehended. These three—(i), (ii), and (iii)—are each as much *alternatively* valid as the alternatives in other alternations.

"We have also shown that the alternation of the three infinities is, in essence, the old alternation between subjectivism, objectivism and dialectic (which, again, is the same thing as the alternation between cognition, feeling and conation), and

have also *suggested* that the last alternation between (i), (ii) and (iii), stated in the paragraph above, *may be* identical with it."

If Daya Krishna has paid no serious attention to the second of the three sets of alternations noted above and practically none to the third, that is probably because I have, as just noted above, ultimately identified, or at least sought to identify, the three sets of alternations. But, then, even if two (or more) things are ultimately identical, approaches to them may well be quite different from one another and that makes a lot of difference, in an important sense, between the contents themselves. This is the reason why in my later years I got more and more interested in the later two sets of alternation, though not losing interest therefore in the first two sets. Why I do not know, I lost interest in the *logic* of alternation, though I have never disowned it, and now at the fag end of my life I feel like returning to it.

I have nothing but unstinted admiration for J. N. Mohanty's paper 'Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician'. I agree with him in all the major and minor points he has written in this paper—all the points that he puts forward as *mine*, all points in connexion with the interpretation of these and, unreservedly, all the improvements and corrections he suggests, except one to be mentioned shortly; and even regarding this last, as I shall show, I am not quite sure which way I should proceed.

Mohanty has not preferred to give an account of one or two aspects of my philosophy, i.e., how I have tackled this or that particular fundamental philosophical problem. He has given an account—and a surprisingly excellent one—of my entire philosophical thesis touching as many basic philosophical issues as he could get hold of, and all this he has done within a short compass of fifteen typed pages only. He has referred copiously to many of my major publications—*Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, *Object Content and Relation*, *Philosophy, Logic and Language*, *Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy and other*

Essays and 'Nature and Freedom' published in two instalments in *Philosophica*. He has also traced my philosophical lineage to the thoughts of my father K. C. Bhattacharyya.

Mohanty could present my theses so comprehensively, and yet in so many subtle details, mostly by way of sympathetic elaboration and often through comparison and contrast with such great thinkers as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, N. Hartmann, Merleau-Ponty and K. C. Bhattacharyya and, not the least, on the background of the traditional Indian systems—Mohanty, one of the finest thinkers and scholars of the present day, could do this, and also chose to do so, mostly because he has known me better than any other participant in this Seminar. We two have profited from each other : he was one of my closest students of many years and I have been going through his writings since first he took to it. And my first lessons in Phenomenology and neo-Kantian philosophy I had from him. I wish there were a few more like him who, every bit original, could find as much interest in contemporary Indian philosophy as in its counterpart in the West.

Only on one important point in his paper I have something special to say by way of comment. I first write down the passage concerned. On pp. 139-140 he writes :

> "Perhaps Kalidas Bhattacharyya's thesis may be understood as an attempt to assimilate 'essences' to 'meanings', and then to trace meanings back to their original source in the domain of consciousness—a move that certainly characterises Husserlian transcendental phenomenology".

In the next paragraph he continues :

> "The thesis that essences are meanings and have their constitution in pure consciousness is carried through in two steps. First, essences are constituted in thought, and thought is (implicit) speech. Essences therefore are

constituted by language which, in the long run, is but speaking consciousness."

At the end of the first of the above two paragraphs there is a note, number 16, correspondingly to which, in the Section 'Notes', Mohanty writes :

> "There is also another stand of thought that fits in well with the idea of alternation. According to this, metaphysical entities may be regarded either objectively or subjectively—an irreducible alternation".

I cannot say at this fag end of my philosophical career which of these two interpretations was more in my mind when I wrote about these topics. Even when some weeks back I was going through this paper of Mohanty I could not make out which interpretation was to my maturer liking. I wrote on the margin :

> "I would prefer what is written in the Note 16, although I would gladly subscribe to what is written in the text. Or, better, I am not quite sure which one I really prefer. Or, may it not be that the two are the same thing ultimately ?"

It was only when I was pushing ahead with 'My reactions', writing them down in a systematic form, that I reiterated my decided view in Section II onward.

K. L. Sharma, an excellent scholar in my father's (K. C. Bhattacharyya's) philosophy has very correctly pointed out that the very idea of alternative absolutes I had derived from him though I had developed it sometimes in a very different manner and had done this even with regard to the basic problem of the relations of knowledge, will and feeling to object, subject and their dialectical unity respectively. I strongly feel that anybody desirous of knowing my philosophy should know how through my entire philosophical career, specially in its first days as developed in my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, I had at the back of my mind my father's Superb but abstruse—and, there-

fore, to an extent ever-eluding—philosophy. To understand my philosophy—of whatever value it may be—in the grand perspective of my father's is decidedly a correct procedure, and I thank K. L. Sharma for initiating it. My only point is that he has not done it as completely as he could, and ought to have, so far as my first book is concerned.

I am indebted to him particularly for the fact that my first adventure in philosophy in my first two publications, specially in the earlier one *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, he has very correctly delineated in his paper and also for the fact that he has developed some details which others have not been interested in.

I have only three special points to note regarding what he has written in his paper. They are :

(i) I refer him to those Sections of 'My Reaction' in which I have shown in detail the many basic fields to which the logic of alternation can be applied. There is fundamental alternation as much between (*a*) nature (the actual) and transcendence (the ideal) as between (*b*) subject and object and also between (*c*) knowledge, feeling and will.

(ii) On p. 12 he rightly points out :

> "Is K. D. B.'s puzzle about knowledge-object relation a genuine one...... some Indian systems such as Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā do not consider it a genuine puzzle at all. For Nyāya the relation between subject and object...... The unity between two opposite terms is a puzzle only to Advaita Vedānta and Sāṁkhya...... "

These other philosophies do not consider it a puzzle because they do not take self and knowledge, on the one hand, and object (thing) on the other, to be in any way *opposed*. This point I have thoroughly discussed in my *Comparative Indian Philosophy* now under publication, in instalments, in the Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, and also partly in

relevant Sections of 'My Reaction'. In my *Comparative Indian Philosophy* I have shown that pan-objectivism and pan-subjectivism are two alternative theories, in other words, of two alternative absolutes. Hence K. L. Sharma's otherwise very intelligent observation rather comes in my favour than raise any point against me.

(iii) In the last line of the last paragraph he writes :

> "Thus the unity of mutually opposed......this symmetrical relation is lacking."

But even if this symmetrical contradiction is admitted, what would one specially gain by that ?

Secondly—and that is more important—in my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* I have shown that if A and B contradict each other, then for A to proceed there are three alternative ways : it proceeds either by *rejecting* B or by ignoring it or by absorbing it as subordinate, i.e., as involved in its inner dimension and thus by blunting the edge of contradiction. There is no question of any separate procedure for B. For, 'A' here stands for whichever of the two we start with and then precisely the other is B.

VIII

So far with the participants who have been more sympathetic to me than critical in pointing out my errors. Other participants, however, have been more critical than sympathetic, though most of them have acknowledged that my philosophical theses are good enough to deserve serious consideration. The sharp and candid criticisms coming from these participants have done me an immense good. It has compelled me to rewrite, in 'My Reaction', my entire philosophy as systematically and intelligibly as possible, particularly in the light of the points they have raised against me[1]. I am confident that when these critics go through

1. I have, in the last two years, written specially on religion and art. I do not hesitate to admit that religion, art and the concept of man are most favourite subjects these days, though I have not, and shall not, refer to them in this 'My Reaction'.

what I have already written in 'My Reaction' they will find answers to most of their objections, or at least to the most important of them.

Except, of course, to those which K. J. Shah has raised in his paper 'Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated'. Shah is well known in our country as one of the clearest (and, at the same time, a solid) writer. But unfortunately I could not, when I went through his paper, make out clearly where he was presenting my views where elaborating them, where criticising them mildly and where slashing them. I could not also make out which were specifically his views or the views he was supporting. I confess I have not understood his points fully. With these limitations I note below some of my specific points :

(i) I fail to follow him when on p. 125 of his paper he writes :

> "This sense of freedom can be understood in many ways. The understanding involves on the one hand man's relationship to nature, and on the other man's relationship to the Absolute (Though these two are closely related, Bhattacharyya rarely discusses it)."

Which two does Shah mean—the two relationships or nature and the Absolute ? If the former, I cannot imagine any possible answer to the question. Is the question legitimate at all even as a question ? If, however, he means the relation between nature and the Absolute, is there not a simple answer to it, viz., that they stand related to each other precisely through man ? Further, I cannot quite follow the relevance of this question.

(ii) On p. 126 he writes :

> " Religion (involving relationship with the Absolute) is a form of knowledge-realization."

I do not remember if I have ever said this so *categorically* anywhere, i.e., to the exclusion of its being a realization affair through feeling or will. Since my earliest days I have been insisting on *alternative* approaches—cognitive, emotive and conative

approaches alternating with one another; and, whether the Absolute to be realized is ultimately one or three alternative Absolutes, they are at least visualizable as alternative, being in each case the end-point of one of the three alternative lines of approach

(iii) On the same page he writes :

> "It is both a strength and a weakness of Bhattacharyya that he leaves these different accounts which are stated without considering how far they are the same and what is their relation."

But was this consideration necessary at all ? I sometimes suspect that while in my *Possibility of Different types of Religion* I had to presume many of the points of logic which I had elaborated in detail in my other works I was perhaps uncautious at places and presumed too much, presumed, that is to say, points which I ought to have substantiated in that book. If I have actually done this I plead guilty.

(iv) Shah further writes :

> "Another point that remains undiscussed and is enormously important is that of the relationship between the three kinds of freedom—of knowledge, moral activity and aesthetic experience."

If I have not even *discussed* that anywhere in the book concerned, surely it has been an unparadonable lapse. But I doubt if I have omitted that discussion wholly in that book. Anyway, in my various other writings, mostly wherever I have discussed the notion of 'freedom', I have referred to three types of freedom and discussed their relationship; and in every such case I have argued to the relation of alternation between them—a relation which I have never tired of reiterating.

(v) On p. 128 Shah writes :

> "Thus, in the thinking of the primitive people, there is no transcendence, maturity or sophistication. How can the difference between this and the sophisticated religion

be only of degree ? Prof. Bhattacharyya puts the (...... ?) considerations in favour of his view. "

Surely, Professor Shah has missed an important point of my thesis. It is that religion proper consists in transcendence; and what I have held to be true of primitive religion is that there this transcendence is at its lowest ebb, different types of religion often differing from one another in degrees of transcedence. In higher and higher forms of religion transcendence is more and more explicit. 'Maturity' and 'sophistication' are, in this context, to be understood as but transcendence.

(vi) On p. 128, Shah writes :

> " As K. D. Bhattacharyya points out very often, the second type of reflection is taken as paradigm for the other two types, but the other two types are also *sui generis*, to be distinguished from each other as also from the second type of reflection. "

I do admit both (i) that the different types of religion are arrangeable in a hierarchy according as the transcendence is more and more evident and (ii) that each of these types is *sui generis*. What I mean is that though each such type is *sui generis* there is no bar against *understanding* any one of them in the language of others, particularly in the language of the paradigm case. Is this not the story of evolution everywhere—A evolving out of B and yet both A and B asserting their autonomy, i.e., each refusing to be reduced to the other ? I am thankful to Shah for pointing out that my way of expression has been faulty.

(vii) On p. 129, Shah writes :

> " If transcendence and relationship to the Absolute are necessary characteristics of religion then primitive religion is hardly a religion. "

I have already replied to this objection.

On the same page, and in the same context, he writes :

> "But this is not what, according to K. D. Bhattacharyya, characterises religion."

Why not ? It is religion, though of a lesser degree of transcendence.

(viii) He writes again :

> "There are occasions when K. D. Bhattacharyya unequivocally attributes spiritual experience only when sophisticated self-reflective thinking is present. For example, he says that there alone is genuine spiritual experience where experience is itself reflective."

This is because transcendence is at its highest degree of clarity. I do admit that my way of expression has sometimes been confusing.

(ix) On p. 129 he writes :

> "Now this commitment can be present among the sophisticated and such a thinking cannot avoid philosophy. But to think of thinking in terms of myths or similies as philosophical is to stretch a point a little too far."

But this is exactly the point I am driving at all through. Transcendence is as much in the form of (pure) thinking as in that of (pure) imagination. One may even understand it as pure presentation (intuition). And in each case transcendence may be understood as much to be operative (functional) in the world as going beyond it.

(x) On the same page he writes further :

> "...... though K. D. Bhattacharyya talks of the togetherness of the three as a totality that is required, he does not consider the possibility of conflict between the three."

The entire burden of the three lectures in the book under consideration is to show that there *ought not to be* any genuine conflict between them. If this has not been clear through the

many pages I have written I plead guilty. But why should I have studied their compatibility so as much *in detail* if I had not posited my whole thesis against the commonly held view that they are incompatible with one another ?

(xi) On p. 130 he writes :

> "...... it is better to think of the puruṣārthas in terms of a matrix of interacting elements rather than as a hierarchy...... Would the same be true of the three elements mentioned by K. D. Bhattacharyya-scientific knowledge, moral action and aesthetic experience ?"

But have I not in this book, and practically throughout my philosophical career, argued against this sort of interaction of *co-ordinate* elements ? In my various other books and papers I have, either distinctly or by not too distant implication, argued for some sort of *alternation*, permitting, of course, in the alternation of *a*, *b* and *c* the presence of *b* and *c* in *a*, and similarly of *c* and *a* in *b* and of *a* and *b* in *c*, provided in each case the other two remain as wholly subordinate, just accelerating or decelerating the rule of the third, admitting all the while it is the third which holds the reins.

(xii) On p. 131 he writes :

> "The foregoing considerations show that polytheism also could be the theory of a religious life, and there is no need for it to border on irreligion, if it is not related to the Absolute."

Wherever there is polytheism either it preaches alternative Absolute or the different gods are office-bearers under one supreme God or God himself behaves as gods with various offices or they are simply his courtiers. If in polytheistic religions these 'smaller' gods are *worshipped* this is mostly along with the Supreme God, directly or indirectly, though *in some extreme cases* he appears to be excluded.

(xiii) What he writes in the last paragraph of his Section III is exactly what I have been claiming all through my philosophical career and, if not directly, at least indirectly in the book under consideration. It is transcendence understood from different angles of vision.

IX

S. K. Chattopadhyaya has in his paper candidly admitted that this is the first time that he has read any of my writings, and even then he has read only my earliest, and the most immature writing—the book *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*. I may add that I doubt if he had read even the whole of it.

The points, however, that he has raised in his paper are worthwhile in themselves. I do not know if the comments I note below will satisfy him.

(i) *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* is my earliest book. I have indeed transcended many of the immature arguments stated in that book. But my general attitude to ultimate alternation (s) has continued to be the same till today.

(ii) In my published papers on the concept of man—particularly on the Indian concept of man—I have to a great extent developed the very standpoint that Chattopadhyaya recommends. But I have done it all in the context of the body-self unity.

(iii) I too have claimed (in the book *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*) that when we are in the 'objective' attitude we have objects bodily, i.e., things of nature. But when at the same time I have claimed that in the 'subjective' attitude I experience the subject I have never meant that this awareness is all-*conceptual*. Undoubtedly, so far, the first attitude is unreflective and the second reflective. But this need not mean, as Chattopadhyaya claims, that this second attitude is *conceptual*. What exactly this *reflection* is I have discussed threadbare later in the chapter 'The Nature of Reflection' in my '*Philosophy, Logic and Language*.'

What I had in mind, and developed to the best of my capacity, when I wrote the earlier book is as follows :

It is a sort of *direct* awareness (and, therefore, not conceptual) where we are aware indeed of both the object and the subject (i.e. awareness) because it is the awareness of the 'awareness of the object'. But as such awareness of the piemitive awareness of the object can be had only when one turns his attitude inward, i.e., away from the object[1], this reflective awareness has, precisely to that extent, abjured the object side and just evidences what it itself has been till then.

I confess I had, at that stage, no acquaintance whatsoever with Husserl's phenomenology. Otherwise, I would have insisted that even the objective attitude is not that simple, viz., just the (unreflective) awareness of things of nature. This naive awareness of things of nature I would have called natural (or naturalistic) attitude, as against which both the objective and the subjective attitudes would be reflective. This point I have developed in Section III onward in this 'My Reaction'.

(iv) I made this confusion in my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* and I thank Chattopadhyaya that directly or indirectly he has pointed this out. But Chattopadhyaya too should have noted that the reflective awareness of the primary (i.e., natural) knowledge-of-object, is not, for that reason, conceptual. It is direct awareness, first, in the form of knowledge that has self-consciously and yet directly turned toward, i.e., still been referring to, things of nature and that way got directly in touch with *contents* (= essences = noema) belonging intrinsically to the region of consciousness (subjectivity), and, secondly as a further advance, got even beyond this 'reflective' objective attitude, to the subjective attitude proper, to the self-evidencing in-itself of the mere awareness side, away from even the *content.*

1. In that book I used the term 'object' mostly, i.e., unless explicitly excepted, in the sense of 'thing that is in nature'.

(v) It is this reflection as consciousness turning inward—away whether from natural thing or from content—which immediately certifies the built-in contradiction between object (no matter whether natural thing or content) and subject.

(vi) How could Chattopadhyaya be so sure that the unreflective starting situation he so much banks upon is of the form 'knowledge-of-object'? Might it not be mere 'object' (content or noema), his so-called unreflective knowledge-of-object being only two things of nature in some sort of unity? Alternatively, might it not be the Bradleyan 'lower immediacy'? For myself, I would agree with Chattopadhyaya that it is 'knowledge of object'. But I held this on the mere, and explicit, ground that later reflection certifies that it was so. If, however, later reflection certifies that earlier, at the unreflective level, there were two distinct entities—knowledge and object, it certifies equally, and as involved in the very first certification, that the two elements of this unity were also contradicting each other. Is this not precisely the key-concept '*avidyā*' of Advaita-Vedānta of which Chattopadhyaya has all along been a loud votary?

(vii) On p. 34 of his paper he writes :

> "I am not sure if a relational unity, such as 'knowledge of object', is immediately felt, and is a prime datum. The immediate, in the sense of primary content or datum, may just be a 'This so-and-so', a chair, a table, a running bus."

This possibility I have touched in my note '(vi)' above. But whatever it may be, is it not after all a datum to reflection? Chattopadhyaya, of course, understands this reflection to be simple (psychological) introspection. What I, on the other hand, have understood it to be is different[1]. It is introspection understood in the Advaita or Sāṁkhya fashion as only a result

1. In this I have followed my father K. C. Bhattacharyya, to the extent I could then understand him.

of getting rid of the paradoxical unity *knowledge-of-object*– a sort of *transcendental* reflection which Kant, the phenomenologists and many others have started with.

Then, again, here, and in the next few lines, Chattopadhyaya has too easily identified (even psychological) introspection with 'conceptual formulation'. Conception is a relational *review*, which introspection is not.

(viii) On the same page he writes :

> " A view like this, I believe, cannot be rejected without a proper hearing, since it explains the so-called subject-object unity, a close unity of Professor Bhattacharyya's acceptance, in a much simpler way without the innovations of disjunctive or dialectical unities. "

Nobody need deny pre-reflective unity, though it need not necessarily be of the Bradleyan type. The unity that, in the book under consideration, I have been concerned with is post-reflective unity—how, in other words, when reflection has once exposed the contradiction involved one can consistently speak of their unity. In a way, indeed, the pre-reflective is the same thing as the post-reflective, but that is for one who has once passed through reflection. Did not Bradley too, in a way, admit these pre-and-post reflective stages ? And, once he at the reflective stage (which he calls the stage of thought) discovered sorts of contradiction, did he not resort to a sort of dialectical unity to account for the post-reflective unification, and did he not understand the stage of pre-reflective unity as a sort of imperfect, confused presentation ? Was his theory simpler than ours? Indeed, is any philosophy simpler in that sense ?

(ix) On page 35 he writes :

> " This 'one-ness' which is non-relational, and so not really any unity of 'sides', *reflexively* develops into a relational unity. "

First, what does Chattopadhyaya mean by 'reflexively'? Does he intend that to the relational unity, as a fact over there, there is some *objective* contribution of reflection as a form of subjectivity ? Or, does he mean that the relational unity is but *subjective* unification ? Obviously, he means neither of these. But then what is it? What is the exact contribution of reflection?

Secondly, if the pre-reflexive one-ness be no *unity* of two different things, like knowledge and object, how, *later in reflection*, could we say that it was somehow such a unity (however unintelligible) ? Wherefrom did they emerge at the reflective stage? The difficulty with Chattopadhyaya is that he has too easily taken reflection as a *conceptual* activity. Even Bradley who took it at the intermediate stage to be 'thought' took it ultimately for enlightened *immediate experience*.

(x) On the same page, a few lines later, he writes :

> " So the subject-object close unity which Prof. Bhattacharyya seeks to discover laboriously in certain innovated contexts is already presaged in the given experience, the pure *one-ness* of the to-be-developed act and the to-be-discovered content. "

First, I did not laboriously seek to discover the unity of subject and object. Even Chattopadhyaya's 'immediate experience' is what is found in reflection ('reflection' meaning here no *conceptual* ability) to be such a unity. Is not what is reflectively true, true also *in fact* ? This I have sought to explain in as convincing a manner as possible in many of my later writings (and nowhere have I taken reflection to be a conceptual activity). Chattopadhyaya's mature thought could well have avoided being so devastatingly critical of my first immature writing if he had gone through what I have written throughout my later life.

Secondly, are not 'to be developed' and 'to be discovered' only inverted images of the fact (that I have always insisted on) that what is discovered in reflection was already present at the

unreflective stage ? I have insisted too in my later writings that there is a difficulty, at the reflective stage, to understand how precisely the two sides, evident in reflection, could so peacefully co-exist at the unreflective stage. I refer the reader to Mohanty's paper on me.

(xi) On page 36 he writes :

> " In a conjunctive relation also .... ' subjectivity-object ' relationship clearly "

My reply would be as follows :

(*a*) My central point is that if the constituents contradict each other there cannot be conjunctive unity.

(*b*) My whole difficulty was with the problem how two contradictories could be conjointly united. Against Alexander my precise point was that he had missed their contradictory character—one as inward-looking (in the attitude of withdrawal, dissociation) and the other as that of from which the former seeks to get dissociated. (Of course, in those days I knew nothing of Husserl's phenomenology.) So far as I remember, in my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* I have refuted Alexander. Alexander glosses over the difficulty by a clever use of language. In fact he has admitted the very difficulty, though in the guise of a linguistic solution.

(*c*) When Chattopadhyaya writes, " ...... their contradiction or absolute incompatibility is not there given but is the result of...... ". This could be admitted if, and only if, the inwardness of subjectivity (knowledge) or, phenomenologically, its *sui generis* reference, its ' intention ' (in Kantian language, *a priori* anticipation), could be denied or lost sight of. But what is knowledge as consciousness if it is not knowledge of ......? I wonder how the Advaitin in Chattopadhyaya could miss this simple point.

(*d*) In my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* I have rarely brought in the concept of *self*. By ' subject ' or ' subjectivity '

I have meant—and that is more than evident—only knowing, i.e., the subjective side of the knowledge-of-object situation. Throughout the book, and very clearly indeed, I have used the two expressions ' knowledge-of-object situation ' and 'subjectivity-object situation ', synonymously.

(xii) From the next paragraph on, all that he has urged against me follows from his initial presupposition that the knowledge-known distinction is a *conceptual* rendering of the originally given immediate experience. How again, does he know that the knowledge-known relation was latent in " the original pure one-ness of act" ?

(xiii) My notion of ultimate alternation he has too easily repudiated without, I suspect, paying any serious attention to how I developed it. On pp. 37–38 he writes :

> " These two relations, one distinguishing one thing from another......apart from one another."
>
> again,
>
> " We all are used ......from the conceptual or meaning angle. "

It appears that he has not gone through any substantial portion of what I have written on ' ultimate alternation '. That constitutes at least two thirds of my book *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*. Chattopadhyaya has only too naively presented the theses which I took so much pains to develop.

Secondly, have I ever denied that knowledge and object come together ? I have always maintained that in reflection we discover them to have been definitely, though bafflingly, together at the unreflective level. Only, what more I have maintained is that this their coming together is unintelligible, because of their mutual antagonism evident in reflection; and what further more I have added is that what is found in reflection is accepted by all to have been the genuine reality, in whatever form it may have

been given pre-reflectively. Another point that I add now is that reflection is not necessarily a conceptual affair, not necessairly an act of *interpretation.*

(xiv) On p. 38 he writes :

" His thesis does not help us..before us for our choice."

But, rightly or wrongly, I have shown in great detail how synthesis is equally intelligible even in the case of the attitude which is fundamentally conative. I wonder how Chattopadhyaya could miss this point.

(xv) On page 39 he writes :

" ....each realising the three attitudes, subjective, objective and dialectic in terms of .... modes of objective presentation. "

I cannot follow what precisely he means here.

The last but one sentence of this paragraph he ends with a sort of eulogy like " stupendous power of analysis and forceful *logical construction*" (italics mine). For me, however, it was no *logical construction.* Why give a bad name to a dog and then hang it ?

(xvi) He begins the next paragraph as :

" The attitudes that he speaks of are all post-reflective."

I cannot follow what he intends by the expression 'post-reflective'. Does he mean 'conceptual' ? But that I have never meant.

(xvii) He writes again in the same paragraph :

" The subjective attitude and the objective attitude are......"

No. Reflection is as *sui generis* as original presentation. Indeed, reflection, as I have understood it, is introspectional presentation; nothing all-conceptual, and need not contain even a fragment of conceptual construction.

When I wrote the book *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, I knew, I repeat, nothing of phenomenology. Phenomenology, undoubtedly, is a sort of synthesis of withdrawal and forward-looking attitude. But, decidedly, its basic standpoint is withdrawal reduction or *epoche*. There are grades of withdrawal. At no stage in the progressive phenomenological *epoche* is there any genuine synthesis of subjectivity and object. (If only I had then known phenomenology I would have written the book in a new fashion the content however remaining the same.)

The papers "Philosophy and Metaphilosophy" of Bhatnagar and "Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy of Alternative Absolutes" by N. K. Sharma are as much, on the whole, good expositions of my different theses as unsparing criticisms, at the same time, of some of them, which few, however, have, unfortunately, formed vital parts of my work. In fact, these two participants have given me the severest jolt. I congratulate them, they have, on the whole, raised very relevant points against me; and it is mostly by way of defending my theses against their very relevant and trenchant criticism that through the first three sections of 'My Reaction' I have re-stated my entire philosophy as strongly and carefully, as it has been possible for me. Normally, after all that I have written in those sections I do not feel I am under any obligation to reply to their charges in detail. Yet some of these I take up for rapid disposal here.

(i) On p. 68, for example, in his paper Bhatnagar writes :

"For example, take his use........ challenged from outside the system."

But what is the harm if I use a certain term in a clearly stated sense—and not only that, in a sense in which it is also used by many others? How, otherwise, could Bhatnagar follow me all through?

(ii) On the same page, he writes further :

"Normally postulates are understood......given certain rules of inference."

But have I not said exactly this, and in a clearer way?

(iii) He writes again :

"Thus as propositions they have ......of strategy alone."

In this sense I would also never deny their 'having cognitive import'.

(iv) He continues :

"Now it is no sin ...... makes things easier." Have I said anything very different?

(v) Again :

"The position of epistemic presupposition as postulate is not at all clear......"

Have I not made it sufficiently clear? If not, I refer Bhatnagar to what I have written in Sections II and III of 'My Reaction'.

(vi) Again :

"...... but it is equally difficult ...... subject matter of metaphysics."

Why not clear? Refer, further, to Sections II and III of 'My Reaction'.

(vii) The last sentence of this paragraph runs as :

"Even if 'self-consciousness' ...... aspect of a postulate?"

First, I have never maintained that epistemology is exactly as non-committal as postulates are.

Secondly, 'self-consciousness' means here *reflective use*. So, where lies the difficulty? Further, there is no deduction except in the sense that if you accept the postulates and certain data (the metaphysical concepts) the *system of metaphysics* stands constructed.

(viii) In the next paragraph he writes :

" We, however, cannot rest ...... their respective disciplines".

I would reply :

First, why should we give up the idea of metastudy altogether? Epistemology *is* a meta-study of metaphysics. Secondly, metaphysics is not meta exactly in the sense in which epistemology is meta. Metaphysics deals with another order of reality, called transcendent. Thirdly, any study belonging to a higher order than that to which another study belongs need not be, for that reason only, meta in relation to that other study. Metaphysics, for example, though at a level higher than that of sciences, is no meta study *of those sciences.* At least that I have very explicitly denied. Fourthly, even metaphysics is not 'self-reflexive'. The only self-reflexive study is epistemology, and, as I have repeatedly claimed, it is as much meta-metaphysics as meta-(classical) science. Fifthly, though in so far as science is ratiocinative and theorizing it is reflective, it is not essentially self-evidencingly intuitive. Epistemology is definitely so, though not committed to any specific type of reality; and metaphysics is so but as committed to a type of reality.

(ix) In the last but one paragraph he writes :

" The question of territorial rights ...... concerned with them. "

There is not much of difference between philosophy (Metaphysics) and religion. Science, in a way, constructs its basic concepts, but philosophy takes these as they are there.

As for N. K. Sharma, his central reaction to my concepts of ultimate alternatives is :

" After carefully reading his book, I am tempted to believe that where he is in agreement with the Jains he is right, but where he differs from them his position is not sound."

In Sections I and III of 'My Reaction' I have clearly noted where precisely I differ from the Jain position and yet why I consider my thesis as sound.

As for details of N. K. Sharma's criticism and my replies :

(i) On p. 58 he writes :

"If he had attended this system......would have been forced to modify his system considerably."

I have shown in 'My Reaction' why I do not feel forced that way.

(ii) On p. 59 he writes :

"The word they use as connective..........a complete picture of it."

Precisely here I beg to differ with the Jains, if by '*ca*' and 'and' they intend that the different standpoints that by themselves were limited come to be freed of such limitations in the *kevalin's* total view. In the relevant Section of 'My Reaction' I have confessed that I am not sure if this was the true Jaina view, if, in other words, in the *kevalin's* view the partial truths are simply added upon one another into a total view. There I have rather claimed that Jaina kevalism is intelligible in quite another way not far different from how I have tried to understand the very alternation *of the different ultimate alternatives.* Kevalism is no mechanical aggregation.

(iii) On pp. 59–60 he writes :

"But here we may ask him whether......satisfied with these different alternatives."

What he writes here is almost entirely acceptable to me. With but this difference : I am now prepared to admit—what I did not admit in so many words in my *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* but have admitted clearly in Sections I and II of 'My Reaction'—that to admit several alternatives is also to transcend these alternatives. To say that ultimately there are so

many alternatives is not itself another alternative co-ordinate with them. What this position exactly is I have tried to clarify in the Sections mentioned above of 'My Reaction'. I confess, however, I am not sure about what exactly the Jains mean. But I have examined all possible interpretations.

(iv) In the next paragraph he writes :

> "Professor Bhattacharyya's attitude thus appears to be that of an agnostic...... It may involve ignorance, most probably it does."

I have hever held, and shall never, hold that it involves ignorance. What I intended is that nothing that is positive and co-ordinate with these alternatives is superior to, i.e., in any respect better than, any of these. And now, as I have shown in the relevant Sections of 'My Reaction', I am prepared only to admit that the awareness of the ultimate alternatives as alternatives transcends them. As so transcendent it is just the awareness (and absolutely nothing in addition) that these are the ultimate alternatives.

(v) On p. 60 he writes :

> "If this is incompleteness ......"

But have I ever said in so many words that this *is* incompleteness ? What much I have claimed is that if anybody calls it incompleteness, even then there is no way out to something that he might call complete.

(vi) In the next paragraph he has claimed that disjunction can be true, if at all, of appearance only, never of reality. My reply is as follows :

I have never said categorically that disjunction is true of appearance only. What I have said is that if anybody confines it to *appearance* then it is such a type of appearance that from it there is no way out to something else called 'reality'.

Secondly, if there is no way out of it, why should one at all call it 'appearance' ? The only acceptable way it could still

be called appearance would be the one of the Mādhyamika Buddhists, the reality or the Absolute there being complete non-commital, *madhyapanthā*, which again, is, in fact, none other than these alternatives constituting the appearance world.

(vii) In the same paragraph he writes :

> " Having accepted the thesis of an agnostic one cannot escape the conclusion ...... "

But I have never accepted any agnostic thesis. What I have held is that reality alternates among different theses. I have never meant that it is something completely other than—either co-ordinate with or even transcending—these alternatives.

(viii) On p. 62 he writes :

> " Here the concept of unity is ...... is a relation. "

What I have contended is just the opposite, viz., that disjunctive unity is non-relational, predication there being neither itself a factual relation nor representative of any. Even granting N. K. Sharma's point that " even disunity is a relation ", what does he gain thereby ? He writes, " Mere occurrence of two terms in a judgement cannot be called a unity ". But then what is it ? What does he mean by ' verbal unity ' ? Does he mean that there is even no unification ? I cannot quite follow him.

When he asks, " In what meaningful way, then, can the two or rather three alternative absolutes of Prof. Bhattacharyya be said to be united ? " My reply is " United, because (i) the union is not merely verbal and (ii) because it is disjunctive."

(ix) Towards the end of the next paragraph he asks :

> " But would it then not amount to saying only that the two stand disunited ? "

When A rejects B, or in any meaningful way negates it, there is a sort of *unity* of A with the absence of B in so far as we respond neither to A as it is in itself nor to mere absence of B but to ' A in the context of the absence of B ', i.e., to ' A in which B is

absent', or to 'the absence of B (or to absent B) in so far as it obtains in A'. May not what I call 'disjunctive unity' be understood this way ?

(x) In the last paragraph he writes :

"He also ends his philosophy ...... reality as it is."

Have I ? I have only maintained that beyond the disjuncts there is no third entity or that if there were one it could not be known. What he says in his last but one sentence I cannot follow. If only the different attitudes could be transcended and the transcendent could be posited as it is in itself, only then could one speak of 'validity' that is more than *attitude*. But my central contention has always been that either there is no transcendence at all or that there is no *such* transcendence. In either case the different attitudes are all self-complete, none ever felt as partial.

As for Mrs. Yogesh Gupta, she has raised many pertinent questions in replying to which I had to re-think some of my basic theses I developed in the first chapeter of my *Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy*, and though, fortunately, I find that I do not have to alter them I have yet to clarify and substantiate them once again. She has divided her paper into four sections. I will also reply section by section.

I. She almost begins with saying "...... the main issue which motivates the author to write is to save metaphysics from the attack of logical positivists and establish it as a second-order ...... inquiry." Undoubtedly, the logical positivists were in my mind, but I never thought that my main task was to silence them, nor was my notion of 'second-order inquiry' just a defence-mechanism in that struggle. That metaphysics *is* a second-order inquiry was the main point I was driving at, irrespective of what the logical positivists and their kinsfold had said or not, and I believe that in my book I did establish it to the best of my ability. If I used it there against the whole group of positivistic thinkers, this is all because it was the handiest of weapons.

It follows that neither my clear-cut "distinction between study and meta-study" nor the one "between science and philosophy" which is based on it was just *designed* for "achieving this end", viz., to silence these positivistic thinkers.


She then comes to her main point. She asks me to throw more light on the status-differences (i) of physical, psychological, anthropological and social science *vis-a-vis* one another, (ii) of these sciences on the one hand and logic, mathematics, metaphysics and epistemology (the last two together called philosophy) on the other, and (iii) between the second-level studies like logic, mathematics and metaphysics on the one hand and the third-level study, viz. epistemology, on the other. Her question, in other words, is whether these studies, horizontally coplaner or vertically hierarchical, could not in whatever manner *supplement one another*, and if not, whether they are all to be hierarchically arranged, which latter would mean that there is either the mere relation of alternation between them (an oblique reference, incidentally, to my favourite notion of alternation !) or on relation whatsoever, i.e., no relevant context whatsoever for considering them together.

My reply—a thesis already developed in the chapter of my book under consideration—is as follows :

(*a*) Studies like physical, biological and anthropological sciences—the later including psychology and social sciences—which all deal with empirical situations and are horizontally coplaner, do always supplement one another. It is only in their case that I have spoken of 'division of labour'. That they supplement one another means that their provinces add up to one unitary reality we call Nature or empirical world.

(*b*) But between these empirical sciences, on the one hand, and logic, mathematics, metaphysics and epistemology (the last two *together* often called 'philosophy'), on the other, the relation is one of hierarchy, every higher rung of the ladder being

meta relatively to the lower. Logic, mathematics and philosophy are (coplaner) *meta* studies of various presuppositions of the empirical sciences; and as between metaphysics and epistemology, the relation is that epistemology is *meta*-metaphysics. The distinction between logic and mathematics on the one hand and metaphysics on the other is that while the former two study one kind of presuppositions of the empirical sciences, metaphysics studies another kind of pre-suppositions. In my *Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy* I have thoroughly discussed the two kinds of presuppositions. I have also discussed there the type of 'Presuppositions of metaphysics' that epistemology studies. The whole hierarchy would therefore look like :



Now, if A, B and C are in a hierarchy they are never meant to form one comprehensive study like the genuine interdisciplinary 'physics *cum* biology *cum* anthropological and social sciences'. The provinces of these latter add up to one Nature, the one subject-matter, though divided among different scholars merely for the sake of convenience. But, for all studies called 'Science' (in the sense in which I have used the term in my original essay), the provinces of the different studies at different levels of the hierarchy do not add up and expand that Nature any farther; nor do these latter studies together form any other intelligible unitary complete study with a genuine subject-matter.

The relation between a study and the corresponding meta-study is like that between a form distinguished and the total homogeneous complex from out of which that form came to be livingly abstracted. Forms are living abstractions : when abstracted they demand an original status of their own, a sort of autonomy, and

can be, and are as a matter of fact, studied on their own account. At a lower level, on the other hand, from where they came to be distinguished they stood as homogeneously fused with contents. Thus, though forms could be recognised and studied by themselves, contents never have that privilege. There is no pinpointable content said to be distinguished from the originaly given whole; it can at most be spoken of indefinitely as "What remains over after forms are distinguished in the given whole", but can in no way be tackled bodily, i.e., by itself. This is what is meant when it is said that forms *transcend* the given whole that is Nature. Since content as such has no pinpointable status one can never use the formula 'form + content = reality', because there is no distinct content for the form to foist upon, nor a form for a distinct content to run up to and embrace. Tnis is what I mean by 'meta-study'. Another name of it is 'transcendental study'. All these I have developed systematically in my article 'The Nature of Reflection in Metaphysics' in *Philosophy, Logic and Language.*

Is not at least the relation of metaphysics to epistemology an exception to the rule? Have I not myself, one may point out, said in so many words in the first chapter of my *Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy* that metaphysics and epistemology, taken together, are called 'Philosophy'? What, however, I really intended there is that those who use the term in that sense do not know what precisely they mean. Either it is only a historical accident that the word has meant both (for, before Kant, or even before Descartes, no one thought of distinguishing epistemology as a systematic study of the original status and movements of pure subjectivity, often called Thought or Reason, from metaphysics as the study of transcendent(al) reals) or, as I myself have suggested in that chapter, this pure subjectivity (= Thought = Reason) has another sort of *reality*, the two realities, viz. the realities of transcendent(al) object and trans-

cendent(al) subject being, as realities, identical in status and, therefore, permitting mutual supplementation. One may very well object to this identification. But then the position would be as follows :

If of the two reals A and B, A as an explanatory principle of B belongs to a higher—a meta-level, what it all means is :

(i) B may well remain satisfied with itself all through, and at its own level, with even no curiosity for A *as A* (though concerned all the while with A as undistinguishedly fused in that, i.e., in B), but concerned very much, and quite definitely, with the associate members at its own lower level, using them as justifying grounds of its own existence and relevance.

(ii) A may well remain satisfied with itself, without any concern for B except at most as that damned fusion it has freed itself from.

(iii) Out of a sort of metaphysical generosity A may stoop to show how B (and its associates at that lower level) depends for its broad categorial structures and functions on that A.

However, in none of these three possible alternatives is there anywhere any question of adding up, or even organizing, many 'constituents' into one whole. Obviously not in (i) and (ii). That we have the same non-supplementation in (iii) too is evident from the fact that the structures and functions spoken of there are all forms as distinguished and we have seen that by the side of such forms contents never stand as defined constituents, no matter whether the whole to be formed be a mechanical or an organic one. To say that before the forms are distinguished in their autonomy there *was* after all a whole (from out of which they were distinguished) would not help, for in that whole there was no form as form. This, precisely, is the characteristic feature of the relation between a lower level and one that is meta.

I am prepared to call each of the three relations in (i), (ii) and (iii) one of alternation, though they are three different

forms of alternation, and these three forms of alternation themselves, in their turn, alternate among themselves. I regret I did not discuss this point in the original essay.

One may, of course, object still and point to any living body as the organic *unity* of life and matter. Well, in that case I would reply that life is no entity at a level that is higher in the sense of being *meta*. For, life as such cannot be distinguished in its autonomy as forms are, even though it may not be exhausted in matter. There can never be a systematic study of different life principles considered by themselves and apart from all consideration of matter in the way we have meta studies like pure mathematics, logic and metaphysics.

All the difficulties are still not over. Mrs. Gupta might ask : if there are different studies at the same meta-level-studies like logic, mathematics and metaphysics—may they not *supplement* one another? My reply to this would be as follows :

Mathematics and Logic as the study of *postulates* (in my sense, i.e., as *mere* working principles, as mere useful devices, but only in so far as they are basic principles) may well supplement each other and grow, in diverse ways, into one grand discipline. Yet, correspondingly to this we do not come across any grand *reality*. Indeed, as I have understood these two disciplines in my original essay, the subject matter of neither of them is any *reality* none of the pure logical and mathematical propositions represent any *fact* anywhere.

I admit that in my original essay I overlooked what is known as 'intuitionist mathematics' and, similarly, tne old Aristotelian logic which may well be called 'intuitional logic'. The basic concepts of these two studies do indeed represent *realities*, though of a higher order, and when through thinking manipulation these studies develop from out of these basic realities elaborate systems, these systems too are somehow considered as real, and real of that higher order. But, then, such mathematics and

logic, in so far as they are concerned directly with space, time, number, etc., and with our *actual* ways of thinking, could well be integrated with metaphysics (and even with epistemology in so far as its subject-matter too is understood as reals of a sort), though they would largely fly tangentially off it in that most of the constructions they indulge in are just *methods* (though not 'merely instrumental' in any ghostly manner) which metaphysics (and even epistemology) might, whenever necessary, *use* but not contemplate. Intuitionist mathematics and logic might be taken as *specialization* in some of the basic facts with which metaphysics is broadly concerned.

II. The second section of her paper too she (almost) begins with saying that according to me "presuppositions which demand a meta-level are in the form of axioms, postulates, heuristic principles or *empirical facts* as well as facts of a higher order" (italics mine). No, I have never included any sort of empirical facts among such postulates.

She next complains that in my original essay I have "given importance to and discussed only one type of presuppositions of science, that is, those which are facts of another order." Well, if I have done that, this is because I was interested there in the single problem of the relation between science and metaphysics (philosophy). I may add that incidentally in that connexion I also studied—and that too quite elaborately—the general nature of another type of presuppositions of science, viz. postulates and axioms, and had shown their difference from postulates that are facts (reals) of another (higher) order.

When she asks whether metaphysics as meta-science has or has not "the right to study all sorts of presuppositions of Science" my reply, which I have spared no pain to make absolutely clear in that essay, is a straight 'No'. There I have shown elaborately enough that meta-physics studies only one particular type of presuppositions of science. Other types of presuppositions are

studied in other disciplines, viz., formal mathematics, modern formal logic and another discipline which I have called 'modern science' as distinguished from classical science. In that connexion I have shown that while classical science is concerned all along with natural (empirical) reals—its *theories* being almost (or, at least, attempted) exact pictures of Nature—modern science, as more self-conscious, belongs to a higher (meta) level co-ordinately with metaphysics. I meant that while metaphysics studies the 'fact'—presuppositions of science, modern science studies the axioms, postulates and even the methods of that classical science. Indeed, modern science is ever-increasingly all *theory* or *system of theories*, i.e. an axiomatic—of course, with the governing touch somewhere of Nature but not *presenting*, i.e., picturing, that Nature (in its correct features) entirely, or even largely. That way it is continuous with mathematics and logic as I have understood these two in my original essay. There I have considered only 'formal mathematics' and the 'modern-day formal logic', not the 'intuitional' ones. I admit it was a defect on my part not to have considered intuitionist mathematics and Aristotelian logic. This is why I have maintained in that original essay that mathematics and logic—meaning formal ones—, when they grow more and more self-conscious, may come very near to the third-level study, viz., epistemology, and could even identify themselves with it, if not for the fact, which I too have claimed, that the pure thought (Reason) which epistemology studies may eventually claim a sort of *reality* which they would never claim. The same is the story with *modern science* too: growing more and more self-conscious it may, that way, come very near to epistemology and yet fall short of it exactly for the same reason. Mrs. Gupta, I am sorry to say, has been considerably misled by my leaning over much toward formal mathematics and logic to the exclusion of the intuitionist ones. But I may be excused, seeing that the latter are, in modern days rapidly receding in favour of the former.

It follows that many of the points which she has raised later in this second section of her paper are off the marks. I turn only to those few which require answering.

(*a*) She objects to my use of the phrase 'presuppositions of science' and suggests instead that here 'Science' should be 'Sciences'. But what is the harm if I use the word in the singular number, seeing that all the sciences (except mathematics and logic, if they are sciences) are studies of Nature, i.e., of the empirical world, precisely, for which reason they are called 'science'. The word 'science' may indeed be used in a broader sense as indicating any systematic study. But I have not used the word in that sense. My aim was to understand the exact difference (as far as possible) between empirical and transcendental study. One may deny transcendence, but before that he must understand what precisely is meant by it. I have done that and, in addition, defended and further developed this transcendence.

(*b*) As for life, psyche, etc., they are studied in metaphysics quite in the way space and time are studied there. When life-sciences study them what they do is only to study the behaviours (not covered by the physical sciences) that, in different cases, *presuppose* (in the way space, time, etc., are presupposed in physical sciences) these concepts. In life-Sciences these concepts are just employed (and clarified only that much as is required by such employment), not studied in their own interest. *Life*, *psyche*, etc., are only working concepts there.

(*d*) She writes, "According to the author" (meaning me) these are acquired or inferred ...... at the unreflective level."

No, this is not what I mean by 'reflective consciousness'. What I mean I have already stated in connexion with *form* and *matter*, both in the present answer-paper and more elaborately, in my article, 'The Nature of Reflection in Metaphysics'. She does not notice that the act of distinguishing to which she refers so many times in her few lines of comment is, as I have under-

stood it in my original essay, no discursive thinking at all, neither inferring nor anything of the sort.

Regarding the next few sentences in the same paragraph, in her paper, I refer her again to my article 'The Nature of Reflection in Metaphysics'. In metaphysics there is no question of understanding any (empirical) phenomenon: such understanding, however necessary elsewhere is no task of metaphysics. Meta-physics does not want to explain Nature through intellect only, i.e., by means merely of analysis, inference and theorization as science does. It seeks to *discover* the informing principles of Nature, and with more and more attention paid to such discovery it grows more and more reflective and consequently clearer and clearer and more and more detailed. This is why there is no finality here too. What is more interesting is that at every step of discovery, indistinct or distinct, it is *ipso facto* the discovery of a *system* of different items. The system, in other words, stands *presented* at every step of discovery, though in progressive clarity and distinctness, not *constructed intellectually*. 'Better and better systems' means that the system is more and more clearly—and therefore also more and more comprehensively—*discovered*. It is only *after* such discovery has taken place that intellect with its paraphernalia of analysis, inference, theorization, etc., comes in order either to convince *others* (or in some cases to persuade them, though strongly enough) or erect a bulwork of defence round what has been discovered or demolish contrary accounts.

When, therefore, she writes, "A philosopher as a metaphysician must have the freedom to posit or imagnine what might in principle be taken to exist in the world ......" my only reply is that in metaphysics (and epistemology) such positing is only secondary and always hanging on to the *discovery* (however faint or clear) of the system.

So far as methodology is concerned I have not differed much from Aristotle or Kant, except that unlike Kant I take the cate-

gories to be real and knowable. Except for this, has not Kant clearly spoken of 'transcendental reflection' and has he not, in that connexion, put hypothesis in its proper place?

III. After what I have said so far my comments on her points raised in the third section of her paper necessarily shink into the following :

(*a*) The same term used in classical science (say, classical physics) and modern science (modern physics) does not always mean the same thing. For example, while for classical science space, time, etc., are exactly as we have them in our daily life, only understood analytically and more throughly, for modern science they are ghostly extensions of these, the extensions continuing as far as they are needed for constructing a most efficient system. In other words, in modern science they are only working concepts (postulates, in the sense in which I have used the term), taking their cue from the corresponding intuited space, time-etc., but expanding themselves as far as, and in whatever direction, needed in order that the newly postulated (constructed) concepts may work as satisfactorily as possible for building as good systems as possible.

This reformulation, in modern science, of the day-to-day concepts is qualitatively different from the way they were formulated in classical science. In the latter they are first stated clearly, in order that if any extrinsic concepts have been mixed up with them these are detached and formulated separately—of course, all in defined interconnexion. All this, however, is done, even there, with the same purpose of *using* these concepts, not for studying them in their own interest. In this aspect of *use*, the classical science and modern science sail in the same boat; only classical science does not tear itself violently from the corresponding common notions, which precisely modern science does. Modern science is a sort of *theoretical technology*, its only purpose being success by whatever means. Classical Science, thus, is

my reply is simple. Yes, there are such disciplines, and we may very well talk about them; but they are not meta-studies for that reason, because, as already said, they themselves develop into these. The Frankensteinian technology is unendingly self-examining, self-correcting and self-developing.

Toward the end of her paper she asks an excellent question; "Are all of the self-correcting dominions autonomous........" i.e., not sometimes interrelated ? I reply, they are autonomous unless and until you discover relations between them. Such relation there certainly is between (formal) logic and (formal) mathematics. What such logic and mathematics deal with are all postulates (in my sense) and they easily and quitely glide from one region to the other yielding a more comprehensive meta-study but—and this has to be particularly noted—*at the very same level.* But between logic and epistemology there is no such smooth passage. For the presuppositions of metaphysics, with which epistemology is concerned, are none of them postulates (in my sense). Further as I have already maintained, epistemology claims a sort of reality of the things it deals with, which (formal) logic and mathematics never do. Mrs. Gupta writes in this connexion, "Traditionally Logic is treated as one of the branches of epistemology". What I can clarify in this connexion is that I have been using the term 'epistemology' in the Kantian sense of 'theory of knowledge' where knowledge is not taken as an empirical phenomenon or a set of empirical psychological phenomena.

To what she writes at the end of her paper my reply is: metaphysics is self-correcting but not self-developing because it is concerned with facts and does not deal with postulates (in my sense). Further, as I have already shown, if metaphysics needs logic's help that help is all *ab extra.* Epistemology, on the other hand, is self-conscious and self-developing, because it deals with postulates, and these postulates are ultimately also

facts (reals). The last point I would like to emphasise in this connexion is that metaphysics bears in no way on postulational (formal) logic, although it is on the same footing with—perhaps comprehends, though partly (this I have already discussed in this paper)—intuitionists logic and mathematics.

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